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Chapter One
The European Community and the Irish/Northern Irish 
Cross-border Relationship: Theoretical Framework
In tro d u c tio n
M eandering for 400 kilometres, the Irish border dem arcates the line 
between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. It is a fine line 
which cuts through villages and towns. Like m any land borders, there is 
scarcely a difference apparent betw een the 'black slanting' hills of 
Donegal and those which frame D erry / Londonderry, nor between the 
quiet melancholy of M onaghan and that of Omagh. Yet the conflict in 
Northern Ireland has both reflected and reinforced the significance of 
the land border, making it more than a physical line, but a line which 
represents deep and old political division. The result of this division is 
that there has been only limited economic cross-border co-operation 
and even less political co-operation. The aim of this thesis is to 
examine the effect of the European Com m unity upon the economic 
and political relationship between Northern Ireland and the Republic 
of Ireland, that is upon  the Ir ish /N o rth e rn  Irish cross-border 
relationship.
In examining the EC's effect upon the Irish/N orthern  Irish cross- 
border relationship, the theoretical aim is to test the validity of neo­
functionalist theory of integration in the Irish /N orthern  Irish case. 
Neo-functionalism proposes that the existence of common economic 
interests leads to econom ic co-operation betw een neighbouring  
regions. Such econom ic co-operation then leads to political co­
operation, even betw een regions which have experienced historic 
political tensions. N orthern Ireland and the Republic are examples of 
such regions. Moreover, they have been members of the EC since 1973. 
The questions addressed by this thesis are whether there is evidence 
that the EC has increased economic co-operation between these two 
regions and w hether or not any resultant economic co-operation has 
led to political co-operation.
The impetus for this study was derived from the resurgence of 
neo-functionalism as result of the ratification of the Single European 
Act in 1987. This act included specific policy changes which were 
p articu larly  re levan t to the I r ish /N o rth e rn  Irish  cross-border 
relationship. For example, the move tow ards the creation of a Single 
European Market im plied a degree of policy harm onisation between 
EC states and aim ed to abolish economic boundaries between states. 
By implication, the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic 
would also be the object of harmonisation policies.
M oreover, because the creation of a single m arket w ould  
accentuate the economic difficulties experienced by weaker economies 
in the EC (NESC, 1989, p. 526), the Single Act included the provision for 
a significant regional policy reform. The subsequent 1988 reform  
entailed the identification of the weakest regional economies in the EC 
and pledged to concentrate an increased am ount of EC regional aid 
upon a small num ber of most deprived areas. Both the Republic and 
N orthern  Ireland were identified as priority  regions and successful 
applications for regional aid in order to pursue a given project w ould 
receive a maximum of 75 per cent of total cost.
EC m oney w as also provided specifically for cross-border 
programmes which would be implemented by two adjoining regions of 
two EC states. Until 1993, Northern Ireland was the only priority, so- 
called  O bjective O ne, reg ion  w ith in  the  U n ited  K ingdom . 
Automatically, the Republic and N orthern Ireland were perceived by 
EC policy m akers to share common economic interests. The EC 
appeared  to be w illing to provide economic incentives for cross- 
border co-operation on the basis of these interests.
According to neo-functionalists, these common interests will 
lead to increased economic cross-border co-operation, which, in turn, 
w ill lead  to increased  political co-operation. Politic ians also 
em phasised that the Single Act of 1987 and the 1988 regional policy 
reform had significant implications for the Irish /N orthern  Irish cross- 
border relationship. For example, John Hume, leader of the nationalist 
Social Democratic and  Labour Party (SDLP), has em phasised the 
anachronistic nature of the conflict in N orthern Ireland in the new 
Europe of the regions.1 Charles H aughey, then Irish Taoiseach, 
em phasised  the econom ic logic of increased cross-border co­
operation in the new SEM.2
In this way, the case of the N orthern Irish /Irish  cross-border 
relationship is not a case apart in EC politics, but rather is a critical test- 
case of neo-functionalism. The conflict in N orthern Ireland and the 
poor relationship betw een N orthern Ireland and the Republic are 
obstacles to the attainm ent of full European Union. As long as two 
regions, no matter how  small, are in conflict, the validity of integration 
theory and the success of the European Com munity are limited. The
1 Hume, J., (1989), interview, RTE radio, News at One, 12.11.1989.
2 Haughey, C. J., speech to Fianna Fail Ard Fheis (Annual Conference), March 1991.
aim of this thesis is to determine whether or not the move towards a 
Single European Market and EC regional policy reform have increased 
economic and political cross-border co-operation betw een N orthern 
Ireland and the Republic. Can neo-functionalism be validated by the 
developm ent of the cross-border relationship in Ireland, or does the 
evidence prov ided  by this relationship  falsify neo-functionalist 
assumptions? That is the core theoretical question of this thesis.
The time frame used to answer this question is the relatively 
short period from 1988 to 1993. This period is examined, because it 
m arks the initiation of the aforem entioned EC policy changes. 
However, in chapter two, empirical evidence is provided of the unco­
operative Irish /N orthern  Irish economic cross-border relationship 
which existed for the period 1925 to the 1980s. The possibility is 
highlighted that this political relationship was changing because of the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement, which was signed by the British and Irish 
governments in 1985.
In subsequent chapters, the degree of co-operation between key 
actors on both sides of the border from 1988 to 1993 is determined. The 
behaviour of civil servants (chapter four), economic elites (chapter five), 
m em bers of the European Parliam ent (EP) (chapter six) and local 
councillors (chapter seven) is of key concern, because these sub­
national actors are im portant actors in the domestic environm ent of 
N orthern Ireland and the Republic. The specific policy sectors which I 
examine are those where common economic interests are perceived to 
exist, namely, agriculture, tourism and transport.3
In chapter three, the role of EC institu tions in increasing 
Irish /N orthern  Irish cross-border co-operation is examined. The policy 
changes of 1988 are discussed in greater depth and then the response 
of the European Parliam ent and the European Com mission to the 
conflict in N orthern Ireland and to the weak Irish/N orthern  Irish cross- 
border relationship is determ ined. All of these case study  chapters 
(three, four, five, six and seven) are based upon interviews which were 
conducted between 1991 and 1993 with relevant actors. Reports, texts 
and EC documents were also used. In conclusion, an analysis of the 
case study findings in the light of neo-functionalist theory is provided.
In this chapter, the rationale for embarking upon a study of the 
Irish /N orthern  Irish cross-border relationship is provided. In section
3 See Appendix 1.
one, neo-functionalism is examined in greater depth and it is shown 
how  neo-functionalism  is, at heart, concerned w ith m anaging and 
containing conflict and assumes that although conflict is inevitable, 
E uropean peace and integration is not. Neo-functionalism  is thus, 
central to the conflict in N orthern  Ireland and to the cross-border 
relationship. In section two, attention is paid to the m eaning of co­
operation and the relevance of its application to the Irish /N orthern  
Irish relationship. Also in section two, it is shown that the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement (AIA), which was signed in 1985, may be the main influence 
upon the cross-border co-operation, as opposed to the EC.
C onsequently , in section three, the concept of coercive 
consociationalism is examined as an explanation of the AIA and as a 
theory which is relevant to the Irish /N orthern  Irish cross-border 
relationship. It is shown how  coercive consociationalism and neo­
functionalism  complement each other, but are based upon different 
assum ptions. In section four, the various hypotheses w hich  
international relations theory provides are sum m arised and different 
predictions as to how the EC has affected the cross-border relationship 
for the years 1988 to 1993 are laid out.
i. The Irish/Northern Irish Cross-border Relationship: A Critical 
Test of Neo-functionalism
The existence of conflict in Northern Ireland and the closely related 
weakness of the cross-border Irish /N orthern  Irish relationship is an 
obvious hindrance to European integration. It also poses questions for 
integration theorists. Such theorists have sought to determine the path 
to peaceful change. This concern for maintaining peace and for healing 
old w ounds is often lost in various descriptions of the technicalities EC 
policy and institutions. Before neo-functionalism  is exam ined, it is 
necessary to highlight its roots, so as to isolate its fundamental concern, 
a tta in ing  peace. This concern m akes neo-functionalism  of key 
relevance to the Irish/N orthern  Irish cross-border relationship.
The intellectual pre-history of neo-functionalism
Neo-functionalism attem pts to grapple w ith the ancient problem  of 
conflict. However, it is bu t a descendent of an equally old debate 
betw een idealists and realists. O lder studies provide a necessary 
perspective and enrich an appreciation of the more m odern theories of 
co-operation. Indeed, it is these older theories, written with a sense of 
immediacy in the aftermath of war, that transform the study of cross- 
border co-operation in one small region into a question of universal 
significance: W hat are the causes of w ar and peace? Thus, neo­
functionalists are concerned not sim ply w ith  determ ining  w hat 
increases co-operation between states, but, m ore fundam entally with 
w hat prevents the outbreak of war. In the Irish /N orthern  Irish case, 
then, neo-functionalists are concerned not simply with increasing co­
operation between the two regions, but with the question of how  to 
resolve the existing conflict in Northern Ireland and how to prevent the 
spread of such conflict across the border at a later date.
T hus, in te rn a tio n a l re la tions th eo ris ts , in c lud ing  neo ­
functionalists, attem pted to explain these wider problems of w ar and 
conflict. These explanations fell into two schools: idealism and realism. 
Neo-functionalism is the modern day branch of the idealist school. The 
first idealists date back to the early seventeenth century, but they are 
perhaps best remembered for stimulating the creation of the League of 
Nations in 1923. The basic premise upon which idealists based their 
case was that humans do not want to go to w ar and that war between 
states can be avoided through the use of international arbitration and 
the rule of law. If states have an institution to which they can turn in the 
event of perceived injustice, then interstate conflict can be channelled 
through peaceful means towards a resolution.
Idealism 's zenith appeared to be in 1928, w hen the General 
Treaty for the Renunciation of War was signed at Locarno. It appeared 
that there was then a m eans of independently  ad judicating all 
international disputes. However, the collapse of the League of Nations, 
heralded infamously by Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia in 1936, provoked 
a realist backlash amongst analysts of international relations.
The basic realist assum ption was that conflict was inherent in 
hum an life. Politics was said to be governed by objective laws which 
had their roots in nature. The basic law approximates to the Hobbesian 
view where every individual fears that the other will attem pt to attack
h im /h e r. Consequently, each ind iv idual builds up  h is /h e r  ow n 
defences. In international politics, this defence entails the maximisation 
of state pow er in the international system. International law  "is 
divorced altogether from ethics ... It is an expression of the will of the 
state and it is used by those who control the state as an instrum ent of 
coercion against those who oppose their power" (Carr, 1981, p. 176).
For realists power was anything that established and m aintained 
an individual state's control over other states. In practice, realists 
argued that effective power was military force. Moreover, the pursuit of 
power served each state's interest. It was the individual self-interest of 
states w hich was said to dom inate in ternational politics: "An 
Englishman never forgets that the nation which lets its duty get on the 
opposite side to its interest, is lost" (Shaw, quoted in Carr, 1981, p. 94). 
There was a pessimistic view of hum an nature in the realist argum ent 
and acceptance of the inevitability of war.
A pplying the realist argum ent to N orthern  Ireland and the 
Republic, the proposition w ould be that the conflict in N orthern  
Ireland, w hilst ostensibly about constitutional sta tus and  w hilst 
reflecting the insecurity of all communities on both sides of the border, 
is fundam entally  about the p u rsu it of pow er. The existence of 
param ilitary violence, according to realists, w ould be an attem pt to 
achieve political aims, but would, on a deeper level, also be a battle 
between two communities who seek to maximise their own pow er 
(that is, to enforce their will upon UK and Irish decision makers) vis-&- 
vis each other. Consequently, international law, or indeed any attem pts 
to reassure unionist and nationalist extremists, m ust fail to resolve the 
conflict, because the motivation for that conflict is the raw  pursuit of 
power. International arbitration through the rule of law  is largely 
irrelevant to this conflict and to its resolution. Similarly, international 
arbitration w ould not facilitate a m ore co-operative cross-border 
relationship, for actors on both sides of the border would themselves 
be involved in a pow er game, where co-operation w ould entail a 
concession and a loss of relative power.
In the afterm ath of a Second W orld W ar, the ideological 
pendulum  swung, perhaps paradoxically, to the idealist belief that war 
was not inevitable. Functionalists and neo-functionalists provided a 
different analysis for the existence of conflict. It is of course the latter 
which are of key concern to this thesis.
8Functionalism and neo-functionalism
The realist argum ent was more persuasive. History seemed to uphold 
the tenet that war was a natural part of the hum an condition and that it 
was impossible to alter state preferences so as to avoid war. In short, 
realism was a status quo argument, whilst idealism sought to change 
the status quo, and idealists believed that a peaceful world which could 
survive in the long run  was not an im possible hope. M odem  day 
idealists m et this realist challenge by developing a more sophisticated 
notion of power. Functionalists developed this notion first and neo­
functionalists, whilst adhering to a more realistic analysis of conflict, 
built upon core functionalist ideas later. Consequently, it is essential to 
describe not only neo-functionalism, but also functionalism.
Functionalists argued that the absolutist notion of power which 
was used by realists was not applicable to the post war world. Power 
was not uniform  for one country across all spheres of its activity. 
In stead , each sta te  w as in an env ironm ent w here  c o m p l e x  
in terdependence  existed. In this new  w orld , a m ultip lic ity  of 
transactions and a m ultiplicity of issues existed. The large num ber of 
transactions existed not simply within states, but also across states. The 
large num ber of im portant issues meant that states could not simply 
pursue  one interest, such as power maximisation, at the expense of 
other states, but that they had different goals depending on the specific 
issue at stake (Keohane and Nye, 1981, p. 126).
The critical factor in examining complex interdependence was 
economics. The grow th of trade m eant that states depended on the 
prosperity  of each other, if they were to develop m arkets abroad. 
Consequently, an individual state's economic well-being depended 
upon other states enjoying economic growth. Economic pow er could 
not be pursued at the expense of other states, but, in fact, could be 
achieved only if other states grew economically. Power was not zero- 
sum.
M oreover, pow er was not uniform. Some states m ight enjoy 
economies of scale in car manufacturing, whilst others m ight have a 
comparative advantage in high technology. There was a multiplicity of 
sectors, or issues, and some states predom inated in some of these 
sectors, bu t o ther states predom inated in others. This functional 
differentiation within and between states implied that states were equal
overall, because no one state could have a preponderance of power 
across all sectors (Mitrany, 1943, p. 60).
The multiplicity of transactions between states and the existence 
of various sectors of activity also had  im plications for the realist 
assumption that the state was a uniform actor. In contrast to this realist 
assum ption, functionalists argued that the state was m ade up  of 
different functions, w hich cross-cut official governm ental power. 
W hereas even in a federal system of states authority  is linked to a 
regional territory, in the complex environment, authority was specified 
in accordance with function. Thus, the Schuman Plan in 1950 organised 
states so as to m anage coal supplies. The function determ ined the 
organisation and indiv idual state pow er took a back seat to the 
functional requ irem ent of coal m anagem ent. N o constitu tional 
territorial arrangements were needed to achieve integration.
Functionalism  posited  tha t the sta te 's au thority  w ould  be 
determ ined by practical requirements. For states which possessed a 
shared group of functions, for example, the m anagem ent of coal, co­
ordinating agencies w ould be established. The functionalist argum ent 
was that, through a natural process whereby citizens came to share 
functions and developed a multiplicity of contacts, the existence of 
state boundaries and the raw  pursu it of individual pow er w ould 
diminish. Citizens, bureaucrats and politicians all had a role to play in 
overriding state boundaries, but, above all, it was the citizens which 
would dom inate the erosion of the state: "Society will develop by our 
living it, not by policing it" (Mitrany, 1943, p. 97). W ar w ould be made 
obsolete.
The predom inant role to be played by citizens in the pursuit of 
integration and the dim inished emphasis placed upon constitutional 
arrangem ents was a key m ark of functionalist thought. For Karl 
D eutsch, in teg ration  w as m arked by the existence of m utual 
sympathies between people, by a "we feeling", by trust and by m utual 
co-operation (Deutsch, 1957, p. 36). This feeling was caused initially by 
social mobilisation, in turn  caused mainly by the mass m edia, literacy, 
urbanisation and internal migration (Deutsch, 1969, p. 22). The increase 
in transactions betw een these people erodes the state boundaries 
which divide them and creates a multiplicity of functional boundaries:
W hat lies w ithin a set of m ultiple boundaries is a region. If the
boundaries are intense, if a common political machine governs
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the whole areas within them, we speak of the region as a country
... (Deutsch, 1969, p. 101).
The erosion of boundaries would occur when their intensity lessened 
because of an increase in the num ber of cross-cutting transactions. 
Functionalists examined the potential erosion of boundaries closely. 
Integration was defined, as above, as "the attainm ent within a territory 
of a sense of com m unity and of institutions and practices strong 
enough and widespread enough to ensure for a long time dependable 
expectations of peaceful change" (Deutsch, 1957, p. 5). The "true task of 
peaceful change" was "to remove the need and the wish for changes of 
frontiers" (Mitrany, 1943, p. 101). The growth of cross-cutting functional 
boundaries w ould perm eate territorial boundaries and make such 
peaceful change possible.
The relevance of functionalist thought to the Irish /N orthern  
Irish cross-border relationship should be obvious. A ccording to 
functionalists, both economic and political co-operation could occur 
between communities in N orthern Ireland and between communities 
on both sides of the border, because of the existence of complex 
interdependence. Because power is not necessarily zero-sum, because 
each com m unity's economic well-being depends on the other, and 
because the significance of the border between N orthern Ireland and 
the Republic is to be gradually  eroded by economic interactions 
between people at grass root level, then over time the political conflict 
which divided nationalists from unionists and N orthern Ireland from 
the Republic should cease to exist.
The main problem with functionalism is that events continually 
challenged its validity. The failure of the European Defence Community 
(EDC) in 1954 and the nationalist stance of France, under Charles de 
Gaulle, provided am ple evidence that an integrated Europe of six 
w ould not easily occur. However, idealists were undaunted and neo­
functionalists attempted to refine the functionalist argum ent in the light 
of the EDC's fate.
N eo-functionalists differed from  idealists in an im portan t 
respect. In contrast to idealists, neo-functionalists accepted that conflict 
was inherent in hum an nature and thus in international relations. 
However, unlike realists, they believed that state preferences could be 
altered so that they would wish to avoid war. Consequently, even in the 
presence of conflict, co-operation and peace were possible. Because of
11
the neo-functionalist em phasis upon  the ability  to a lter state  
p references so as to m anage conflict and  because of neo ­
functionalism 's sim ilarity  to functionalism , I am trea ting  neo­
functionalism as a category of idealist theory.
The functionalist assum ption of complex interdependence was 
m ain ta ined  by neo-functionalists. H ow ever, neo-functionalists 
abandoned the functionalist argum ent that the popular level of society 
could cause change. Neo-functionalists emphasised the significance of 
political and economic elites in causing integration and the necessity 
for central political institutions to harness these elite activities and 
provide the dynamism to create a federal region.
The concept of spillover was central to the neo-functionalist 
argument. The distinction between high and low politics was taken as a 
starting point. High politics referred to questions of national defence 
and security (Hodges, 1972, p. 24). It was in this area that functionalist 
logic had  failed so dism ally in 1954. Low politics referred to the 
economic aspects of policy making. Whereas it was difficult for states 
to agree upon  a European Defence C om m unity, econom ic co­
operation was perceived to be politically neutral and less contentious. 
How ever, w ith the expansion of the welfare state, low politics had 
come to dominate state policy to an unprecedented degree by the late 
1950s in industrialised West European states.
The expansion of low politics m eant that, in fact, even economic 
policy necessitated political activity. Thus, neo-functionalists argued 
that functional economic co-operation in areas w here little conflict 
existed w ould spillover to political co-operation. Economics w ould 
perm eate political realms and the distinction betw een high and low 
politics w ould become blurred. The mechanism which w ould cause 
this spillover was described by the early neo-functionalists as follows.
Eventually, so neo-functionalists argued, dem ands w ould be 
m ade by interest groups (whose members w ould all possess common 
interests) that central supranational institu tions be established to 
m anage the vast array of joint economic tasks. Interest groups were 
assum ed to be pivotal to the integration drive:
Integration proceeds most rapidly w hen it responds to socio­
economic dem ands from the industrial u rban  environm ent, 
when it is an adaptation to cries for increasing welfare benefits 
born of a new type of society (Haas, 1970, p. 102).
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Indeed, according to one neo-functionalist, m uch pressure for the 
developm ent of the European Community originated in the business 
communities of the founder states. These communities influenced their 
political leaders and an elite socialisation process in favour of deeper 
integration occurred. Through these interest groups, economic co­
operation spilled over to political co-operation and, according to neo­
functionalists, central political institutions became the driving force of 
C om m unity form ation (Harrison, 1978, p. 254). To this end, the 
European Social Council (ESC) was set up to represen t national 
interest groups in European umbrella organisations.
Once formed, the supranational institution was to provide an 
underly ing  dynam ism  for the in tegration  process. E rnest H aas 
described the key purpose of the central institu tion  as tha t of 
"upgrading common interests" (1970, p. 96). It is this element which is 
most central to this thesis. Haas outlined three types of compromise in 
a bargaining situation.
• The first type was to find a minimum common denominator. The
common denom inator outcome is not efficient, because the outcome 
is so diluted as to make it meaningless (Haas, 1970, p. 93).
• The second type of com prom ise is accom m odation by
bargaining. Such accommodation does not satisfy either party  fully, 
because both sides have to sacrifice (ibid).
• The third type is accommodation by the upgrading of common 
interests. This type is a feature of an integrative process. Unlike the 
second type neither side has to sacrifice, because all sides gain (ibid). In 
fact, strictly speaking, the upgrading of common interests does not 
represent a compromise at all.
The existence of a central institution is vital, according to neo­
functionalists, so as to m ediate and  upgrade  com m on interests 
between interest groups and states. The central institution's interaction 
with national agents was also to be used as a measure of integration. 
Integration for neo-functionalists was less a condition and m ore a 
process. This process was to be m easured by the degree to which 
national groupings transferred authority  and legitim acy from  the 
national state to the supranational central institution (Lindberg and 
Scheingold, 1972, p. 291). The goal of the integration process was the 
attainment of a federal union of states.
Neo-functionalist theory can be applied to two levels of analysis: 
the form ulation of EC policy and the effect of that policy upon
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domestic actors. Firstly, neo-functionalism may be used to explain the 
creation of the EC itself and the form ulation of new  EC policies. 
Interest groups are fundam ental in causing the emergence of the EC 
and in demanding the formulation of new  EC policies. For example, the 
Single European Act was seen to represent the will of interest groups, 
acting through their national representatives in close co-operation with 
the Commission. The deregulatory provisions of the Act were in the 
interest of certain European business sectors. Loss of competitiveness 
in the 1970s m ade the prospect of a European strategy alluring, so as to 
create free trade and expand markets.
In 1981, a group of information technology firms m et w ith the 
internal m arket commissioner, Etienne Davignon, and form ed the 
Thorn-Davignon Commission, which "reportedly discussed m arket 
liberalisation" (Moravcsik, 1992, p. 44).4 In 1983, a round table of 
European industrialists was founded by the chief executive of Volvo. 
Commission members were also represented on this round table and 
it remained in place after the signing of the SEA, so as to ensure that 
the Act's provisions w ould be im plem ented (ibid). Indeed , the 
background to the SEA has been compared to that of the formation of 
the ECSC, where likem inded Elites became committed to a European 
strategy: "Major businesses have allied w ith the Com m ission to 
persuade governm ents, which were already seeking to adap t to the 
changed international structure" (Sandholtz and Zysman, 1989, p. 118).
Secondly, neo-functionalism m ay be used to account for the 
effect of EC policy upon key domestic actors by explaining how  the EC 
'upgrades common interests'. According to neo-functionalists, the 
potential effect w ould be as follows: The form ulation of new  EC 
policies, in particular the SEM and the reform of EC regional policy, 
would increase the num ber of common economic interests shared by 
elites in N orthern Ireland and the Republic. These interests w ould 
provide a basis for increased economic co-operation. H ow ever, as 
economic co-operation increased then so too w ould the dem ands of 
these elites for overarching co-ordinating political structures, that is for 
political co-operation. In the context of the conflict in N orthern Ireland, 
the dem ands for overarching political structures would be preceded by
4Moravicsk, Sandholtz and Zysman and Garrett are associated with the 
intergovernmental institutional school of integration theory. However many of the 
examples I cite here from their work echo a neo-functionalist perspective. 
Consequently, I cite them here in my section on neo-functionalism
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com m unication and m eetings betw een politicians from N orthern  
Ireland and the Republic. This is also a form of political co-operation. 
For neo-functionalists, such political co-operation on the basis of 
economic co-operation is possible.
The focus of this thesis is not upon the formulation of EC policy. 
The question  of w hether I r ish /N o rth e rn  Irish  in te rest groups 
influenced the formulation of the SEA level is not of concern. W hat is 
of concern is how EC policies, once form ulated, have affected the 
behaviour of domestic actors so as to increase Irish /N orthern  Irish 
cross-border co-operation. This study of cross-border co-operation is 
particularly  necessary because neo-functionalists have paid  scant 
attention to the effect of EC policy on domestic politics. The emphasis 
of integration studies by all integration theorists, not sim ply neo­
functionalists, has been placed upon the reasons for the formulation of 
the Single European Act not upon  the effect of that Act upon 
dom estic elites (see, for exam ple, G arrett, 1992; K eohane and 
Hoffmann, 1992; Moravcsik, 1990; Sandholtz and Zysman, 1989).
The absence of empirical research around the subject of the 
SEA's impact upon domestic actors causes a doubt as to w hether or 
not the Com mission increases the num ber of common economic 
interests between domestic actors. Moreover, there are three other key 
'question marks' over neo-functionalism as an explanation or predictor 
of the Irish/N orthern Irish cross-border relationship:
First, U nion ist/Irish  co-operation m ay have existed before 
membership of the EC or before the signing of the Single Act.
Second, there is evidence that co-operation appeared to exist 
between the SDLP and Irish policy m akers before the signing of the 
Single Act.
Finally, the AIA and not the EC m ay have increased co­
operation, during the time frame of this study.
The first two doubts can be dismissed by examining the concept 
of co-operation. Consequently, in the next section, this concept is 
examined so as to determine the applicability of neo-functionalism to 
the Irish /N orthern  Irish cross-border relationship. The role of a third 
factor, the Anglo-Irish Agreem ent will be identified as crucial to an 
understanding of the cross-border relationship and to an examination 
of the EC's effect upon co-operation.
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ii. Co-operation and The Northern Irish/Irish Cross-Border 
Relationship
The reason the N orthern Irish /Irish  cross-border relationship is an 
ideal test of neo-functionalism is precisely because that relationship 
has not been a co-operative one (chapter two). Neo-functionalism  
attempts to explain how such an unco-operative relationship can alter 
on the basis of common economic interests. It is essential to define the 
m eaning of co-operation, before describing w hy the N orthern  
Irish /Irish  rela tionship  can be described as unco-operative and 
consequently, before exam ining w hether or not co-operation has 
increased. Similarly, a definition of co-operation clarifies how  neo­
functionalism  m ight be applied to the Irish /N orthern  Irish cross- 
border relationship in practical terms. In short, w hat exactly does co­
operation mean and w hat can be expected as evidence of cross-border 
co-operation? It is also essential to identify other factors, apart from the 
EC which m ay have caused or which may reflect co-operation long 
before the Single European Act was born. In the next sections, I deal 
with both these tasks.
The Meaning of Co-operation
Perhaps the m ost useful definition of co-operation is provided by 
Taylor. Co-operation is:
A lim ited involvem ent of states in joint enterprise, lim ited in 
both  scope and  du ra tion  and focused u pon  a specific, 
predetermined objective (Taylor, 1978, p. 124).
For example, the agreement to administer jointly a cross-border land 
drainage project is an example of co-operation. This agreem ent entails 
a process of negotiation, of m ediation and of arbitration betw een 
actors (ibid). Com m unication is of key im portance. Consequently 
evidence of joint m eetings and of increased com m unication flows 
between actors is also evidence of co-operation. The different types of 
co-operation can be listed:
1. Joint meetings
2. Joint studies
3. Informal contacts: phone calls, letters etc.
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4. Formulation of and agreement upon joint
programme
5. Administration of joint programme.
6. Development of further joint programmes
7. The establishment of institutions to administer
current and future joint programmes
The existence of common interests in itself does not im ply co­
operation. For exam ple, a joint drainage program m e m ay save 
communities on both sides of the border money. Economies of scale 
exist so that the infrastructure used to drain a large area on both sides 
of the border is more cost efficient than if it were used for a smaller 
area. Moreover, actors on both sides of the border share the cost of 
equipm ent and so that cost is spread. There is a common benefit to be 
gained  by cross-border co-operation. H ow ever, unless actors 
recognise this benefit and act upon their recognition, co-operation 
does not occur.
C o-operation begins w hen actors recognise their comm on 
interests and communicate w ith each other on the basis of these 
interests. The agreement to administer and finance a joint program m e 
is to be found in the centre of the continuum. Co-operation does not 
necessarily stop at that point. Co-operation, according to Taylor’s 
definition, refers to one limited area, however, co-operation from one 
fixed area m ay lead to co-operation in other areas. The existence of 
one joint program m e m ay lead to others in other sectors. Because 
actors have communicated with each other, they m ay discover that 
they have other common interests. For example, they m ay feel that 
they would both benefit from better road links between the two areas.
The existence of co-operation on economic matters may lead to 
an agreem ent to set up  overarching adm inistrative structures which 
represent joint authority over the two areas for specific functional tasks. 
The establishm ent of the European Coal and Steel Com m unity, for 
example, is an example of such joint adm inistration. At this point, 
political co-operation occurs. The economic and political significance 
of the border is less. In other w ords a process of integration is 
underw ay. Integration theory attem pts "to explain the tendency 
towards the voluntary creation of larger political units each of which 
self consciously eschews the use of force in the relations betw een 
participating units" (Haas, 1970, p. 108).
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It is clear that "the voluntary creation of larger political units' is 
not particularly problematic for constitutional nationalists in N orthern 
Ireland, who seek to be part of a larger political unit which covers the 
32 counties of Ireland, but who seek this aim through peaceful or 
voluntary  means. If cross-border co-operation contributes to this 
peaceful aim, it would not be surprising if constitutional nationalists 
supported such co-operation. Clearly, the finding that a N orthern Irish 
moderate nationalist hill farmer is co-operating with hill farmers in the 
Republic is less surprising than the finding that an extremist unionist hill 
farmer is doing so.
The argum ent that co-operation has a d ifferent m eaning 
depending upon whether or not it refers to unionists or constitutional 
nationalists is based upon the fact that a unionist hill farmer (to use the 
above example) has a political objection to cross-border co-operation, 
because this farmer fears the creation of a Catholic 32 county state 
where h is/her unionist rights would be underm ined (see p. 18 and pp. 
40-41). For h im /her, cross-border co-operation by developing links 
with the Catholic Republic of Ireland may be a first step on the road to 
Irish unification.
In other words, for the unionist there is a conflict of interests 
between h is /h er political beliefs and the existence of economic cross- 
border co-operation. Sim ilarly, for an extrem e nationalist w ho 
espouses the use of force, as opposed to using constitutional means, 
there m ay also be a conflict of interests. Even if cross-border co­
operation is not politically antagonistic to nationalist thought, its 
connection to peaceful and gradual change may not be satisfactory to 
those who favour sudden and violent change.
Thus, both unionists and extreme nationalists perceive that 
cross-border co-operation underm ines one or more of their interests, 
or signifies a loss. This perception of loss, this existence of a conflict of 
interest is w hat makes the concept of co-operation m eaningful. Co­
operation is about the resolution of conflict. It is an em pty term if no 
conflict existed in the first place. Co-operation is a process which uses 
discord to stim ulate m utual adjustm ent (Keohane, 1984, pp. 51-52). 
Clearly, in this thesis the focus is upon the relationship between those 
agents who are not enjoying a harm onious political relationship, 
namely, unionist agents, agents in the Republic of Ireland and extreme 
nationalists. The task of integration theorists is to explain how  actors 
who have conflicting political interests can achieve economic and
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political co-operation. As is shown above, neo-functionalists attem pt to 
answ er tha t question. The I r ish /N o rth e rn  Irish  cross-border 
relationship provides a practical case study.
Co-operation and The Irish Cross-Border Relationship 5
The reason the Irish /N orthern  Irish cross-border relationship is an 
ideal case through which to examine neo-functional theory is because 
that relationship has not enjoyed close co-operative relations and 
because a political conflict of interests has overshadow ed the cross- 
border relationship. If neo-functional theory is to be validated, then this 
absence of political co-operation should not prevent the emergence of 
economic or so-called functional co-operation, should the num ber of 
comm on economic in terests shared by the tw o areas increase. 
Furtherm ore, this economic co-operation should resolve political 
conflicts of opinion.
The cause of the unamicable Irish /N orthern  Irish cross-border 
relationship was ostensibly the division between unionists in Northern 
Ireland, who w ished to rem ain w ithin the U nited Kingdom , and 
nationalists, who dem anded that Northern Ireland become part of the 
Republic of Ireland (see chapter two). For unionists, cross-border co­
operation implied that Irish policy makers, w ith the support of the 
Catholic minority in N orthern Ireland, would achieve Irish unification 
'through the back door'. Cross-border co-operation was one step on 
the slippery slope to Irish unity. In these ways, the cross-border 
relationship was an integral part of the internal conflict in N orthern 
Ireland between unionists and nationalists. Cross-border co-operation 
was a value laden term. For this reason co-operative endeavours were 
few.
On a deeper level, the tense relationship was caused by the 
insecurity of actors on both sides of the border, in particu lar of 
unionists, that their identity was threatened by the other side. Thus, 
unionists feared that the Republic aimed to force N orthern Ireland to 
be part of a 32 county Catholic Ireland.
At the same time policy makers in the Republic m ade no effort 
to reassure unionists that Irish intentions were not irredentist. The Irish
5 The history of the cross-border relationship will be examined in greater depth in 
chapter two.
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constitutional claim that Ireland consisted of the thirty tw o counties 
remained, as did specific provisions in the Irish constitution (Bunreacht 
na hEireann) which unionists perceived to be Catholic and thus 
discriminatory (see chapter two). These factors provided evidence for 
unionists that Catholics in both N orthern Ireland and in the Republic 
were part of a conspiracy to erode Protestant unionist identity in a 
Catholic Ireland. Cross-border co-operation was p art of this papish 
plot. There was, thus, a clear political division between unionists and 
Irish policy makers. However, in order to examine the Single European 
Act’s impact upon the cross-border relationship, it is essential to show 
that that relationship was not co-operative before 1987.
The argum ent that the EC m ay increase cross-border co­
operation in the m idst of this political division obviously assumes that 
no other development has been affecting the level of co-operation in 
the cross-border relationship. In fact, there are examples which appear 
to indicate that co-operation was occurring, or could occur, for reasons 
which had little to do with the EC. For example, in 1965, twenty years 
before this study begins, the Irish Taoiseach, Sean Lemass, m et with his 
N orthern Irish counterpart, Terence O'Neill, to discuss cross-border 
co-operation (a joint meeting). M oreover, the nationalist SDLP in 
N orthern Ireland has been in close contact w ith Irish policy makers 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s.
Similarly, the signing of the AIA in 1985 provided for economic, 
functional co-operation between N orthern Ireland and the Republic. 
This agreement was signed by representatives of the British and Irish 
governm ents in 1985 and aim ed to achieve pow er sharing between 
nationalists and unionists in a devolved governm ent in N orthern  
Ireland. Although the Agreement provided for economic co-operation, 
it was quite obviously political as it reflected political co-operation 
between the British and Irish governments as well as the SDLP.
The A greem ent p ro v id ed  for the  estab lishm en t of an 
Intergovernmental Conference, which would meet every three months 
to discuss matters of concern to Northern Ireland. The Conference was 
to be attended by representatives of relevant departm ents in the UK 
and the Republic and always by the Secretary for Northern Ireland and 
the Irish M inister for Foreign Affairs. The Republic of Ireland was 
allowed the right to be consulted on any m atters which w ere of 
concern to the nationalist minority in Northern Ireland and which were 
''w ithin the field of activity of the conference" (Article Two, AIA). This
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right is in fact ambiguous, for it limits the Irish governm ent to be 
consulted on, for example, the administration of justice in Britain, which 
is of concern to the nationalist minority in Northern Ireland (Boyle and 
Hadden, 1989, p. 36). The Republic in turn recognised that no change 
could occur in the constitutional status of N orthern Ireland, unless a 
majority in Northern Ireland so wished.
Because the AIA was signed by Irish and UK representatives 
(and N orthern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom) and because it 
established m echanisms for economic and political com m unication 
between Northern Ireland and the Republic, the AIA is an example of 
cross-border co-operation. It is also an exam ple of cross-border 
political co-operation, because it was signed and negotiated by 
political elites from two separate states to achieve political aims.
All the above examples of possible cross-border co-operation 
suggest that any examination of the EC’s effect on the cross-border 
relationship m ust pay heed to the possibility that other factors were in 
fact influencing that relationship long before the Single Act. On closer 
inspection, however, all examples apart from the AIA fall short of the 
definition of cross-border co-operation described above.
The first two apparent examples of co-operation are flawed 
examples. The reason for their flaws rest upon the m eaning of co­
operation. The Lem ass/O 'Neill meeting did not lead to an im proved 
cross-border relationship, because the initiative was sw am ped by the 
resurgence of sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland in 1968 (see pp. 48- 
49). The new era of co-operation was marked by the Anglo-Irish Trade 
Agreement in 1965 which provided for free trade between the Republic 
of Ireland and the UK. However, the specific Irish /N orthern  Irish 
relationship remained tense. The Lem ass/O 'N eill historic meeting did 
not herald a new co-operative era. Instead, political conflict prevented 
the emergence of such economic co-operation.
Similarly, the existence of a co-operative relationship between 
the constitutionalist nationalist SDLP and policy m akers in the 
Republic of Ireland reflects an underlying harm ony of political interest 
w ith respect to cross-border co-operation. It is not a m eaningful 
example in terms of the above definition of co-operation. However, the 
co-operative elements of the AIA do pose significant problem s for 
neo-functionalists.
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iii. The Irish /N orthern  Irish  C ross-border R elationsh ip  and the 
A nglo-Irish  A greem ent
The m ain problem  posed by the Anglo-Irish A greem ent for neo­
functionalists is that poten tially  it can affect the cross-border 
relationship. As the Agreement was signed in 1985, two years before 
the SEA, it is possible that, should there be evidence of increased 
Irish /N orthern  Irish cross-border co-operation from 1988 to 1993, the 
AIA in fact caused it and not EC policy reform.
Thus, in the context of this thesis, the cross-border relationship is 
dom inated theoretically if not empirically by two argum ents. One 
argum ent is the neo-functionalist argument, which is described above. 
In this argum ent econom ic co-operation leads to political co­
operation. The other argum ent is that the Anglo-Irish Agreement is an 
example of political co-operation and that this political co-operation 
has increased both political and economic co-operation. In other 
w ords econom ic co-operation cannot occur unless political co­
operation increases first. Spillover is from political co-operation to 
econom ic co-operation, no t vice versa. The theory of coercive 
consociationalism represents this argum ent and it is examined in the 
next sections.
Consociational dem ocracies are those dem ocracies w here 
separate and conflicting segments in society share power. They do so 
peacefully and in the absence of violence because a num ber of 
conditions exist. At the core of all consociationalist accounts is an 
emphasis on achieving co-operation at the elite level.
There are four central conditions6. The first is that elites m ust 
possess the will to resolve conflict. The second condition is that elites 
m ust control or dominate their followers. Thirdly, the segments within 
the relevant society m ust be stable, because elites need to rely on a 
stable support base and they need to have fairly accurate information 
as to how other elites will behave (O'Leary, 1989, p. 576). A fourth 
central condition may be added: no one elite has a majority, or can 
exercise a veto on constitutional proposals. In this way, all groups are
6 I am taking the first three conditions as essential to the attainment of 
consociationalism on the basis of criticisms of Lijphart's other conditions (see, for 
example, Barry, 1975). In so doing, I am clearly accepting O'Leary's exposition of 
consociationalism (O'Leary, 1989, pp. 572-576). The fourth condition has been found to 
be in existence in all consociationalist democracies apart from Austria.
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in a no-win situation. Unless they co-operate with each other, they will 
not be able to exercise their will effectively on policy outcom es 
(Andeweg, 1990).
These conditions which are needed for political co-operation are 
political conditions. Economic co-operation m ay well complement the 
political endeavours which are needed to achieve consociationalism. 
For example, the provision of money specifically for cross-border and 
inter-com m unity co-operation m ay cajole conflicting groups into 
initiating such co-operation. In this instance, common interests are 
upgraded. The EC may well have a role to play in such up-grading and 
neo-functionalist logic m ay aid  the coercive consociationalist 
endeavour.
However, the significant point is that for consociationalism to 
exist there m ust be a basic political agreem ent between elites to co­
operate. Economic co-operation is not a sufficient condition for 
political co-operation to emerge. Thus, both consociationalism and 
neo-functionalism provide different, though not m utually exclusive, 
answers to the question of how to achieve political co-operation in 
divided societies. In the former, political means are fundam ental to 
attaining political co-operation, but for neo-functionalists economic 
means are sufficient, if harnessed by a supranational institution.
The relevance of consociationalism  to the case of the 
Irish/N orthern Irish cross-border relationship is that the AIA is argued 
to be a political a ttem pt to achieve a consociationalist outcom e 
(O'Leary, 1989, p. 581). In N orthern  Ireland, the conditions for 
consociationalism did not exist (Lijphart, 1977, pp. 134-141). N ot all elites 
enjoyed autonom y from their followers and not all had a will to 
regulate conflict. M oreover, unionists succeeded in blocking policy 
initiatives, which w ere not to their self-proclaim ed advantage, 
throughout the history of Northern Ireland (see chapter two).
In the negotiations which preceded the AIA, unionists were not 
consulted. N or did either governm ent revoke the AIA in the face of 
unionist opposition (see chapter two). For those who believe that the 
AIA was a rational, well thought out plan, the negotiators deliberately 
excluded unionists in this way, so as to force them  to co-operate 
politically w ith nationalists on term s set out by the UK and Irish 
governments.
If unionists did not agree to power sharing on British and Irish 
terms, then they would be completely excluded from all negotiations
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on the future of Northern Ireland. They were, thus, threatened with the 
prospect of policies which were antipathetic to their wishes, unless they 
co-operated in negotiations. The power of the unionist block to veto 
UK constitutional policy decisions with respect to N orthern Ireland, a 
pow er which underm ines the fourth condition for consociationalism, 
was, thus, rem oved. The UK governm ent w ould no longer take 
unionists interests into account.
The AIA is an example of coercive consociationalism. Arguably, 
the AIA was not so rationally planned. Critics argue that it was an 
example of ’m uddling through1 crisis m anagem ent (see Thompson, 
1987, for an exposition of this argument), where British and Irish elites 
felt they m ust do som ething and the AIA emerged. A lternatively, 
rational strategies existed, but there were different strands of thought 
running through British and Irish camps. The argum ent here is that 
some members of the bargaining elites saw the AIA as a step towards 
UK w ithdraw al (O 'Leary, 1989, p. 581). H ow ever, arguably, "the 
experiment of coercive consociationalism is certainly being tried, even 
if not all framers of the AIA intended to try it (O'Leary, 1989, 581). This 
argum ent is taken as a premise for the remainder of this thesis.
Thus, the AIA has strong theoretical implications for the cross- 
border relationship (chapter two). The em ergence of m utual co­
operation betw een sub-national elites in N orthern  Ireland has a 
potential effect upon the cross-border relationship, because such co­
operation implies that political differences of opinion will be ironed 
out. As these political differences are at the heart of the poor cross- 
border relationship, then, if these differences diminish, tensions in the 
Irish/N orthern Irish relationship will also be less.
Moreover, integration theorists, would argue that the process of 
communication and negotiation that is involved in co-operation will 
generally lessen the insecurity of both nationalists and unionists within 
Northern Ireland. Consequently, both segments will be more trustful of 
both the UK and the Republic of Ireland. This increase in security will 
im prove the cross-border relationship. Also, the AIA envisages talks 
between all parties in Northern Ireland (apart from Sinn Fein, the party  
w hich supports the IRA)7 and those in the Republic. If such talks
7 In November 1993 the possibility that Sinn Fein would become part of the talks 
process was aired when it was alleged by Sinn Feein that it had conducted secret talks 
with the British government.
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emerged, they w ould provide an obvious example of political cross- 
border co-operation.
The question of whether or not the AIA has affected the cross- 
border relationship  also has a tangible functional elem ent. The 
Agreem ent provides for the developm ent of closer cross-border co­
operation in economic areas (Article 10). In the AIA's 1989 review, 
there was greater emphasis upon this functional co-operation and, 
indeed, upon the EC. The International Fund for Ireland (IFI) was set 
up , again under the aegis of the Agreement, em phasised economic 
cross-border co-operation. Indeed the EC contributes m oney to this 
fund. Clearly, for the devisers of the AIA, economic co-operation did 
have the potential to embellish political co-operative endeavours. In 
this way, economic co-operation has a role to play in a coercive 
consociationalist agreem ent, not sim ply in theory, bu t in practice 
through the IFI.
A tricky question  is determ in ing  w hether econom ic co­
operation under the aegis of the AIA is theoretically different from 
economic co-operation caused by the EC. For example, it is arguable 
that the AIA and the EC are both institutions which harness economic 
co-operation and that this economic co-operation leads to greater 
political co-operation. However, on closer inspection the sim ilarity 
betw een neo-functionalism  and coercive consociationalism  is skin 
deep.
Clearly, the AIA is a political agreem ent w hich contains 
provisions for economic co-operation. However, w ithout political co­
operation, as reflected in the signing of the Agreement, it is unlikely that 
the IFI w ould have been established. Consequently, political co­
operation is at the basis of any em ergent economic co-operation. 
Unlike neo-functionalist logic, spillover occurs from  political to 
economic co-operation, not from economic to political co-operation.
In contrast, neo-functionalists argue that the Com m ission, 
although a political institution, was established for economic reasons. 
Similarly, the EC's policies which m ay increase cross-border co­
operation were m otivated by economic dem ands which overcame the 
political objections of for example, the then British Prim e Minister, 
M argaret Thatcher (Garrett, 1992). Economic co-operation causes the 
establishm ent of political institutions. In this way, the difference 
between economic co-operation under the aegis of the Agreem ent and 
that which has occurred because of the EC is significant.
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For neo-functionalists, econom ic necessity and econom ic 
dem ands are necessary conditions for political co-operation. Political 
elites respond to these economic dem ands and their support for co­
operation is necessary This different analysis of how  to achieve 
political co-operation is im portant because it leads to some neo­
functionalist propositions as to how  unionists in N orthern  Ireland 
w ould  react to the IFI and to EC cross-border initiatives. The 
implication is that if EC cross-border economic initiatives are indeed 
caused by economic need and if the IFI is caused by a political 
agreement, then, unionists because of the political sensitivity of cross- 
border co-operation w ould be more likely to accept EC initiatives, 
rather than the IFI's initiatives. For this reason, neo-functionalists would 
argue that the EC's effect upon the cross-border relationship  is 
potentially greater than that of the AIA.
C learly, should  econom ic and  political cross-border co­
operation have increased between N orthern Ireland and the Republic 
of Ireland, there is a possibility that the AIA is the cause of such co­
operation, that is, that political co-operation was necessary before 
economic co-operation could occur. This bears clear similarities to the 
realist school described above. Coercive consociationalism  is not 
simply an alternative to neo-functionalism, but is part of a larger debate 
between neo-functionalists and realists.
iv. The A nglo-Irish Agreem ent and International R elations 
Theory
Should there be evidence of increased cross-border co-operation in 
N orthern Ireland and the Republic, it has been shown that there are 
two alternative explanations for such co-operation: one explanation is 
that the EC has caused change and a second is that the AIA has 
caused change. Similarly, the signing of the SEA and the round table 
discussions of 1983 are open to num erous explanatory interpretations.8
8 Of the alternative theoretical responses to the SEA, intergovernmental 
institutionalism is the most fashionable. However, this theory does not fit the case of 
the Anglo-Irish Agreement as neatly as does neo-realism. Briefly, intergovernmental 
institutionalism combines realist assumptions of the importance of state sovereignty 
and self-interest with the acknowledgement that international institutions can 
change preferences so as to allow co-operation between states (Kirchner, 1992, p. 11). 
For intergovernmental institutionalism to apply to the case of the AIA, the AIA 
would be construed as a regime which represented agreement on norms, principles and 
decision making procedures. The Intergovernmental Conference is the key institution.
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The neo-functionalist in te rp re ta tion  has been described above. 
H ow ever, there are alternative explanations of the SEA. These 
alternatives to neo-functionalism can be divided into two main schools 
of thought: neo-realism and intergovernm ental institutionalism  (see 
footnote 8).
The argum ent that the AIA has increased cross-border co­
operation rests upon the same premises as neo-realist accounts of the 
signing of the Single Act. Consequently, the questions addressed by 
this thesis do not simply test neo-functionalism, they also examine the 
validity of realism. Because of this theoretical overlap, neo-realism is 
discussed below and is applied to coercive consociationalism.
N eo-rea lists , as their name suggests, relied upon the realist 
assum ption that power was the central tenet in international relations. 
This argum ent was developed to lead to a second proposition that co­
operation betw een states was possible, only if a w orld hegem on 
existed. The United States was said to have fulfilled this condition until 
the 1980’s.
The concept of complex interdependence became the prim ary 
object of neo-realist scrutiny. The functionalist and neo-functionalist 
assum ptions that complex interdependence im plied that pow er was 
not zero-sum  and that power maxim isation and inequality d id  not 
explain state or individual action were attacked. On the contrary, neo­
realists argued that, although in the m odern complex world power was 
not simply m ilitary, pow er could still be defined by examining the 
differing capabilities of states. These capabilities were both economic 
and military and economic power was correlated with political power
Intergovernmental institutionalists could argue two points. The first would be that the 
EC as a regime influenced two of its members, the UK and the Republic of Ireland, to 
co-operate closely by signing an international agreement forming another regional, but 
still international, institution, the IGC. In this way, the AIA could be an example of 
institutional spillover. This proposition would possibly explain the signing of the 
AIA, but it would not explain the AIA's effect upon sub-national actors who were 
opposed to the AIA from its conception.
Secondly, intergovernmental institutionalists would argue that the IGC 
changes the preferences of its members and consequently, whilst each set of members 
retains its national identity, each co-operate because all are members of the same 
institution. The difficulty in applying this theory to the AIA and the cross-border 
relationship is that neither nationalists nor unionists are members of the IGC and as 
intergovernmental institutionalism examines the effect of an institution on its 
members, unionists and nationalists are excluded. My argument is that if the AIA has 
influenced those who have not participated in it — unionists and extreme nationalists 
— then it has done so because its signatories could wield power. Therefore, neo­
realism is a more relevant theory.
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(Waltz, 1979, p. 98). The term hegemony was coined to describe those 
states which enjoyed a preponderance of resources (Keohane, 1984, p. 
31). These resources fell into four categories: the possession of raw  
m aterial resources; the ability to control markets; the possession of 
sources of capital; and, finally, the existence of competitive advantages 
in the production of highly valued goods (Keohane, 1984, p. 32).
The United States was an example of a w orld hegem on in the 
1970s. Power was to be measured by the degree to which some states 
were m ore imm une to the effects of other states' behaviour (Waltz, 
1979, pp. 143-144). In short, neo-realists argued that, yes, all states were 
constrained by each other's behaviour, bu t states w ere not all 
constrained equally. For example, in the 1973 oil crisis, the USA was 
less dependen t upon  oil supplies from  the M iddle East and, 
consequently, it played a more effective role politically in that crisis 
than  d id  European Com m unity m em bers. The preponderance of 
resources enjoyed by the United States placed it in this stronger 
position. It was a hegemonic leader.
Neo-realists argued that the drive to be powerful was easily 
explained for power still perform ed im portant functions for states. It 
was assumed that the prim ary aim of states was indeed to m aintain as 
much autonomy as possible (Bull, 1977, p. 8). No am ount of economic 
co-operation could override this basic political aim. Pow er was 
necessary for states, so as to m aintain this autonom y. Pow er also 
perm itted a wider range of action for states. Power guaranteed safety, 
because pow erful states could enforce their will upon other states. 
Power, also, gave its possessors a large incentive to m aintain the 
international system, according to their wishes (Waltz, 1979, pp. 194- 
195). For all these reasons, states pursued power and states attem pted 
to be hegemons.
These assum ptions were applied by neo-realists to the case of 
the EC. The implication was that international organisations could not 
achieve international co-operation, unless inequality of pow er existed 
between states, where a hegemonic state has more pow er than other 
states. International organisations, such as the EC, could not achieve 
co-operation among members, unless a hegem on existed w ithin the 
organisation, or a world hegemon existed outside the EC, w ho would 
impose an order upon the international system.
If the EC did achieve economic co-operation, it d id  so only 
because its mem ber states enjoyed a basic political consensus. This
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political consensus was needed before economic co-operation could 
occur between states. Consequently, neo-realists argued that economic 
co-operation could not spill over to political co-operation. Even if a 
political consensus existed, it was not stable and w ould eventually 
collapse if interests so dictated.
Underlying all the above reasons for power politics was the old 
realist assum ption that states like individuals were prey to a constant 
sense of fear and insecurity (the Hobbesian fear): "Power and security 
have primacy in hum an nature and consequently, in all political life" 
(Gilpin, 1984, p. 290). In a system  w here no one state enjoys a 
preponderance of resources, that is, w here some states are indeed 
relatively equal and, so, are equally dependent upon each other, then 
precisely because states feel dependent, they will feel increasingly 
vulnerable. Any system of co-operation cannot sustain this inherent 
insecurity. W ith no hegemon to enforce rules and, thus, no leader to 
reassure states, this anarchic system will collapse.
The neo-realist analysis of pow er in the m odern w orld led to 
their argum ent that increasing economic interdependence has certainly 
decreased national economic autonomy. However, neo-realists argued 
that states had intervened in the econom y only to pro tect their 
national values. National self-interest had not merged into some global 
interest, but was still clearly visible. Complex interdependence did  not 
imply that power had ceased to dominate international relations.
The relevance of this neo-realist response to the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement is that the coercive element of coercive consociationalism 
assumes that those who are using coercion enjoy a preponderence of 
resources over those who are coerced. In other words, some actors are 
m ore powerful than others. The fact that the AIA was in fact an 
in ternational treaty  and thus represen ted  the ru le  of law  and 
international arbitration was no proof of its idealist nature.
On the contrary, just as the League of Nations could not achieve 
co-operation because it lacked the pow er to enforce its will, then, 
similarly, the AIA could be im plem ented only by hegem ons w ith 
greater power than sub-national groupings in both N orthern Ireland 
and the Republic. In this way, inequality of power is a central element 
in explaining how both the British and Irish governments could impose 
their will, at least by imposing the AIA, upon reluctant unionists. A neo­
realist exposition of the AIA would be as follows:
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British and Irish signatories and participants in the AIA were 
m ore pow erful because they represented state governm ents. The 
power enjoyed by the UK governm ent with respect to unionists is of 
essential relevance. Legally, the UK governm ent could impose its will 
upon N orthern  Ireland, as long as a m ajority in the H ouse of 
Commons approved. Unionists represented a minority party within the 
UK as a whole and could not legally prevent the imposition of the AIA, 
nor change its contents. Similarly, an economic pow er-dependence 
relationship is evident between N orthern Ireland and the UK, because 
the UK supports the N orthern Irish economy with massive subvention 
(estimated at two billion pounds per annum  for the year 1990 to 1991). 
(Interview, D epartm ent of Finance and Personnel, senior official, 
February 1992). Economically and politically, the government of the UK 
was more powerful than unionists.
This inequality of power between British and Irish governments 
and union ists w as necessary for the em ergence of a coercive 
consociationalist agreement. For realists, then, the AIA is an empirical 
example of how power may be used to achieve political co-operation.
Finally, neo-realism is relevant to the discussion of the AIA and 
the EC, because coercive consociationalism  represents a political 
a ttem pt to achieve co-operation. Political co-operation is thus a 
precondition for resolving the conflict in N orthern Ireland and for 
forcing cross-border co-operation.
Similarly, neo-realists, like realists, argue that economic co­
operation will not spill over to political co-operation. The inherent 
insecurity which is shared by all individuals and, hence, by all states 
implies that even if the Commission upgrades common economic 
interests, any resultant economic co-operation will either collapse in 
the absence of political co-operation, or, if it occurs, it will not cause 
political co-operation because actors will rem ain suspicious of each 
other. No am ount of com m unication, inform ation exchange and 
common economic interests can overcome this basic Hobbesian fear.
The fear of losing one's identity which is at the heart of the 
conflict in N orthern Ireland, is so deep as to prevent political co­
operation, in the absence of a coercive consociationalist strategy. The 
inequality of power needed for coercive consociationalism is really 
another vindication for the argum ent that co-operation cannot occur in 
the absence of hegemonic leadership. In this case, the hegemons with 
respect to Northern Ireland are the UK and the Irish governments, but
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particularly the former, given its legal and financial responsibility for 
N orthern Ireland. The AIA has more pow er to impose change upon 
sub-national actors than has the EC, because actors are m ore 
dependent upon UK and Irish governments than they are upon the EC. 
For neo-realists, the EC's path is doomed to failure.
Coercive consociationalism, then, is an example of a neo-realist 
argum ent. Consequently, should the AIA have had a greater effect 
upon the cross-border relationship than  had  the EC, this study  
strengthens neo-realism.
Clearly, the debate about the relative significance of the EC and 
the AIA in the Irish/N orthern  Irish cross-border relationship is part of 
a larger debate between international relations theorists about how 
best to achieve peace in divided societies. It is because of the concern 
to avoid situations of death and destruction that neo-functionalism  
developed. The relevance of all the above theories of international 
relations to the small bu t tragic pocket of destruction in N orthern 
Ireland cannot be overstated. It has already been shown that the cross- 
border relationship cannot be separated from this conflict, particularly 
since the signing of the AIA. For this reason the case of N orthern 
Ireland and its weak relationship with the Republic is not simply a 
'special situation', it is exactly the type of situation which idealists, 
realists and functionalists sought to avoid.
The applicability of neo-functionalism forms the backbone for 
this thesis. Its applicability is underm ined by the extent to which a 
realist account, represented by the AIA, provides a better analysis. 
These theories provide some hypotheses w hich offer conflicting 
pred ic tions as to how  the EC has affected the cross-border 
relationship. The validity of these predictions will be examined in the 
ensuing chapters, so as to determ ine the applicability  of neo­
functionalism  to the Irish /N orthern  Irish cross-border relationship. 
The hypotheses are presented in the next section.
C on clu sion : The Irish  C ross-border R ela tio n sh ip  and
International Relations Theory: Hypotheses
The term 'theory' is used above in relation to neo-functionalism and 
neo-realism. However, clearly each school is based upon a subjective 
emotion of optimism or pessimism, as the case may be. At heart, the 
question is w hether or not conflict is inherent in individuals and in
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society and much of the writings are laced with value judgements. For 
neo-functionalism's critics, the concept of spillover is one such value 
judgement. Similarly, Gilpin, himself in the realist tradition, has argued 
that realism should be seen "as a philosophical disposition and set of 
assum ptions about the world rather than in any sense a 'scientific 
theory'" (Gilpin, 1984, pp. 289-290).
C onsequently , there is theoretical room  to exam ine neo­
functionalism  and to identify strict conditions under w hich neo­
functionalism may be accurate, or indeed to identify conditions where 
it may not apply. Haas noted that the logic of spillover may not apply 
in Less Developed Countries, w here economic issues were quickly 
politicised (Nye, 1965 and Haas, 1970). This neo-functionalist footnote 
represented a possible constraining condition, yet little work has been 
done on identifying other conditions which m ay aid or inhibit neo­
functionalist logic.
The obvious question is whether or not neo-functionalism can 
be applied to an unharm onious relationship between two regions of 
the EC w ithout the over-politicisation of economic issues. Does 
overpoliticisation occur am ong EC m em bers in the presence of 
fundamental EC policy change? The need to identify strict conditions is 
great. Such identification may make neo-functionalism, or alternatively 
neo-realism, more deserving of the term 'theory'.
Clearly, there is a variety of possible results which can be 
derived from neo-functionalism and neo-realism. For example, civil 
servants, local councillors and in terest groups m ay indeed  be 
responding to the Single Act, or they may be responding to the AIA. 
Alternatively, they may be responding to neither initiative.
Figure 1.1 provides an exposition of all possible results. The 
results of each case study chapter can be applied to this table, so as to 
determ ine whether the findings uphold or falsify neo-functionalism.
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Figure 1.1: Hypotheses of neo-functionalism and neo-realism
There is only one possibility which definitely upholds neo­
functionalism and it is that the EC has caused economic co-operation 
and this economic co-operation has caused political co-operation. 
'Flux' implies that economic cross-border co-operation appears to be 
increasing because in terest groups and adm inistrative elites are 
responding to the EC, but whether or not this economic co-operation 
will spill over to political co-operation is not known, as political co­
operation  m ay need m ore tim e to em erge from  econom ic co­
operation.
Four possible outcom es upho ld  neo-realism . Political co­
operation m ay exist (because of the AIA), bu t it does not lead to 
economic co-operation. Second, neither economic nor political cross- 
border co-operation are found to exist. Thirdly, economic co-operation 
exists, but it will definitely not lead to political co-operation. The fourth 
possibility is that economic and political cross-border co-operation 
exist, bu t that political co-operation has caused this economic co­
operation. This possibility refers to the argum ent that the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement has caused economic co-operation and, consequently, it is 
the most relevant neo-realist hypothesis to this thesis.
The task is to apply these hypotheses to each set of actors in 
N orthern  Ireland and the Republic. It will be show n in the next 
chapters that distinctive groups of actors have reacted differently to 
the EC. Civil servants have not behaved as business people. Local 
councillors have behaved differently again. The Commission itself may 
or may not have provided the dynam ism  which neo-functionalists 
believe to be essential to the evolution of co-operation. In other words,
4. Neo-realism
5. Neo-realism
6. Neo-realism
1. Neo-functionalism
2. Flux
3. Neo-realism
Economic co-op. leads to political co-op. 
Economic co-op. may lead to political co-op. 
Economic co-op. does not occur, but political 
co-op. does exist
Economic co-op. and political co-op. do not exist 
Political co-op. leads to economic co-op. 
Economic co-op. exists, but it will not lead to 
political co-op.
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each case study has its own story to tell. In the next chapter, the 
historical background to these 'stories' is provided.
Chapter Two
A History of The Cross-Border Political Relationship
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In tro d u c tio n
The Irish /N orthern  Irish cross-border relationship has not been co­
operative (chapter one). In this chapter, I show how  this relationship 
has been m arked by political tensions. The history of the relationship 
between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland will be charted, 
so as to gauge the general level of cross-border co-operation since 
1921. The chapter is divided into six sections. In the first section, the 
foundation of the two states will be described. In particular, the 
Boundary Commission of 1925 will be examined. This Com mission 
drew  up the final border between the two states and this section will 
examine traditional nationalist and traditional unionist perceptions of 
the border. The rem ainder of the chapter examines five broad phases 
of the cross-border relationship: insulation; modernisation and reform; 
crisis; the search for a solution and, lastly, intergovernmentalism. These 
phases reflect the changes which have occurred in the cross-border 
relationship during the given period.
It m ust be noted that, although this study is concerned w ith 
functional co-operation, this historic chapter deals w ith the broad 
concept of cross-border political co-operation and, thus, provides a 
framework for the remainder of the thesis. The underlying assum ption 
is that the level of functional co-operation before 1988 was not high. 
Subsequent chapters will confirm this assumption. Moreover, so as to 
examine whether or not political co-operation may lead to economic 
co-operation, or vice-versa, it is essential to examine w hether or not 
political co-operation existed in the first place.
The conclusion of this chapter confirms that levels of political 
cross-border co-operation have been low. H ow ever, it w ill be 
concluded that, although levels of political co-operation have been low, 
political change has occurred in the cross-border relationship. The EC's 
policies may well complement this change.
i. Partition and the Boundary Com mission.
Partition was formally agreed upon by representatives of both the 
British and Irish governments when the Anglo-Irish Treaty was signed 
on December 6 1921. This Treaty gave twenty-six counties to the south 
and six counties to the northern part of the island. The Treaty offered
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the south  dom inion status, alongside the other Com m onw ealth 
members.
Dominion status implied that the tw enty six counties would 
have the same status as other dominions of the British Empire. Thus, 
Irish m em bers of an Irish parliam ent w ould  sw ear an O ath of 
Allegiance to a British monarch. M oreover, the term s of the Treaty 
allowed British control of the main ports and surrounding seas in the 
south. The Irish Army was limited to seventy thousand men.
A significant provision  w as the prom ise of a boundary  
comm ission to "determ ine in accordance w ith  the w ishes of the 
inhabitan ts, so far as m ay be com patible w ith  econom ic and  
geographic conditions, the boundaries between N orthern Ireland and 
the rest of Ireland" (Articles of Agreement for a Treaty Between Great 
Britain and Ireland: Article XII). The Treaty was ratified by the Irish Dail 
on January 7 1922, by a majority of seven votes.
It was argued by those who favoured signing the Treaty that its 
terms were the best that could be obtained at the time. The British 
prime minister Lloyd George threatened an immediate and terrible war 
if the Irish delegates w ould not sign the Treaty. M oreover, pro- 
Treatyites claimed that those terms did allow the freedom to achieve 
freedom at a later date. As regards partition, this freedom would not 
relate only to the 26 counties, but first to 28 counties and then to all 32 
counties. The clinching argum ent appeared to be Article XII of the 
T reaty w hich p rov ided  for the estab lishm ent of a B oundary 
Commission. The Commission was to deal w ith the key question of 
where the boundary was to be drawn.
The Boundary Commission
For pro-Treatyites, the key clause in Article XII recom m ended an 
alteration of the border boundary  "so as to m ake the boundary  
conform as closely as possible to the wishes of the population" (ibid). 
Map 2.1 places this statem ent in perspective. The m ap portrays the 
distribution of Catholics and Protestants in Ulster in 1911. Broadly 
speaking, Protestants were concentrated in the N orth  East of the 
province, w ith Catl die concentration in Fermanagh, Tyrone and part
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of Armagh. The pattern mirrored the pattern laid down in the 1600s1 
and resulted in the segregation of planter and"native" communities 
from each other.
Map 2.1: D istribution of Catholics and Protestants in Ulster 1911 
(Map used by Boundary Commission)
Majority Areas 
|  Protestant
| Roman Catholic
'OMAGH
Source: Neville and Douglas, (1985, p. 110).
The plantation of Ulster occurred in the seventeenth century. In effect, 
plantation meant the settlement of English and Scots citizens who were 
given land holdings in various parts of Ireland. The concentration of 
these settlers was uneven, with most dwelling in the northern part of 
Ireland. As Foster notes:
What must be grasped from the early seventeenth century is the 
im portance of the plantation idea, with its em phasis on 
segregation and on native unreliability. These attitudes helped 
Ulster solidify into a different mould (1988, p. 78).
iThe plantation of Ulster officially began in 1609, although the first 
immigrants from Scotland arrived before that (Foster, 1988, p. 63). The 
peak immigration rate was in the latter half of the seventeenth century.
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This 'different m ould ' was m anifested by the strength of unionist 
resistance to Irish unity. Such opposition was m ade clear in unionist 
reaction to the 1912 Home Rule Bill. After a H ouse of Commons 
debate on this Bill, in February 1912, it was proposed that Home Rule 
w ould be introduced to the whole island of Ireland. Unionists argued 
first that there was no such thing as an Irish nation and then altered 
their stance to argue that there were in fact two nations in Ireland 
(Mansergh, 1991, p. 47). Supported by Bonar Law, a leading member of 
the Conservative party, they threatened civil w ar to defend their 
position. The power of unionist conviction was thus m ade clear to the 
British government and public.
It was then that the British Prime Minister, Asquith, asked Bonar 
Law w hat the unionist definition of its nation was. How m any counties 
did such a nation include? The key point is that the different m ould 
m entioned by Foster divided not Ulster from the rest of Ireland, but 
four counties from the nine counties that comprise Ulster. It was in 
these four counties that Protestant majorities existed. These counties 
w ere Belfast, L ondonderry /D erry  (apart from L ondonderry /D erry  
city), A ntrim  and Down. Thus, a continual theme in im plem enting 
partition was that of deciding where exactly the boundary should lie. 
Nationalists and unionists had different aspirations in this respect.
Nationalists, if partition had to be, preferred the boundary to be 
d raw n  so as to encom pass only the P rotestant dom inated  four 
counties, apart from those nationalists who lived in Belfast. Unionists 
w anted a six county jurisdiction, as that would constitute the largest 
area w ith a safest Protestant m ajority — a 66 per cent Protestant 
m ajority (Buckland, 1981, p. 20). A boundary encompassing all nine 
counties of Ulster would have delivered only a 56 per cent Protestant 
majority (Buckland, ibid.). A four county area was commonly perceived 
to be too small to be economically and politically viable.
The 'different m ould' of Unionism was formally recognised by 
the British governm ent in the Government of Ireland Act 1920, which 
provided for the establishment of two parliam ents, one for the N orth 
and one for the South, in recognition of the distinctive make-up of each 
area. However, it was the unionist, preference for a six county Northern 
Ireland that was agreed upon by the British government in 1920.
The 1921 proposal for a Boundary Commission was interpreted 
by pro-Treatyites as implying that a re-drawn boundary would give the 
two Catholic dom inated counties of Tyrone and Ferm anagh to the
39
South and that the remaining four Ulster counties would join in a new  
32 county Ireland at a later date. Thus, an American Consul to Belfast 
in 1921 commented that Ulster unionists awaited ratification of the 
Treaty "as the condemned might await the hangm an's axe" (Mansergh 
1991, p. 198).
Nationalist hopes and unionist fears were not fulfilled. A part 
from the long delay in the Boundary Commission's appointm ent — it 
was not appointed until 1925 — the decision reached was alm ost 
identical to the original 1920 decision. It was the qualification that 
boundaries w ould be re-draw n "so far as m ay be compatible w ith  
economic and geographic conditions" that dom inated the outcome. 
The implication was that a four county N orthern Ireland could not 
survive. In a leak to the Morning Post, it emerged that the Commission 
had agreed upon the six county option was agreed upon, despite the 
presence of the Irish representative Eoin MacNeill on the Commission. 
The decision was never m ade public officially, but nonetheless came 
into effect.
M ap 2.2 portrays the Boundary Com mission decision. It is 
no tew o rth y  that a long the  b o rder there  is heavy  C atholic  
concentration, (see Map 1.1). Patterns of voting behaviour and the 
incidence of violence are also geographically distributed. Nationalist 
party  su p p o rt has been strongest along the border areas and  
p a rticu la rly  in Tyrone, Ferm anagh and L o n d o n d e rry /D erry .
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Map 2.2: Irish Boundary Commission Proposals
  Border 1920 Act
 Border changes
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Source: Boal and Douglas, 1982, p. 112
The regions of heaviest violence are situated in South Armagh, 
Fermanagh and Tyrone, with Belfast and Londonderry/Derry having 
the highest incidence. Overall, then, there are geographical patterns of 
violence and conflict and it is clear that the border creates a context for 
the remainder of the study. That the border sets a context is not to 
claim that it caused the violence and conflict depicted above. What is 
clear is that different groups within Northern Ireland have different 
perceptions of the causes of that conflict.
For traditional nationalists, the border is, indeed, a root cause of 
conflict. Thus, nationalists argue that the people of Ireland form one 
nation and that Ireland was divided because of British policy makers. 
The traditional nationalist argument is that, if Irish Catholics and 
Protestants had been left alone by British governm ents, then 
Protestants would have been content to join in a united Ireland 
(Whyte, 1990, p. 117).
Traditional unionists, in contrast, argue that the British Isles form 
one unit, including Ireland. The core problem was perceived not to be 
the creation of the Irish border, but Irish attempts to abolish the border 
and form a thirty two county Irish Catholic state. Thus, Irish irredentism 
was the alleged source of conflict, for it encouraged and justified 
nationalist terrorist violence (Whyte, 1990, p. 147).
In this way, nationalism and unionism mirrored each other, with 
nationalists primarily blaming the British state for violence in Northern 
Ireland and unionists blaming the Irish state for that violence. Thus,
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cross-border co-operation had  very  d ifferent connotations for 
unionists and nationalists, the form er's antagonism to the Irish state 
making such co-operation an anathema.
For the nationalist community, cross-border co-operation had  
no malign ideological connotations, indeed, it was perceived to further 
the aim of a united Ireland. Thus, for cross-border co-operation to be 
significant it m ust refer to unionist co-operation with the Irish state (see 
p. 17). The unionist perception of the Republic did indeed hinder cross- 
border co-operation, as the next sections will show.
ii. The Cross-border Relationship. Phase One: Insulation and 
State Building
In the early stages of independence, both states laid the foundations of 
m utual insulation from each other. The reasons for this insulation are 
found in the problems which each state perceived to exist. Thus, the 
border was perceived by unionists as a protection against the erosion 
of Protestant pow er and identity. It was a partial solution to the 
problem of Irish irredentism and unionist policy makers felt obliged to 
consolidate their position and strengthen  barriers against Irish  
encroachment. Insulation was the preferred strategy.
There appeared to be solid reasons for this strategy and the fear 
which caused it. The boundaries of N orthern Ireland divided villages 
and farms. They stood in proxim ity to Catholic Ireland and they 
dem onstrated the fine line of statehood. The potential for that line to 
be eroded seemed strong: The new Irish state was still only sem i­
constitutional — IRA activity reached its height in the civil war of 1922- 
1923 and existed not only in the twenty six counties, but in N orthern 
Ireland as well.
In the new constitution of 1937, Ireland, as it was now called, lay 
claim to Northern Ireland by stating that "the national territory consists 
of the whole island of Ireland" (Article Two, Bunreacht na hEireann). 
Moreover, the constitution appeared to enshrine Catholic doctrine and 
was influenced by the advice of Archbishop Dermot McQuaid, a close 
friend of the Irish leader, Eamon de Valera. In fact de Valera was also 
careful to state that freedom of religious expression would exist in the 
new state. However, the specifically Catholic provisions outw eighed 
the non-Catholic provisions for unionists. Hence, for unionists, the 
external enemy was perceived to be one close at hand, on the same
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small island. It was not simply the existence of this perceived external 
enemy, but also the existence of the Catholic minority w ithin N orthern 
Ireland that frightened unionists.
Thus, unionists, led by the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), set about 
building a Protestant state, by limiting all contact w ith the Catholic 
Republic and also by excluding Catholics within Northern Ireland from 
all corridors of power. Proportional representation was abolished for 
local elections in 1923 and for parliam entary  elections in 1925. 
M oreover, in 1923, electoral boundaries w ere redraw n for local 
elections, so as to ensure Protestant majorities, even in those areas 
where Catholics had a strong presence.
In addition, restrictions of franchise were aimed at the Catholic 
community. These restrictions related to property qualifications which, 
if not met, removed the right of the individual to vote. For example, the 
1923 Local Government (Franchise) Act restricted franchise to those 
holding land to the value of £5 or more. In 1946, the valuation threshold 
was increased to £10. At the same time, discrimination in the allocation 
of housing and jobs m eant that Catholics were affected m ost by the 
legislation. Thus, one nationalist commented: "first you deny the people 
houses, and then because by reason of your own failure they have no 
houses, you deny them votes" (O'Dowd et al, 1980, p. 100).
As regards em ploym ent, figure 2.3 serves to illustrate  the 
un eq u al em ploym ent ra tes am ong P ro te s tan t and  C atholic  
com m unities. "In 1971, Catholics w ere 2.6 times as likely to be 
unemployed as Protestant males" (O'Leary and McGarry, 1993, p. 130). 
Thus, through discrimination in housing, employment, franchise rules 
and boundary control, unionists dom inated both parliam ent and local 
government.
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Figure 2.3: Religion, Sex and Unemployment in Northern Ireland, 
1971.
unem ploym ent 
(per cent)
Cath/Prot male unemployment ratio: 2.62
Cath/Prot female unemployment ratio: 1.94
Protestant fem ales Protestant m ales Catholic fem ales Catholic males
Source: O'Leary and McGarry, 1993, p. 130
Similarly, Catholics were not proportionately represented 
among the security forces. Only one sixth of the Northern Irish police, 
the Royal Ulster Constabulary, was Catholic (Farrell, 1976, p. 96). Many 
of its members were involved in the Orange Order2 and, under the 
provisions of the Special Powers Act (1922), the RUC had the authority 
to ban Catholic meetings, raid houses and intern at will. Consequently, 
"they were seen by most Catholics as merely the coercive arm of the 
Unionist Party" (Farrell, 1976, p. 97).
By 1934, James Craig, the leader of the UUP, could proclaim with 
conviction the existence of a Protestant parliament and a Protestant 
state (Buckland, 1981, p. 55). This Protestant state was created by a 
policy of exclusion (of Catholics) and insulation (from the Republic).
2 The Orange Order was established in 1790 with the aim of 
m aintaining the Protestant religion and ascendancy. It spread to 
include the majority of Protestant males among its membership and 
became associated with ritualistic marches and banners. It gave "a 
sense of unity and purpose to Protestants", but also divided them from 
the Catholic community (Buckland, 1982, p. 5).
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However, the unionist task was greatly aided by the gradual insulation 
of Irish politicians themselves from N orthern Ireland.
For the new Irish state, the border was an imperfect realisation 
of an existing reality in Ireland: unionists would not be part of a united 
Ireland. It was also a source of civil division in the new  state, 
m anifested m ost b itterly  by the Civil W ar of 1922-1923. It was 
im perative that this divisive effect be minimised. Thus, the border's 
m ain significance for the Republic was not as a context for interstate 
co-operation, but as a source of disunity within the twenty six counties. 
It soon became a political football which few Irish politicians were 
willing to touch. The Irish position appeared to be understandable. As 
Keatinge comments:
The position of the new Irish state was by any criterion weak ... 
Econom ic dep en d en ce  on  the  U n ited  K ingdom  w as 
overwhelming and even the formal diplomatic independence of 
the state was at first qualified by the ambiguities entailed in the 
s ta tu s  of a D om inion  in  the  new  C om m onw ealth . 
U nquestionably a small state, w ith a population m arked by 
persistent emigration, the Irish Free State's concerns were those 
of survival... (1986, p. 141).
The adm inistrative task of building an efficient state, w here new 
adm in istra tive  responsib ilities w ere shou ldered  "w ith  sketchy 
resources and rudim entary structures" (Keatinge, 1987, p. 145) was one 
mam m oth task, which the new state had to face. At the same time, it 
was essential that Irish policy makers win international recognition for 
an independent sovereign state.
A part from these burgeoning problem s, if history had shown 
anything to Irish policy makers, it was that unionists w ould resist 
fiercely a u n ite d  Ireland . Bowm an no tes th a t de V alera 's 
com m unications and speeches a ltered  in approach to unionists 
betw een 1917 and 1920. It appeared  that there was a daw ning 
realisation that some conciliatory effort was needed to encourage 
unionists into a united Ireland (Bowman, 1988, pp. 37-43).
Thus, de Valera's emphasis passed from the impossibility and 
uselessness of com prom ise w ith unionists (1917) to the need to 
assim ilate  union ists (1919) and , finally , to the possib ility  of 
accommodating unionists (1920). No doubt, Craig viewed de Valera's 
position as ultim ately uncomprom ising — after all, to accommodate
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unionists was not to agree to unionist terms, nor did accommodation 
relinquish the aim of Irish unity.
H ow ever, having m et Craig in the May of 1920, de Valera 
concluded that "he saw no hope of solving the problem  w ith prior 
agreement of the Unionist minority" (Bowman, ibid.). He added that the 
question was an Irish-English one. Therefore, if Irish politicians turned 
their back on unionists, it was not w ithout the m em ory of unionist 
conviction politics. The question is whether or not by 1920 Irish policy 
m akers really felt a united  Ireland was feasible and, if it was not 
perceived to be so, then w hat was the pay-off in co-operating w ith 
unionists?
The pay-off, in fact, was a loss in the context of Treaty-based 
party politics. Neither of the two main parties could afford to raise 
nationalist hackles by co-operating w ith the very group that was 
accused of tarnishing the nationalist dream. Only if it achieved a united 
Ireland w ould such co-operation be a safe bet in fledgling party  
politics. The chances of such an outcome seemed slim.
Hence, both states insulated themselves from each other for the 
formative part of their existence. As they did so, they also built their 
states in patterns which lay the foundations for fu tu re  decades. 
Protestant hegemony was achieved in N orthern Ireland and, in the 
Republic, little effort was m ade to encourage Protestants to join an 
Irish state. Perhaps the greatest sign of this absence of co-operation is 
that, after 1925, leaders of both states did not m eet again until 1965, 
forty years later.
iii. The C ross-border R elationsh ip . Phase Two: M odern isa tion  
and Reform
By the late 1950s, economic change had  affected both Irish and 
N orthern Irish states. This change in turn affected the level of cross- 
border co-operation between the two states, as well as domestic policy 
in both jurisdictions. The period of m utual insulation had ended and 
was replaced with one where both states attem pted to increase cross- 
borderco-operation.
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Modernisation
In both N orthern  Ireland and the Republic, economic questions 
dom inated the horizon by the late 1950s. The technocratic approach 
which was adopted by both states m ade the prospect of cross-border 
co-operation m ore alluring. From an Irish perspective, such co­
operation would encourage unionists to join in a united Ireland. Even if 
unification did  not occur, cross-border co-operation w ould induce 
economic growth, which was desirable in itself (O'Leary and McGarry, 
1993, pp. 155-156). This was a policy of "technocratic anti-partitionism" 
(Lyne, 1990).
Similarly, Northern Irish civil servants saw the benefit to be had 
from co-operating w ith  the Irish state on an economic basis. Thus, 
economic events in N orthern Ireland and the Republic form ed the 
background to the first meeting by representatives from both states 
since 1925. This background deserves further elaboration.
In 1958, an Irish senior civil servant, T. K. Whitaker, drew  up a five 
year Programme for Economic Expansion for the Republic of Ireland. 
The Irish five year economic plan em phasised the im portance of 
attracting foreign capital, of export prom otion and of agricultural 
modernisation. The plan registered a change in the Irish approach, for, 
since its foundation, the Irish state had insulated itself both from 
foreign trade, from W orld War and, as we have seen, from N orthern 
Ireland. It was clear that Irish policy makers were preparing the way for 
Irish  en trance  to the new ly estab lished  E uropean  Econom ic 
Com munity and, thus, "to aim at self-sufficiency in the old style was 
simply not realistic" (Lyons, 1972, p. 629).
How ever, the new economic policy represented  m ore than 
simply economic factors. It was also a coming of age for the Irish state. 
The policy signified new confidence and the European Economic 
Com m unity was a welcome forum  for the Republic to assert its 
identity, apart from any anticipated economic benefits. The climate of 
European opinion had, thus, affected the Republic. The concept of 
spillover bears striking similarity to the idea of unity-inducing economic 
growth, the technocratic anti- partitionism  described above. Changes 
abroad and at home contributed to the new emphasis on cross-border 
co-operation.
H ow ever, although such grow th was sim ilarly sought by 
N orthern  Irish policy makers, any constitutional im plications were
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strictly  avoided. For N orthern  Ireland, the dom inant economic 
problem  was the economic decline of traditional industries, such as 
ship building and linen. The source of decline was multifaceted:
the difficulty of m aintaining themselves in a w orld which no 
longer needed so m uch of their products (this applied to both 
linen and shipbuilding), the absence of minerals and fuels, the 
smallness of the domestic m arket, the cost of reaching the all- 
im portant export market, the difficulty of finding work for men 
rather than women, and the lack of capital at home (Lyons, 1972, 
p. 748).
M any of these factors form, of course, the backbone of the common 
interests shared by N orthern Ireland and the Republic (see chapter 
one). Poor economic perform ance and British unw illingness to 
subsidise the traditional industries (Buckland, 1981, p. 107) necessitated 
change. In 1964, a six year p lan  w as in troduced  to develop 
infrastructure and 'growth centres' in Northern Ireland.
In line w ith the em phasis on efficiency, cross-border co­
operation was deemed to be desirable and, in 1965, the Irish Taoiseach, 
Sean Lemass, was invited to the Northern Irish parliament at Stormont. 
As Irish policy makers themselves were similarly moved by economic 
logic and global political change, it was not an unwelcome invitation. 
The first meeting between Sean Lemass and Terence O'Neill occurred 
in the January of 1965. N ot surprisingly, the meeting concentrated on 
economic m atters of cross-border co-operation to the exclusion of 
m ore contentious issues. It is notew orthy that the N orthern business 
com m unity welcom ed the meeting: "In general cross-border co­
operation on tourist promotion, electricity generation ... could lead to 
considerable savings" (Farrell, 1976, p. 231).
However, despite further meetings, tangible plans for sustained 
cross-border co-operation proved to be elusive. Domestic upheaval in 
N orthern Ireland intruded upon the tentative process of cross-border 
co-operation.
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"Reform"
The establishment of the welfare state in Britain in the post-war period 
altered the position of Catholics in N orthern Ireland. Catholics now 
had  free access to schooling and m any m ore gained a university 
education. A m iddle class Catholic com m unity developed and, in 
contrast to traditional nationalists, its m em bers w ere w illing to 
participate in the institutions of N orthern Ireland. Moreover, the aim 
was that basic economic and civil rights should be available for all: 
housing, jobs, the right to vote and fair policing. Leaders such as Ivan 
Cooper, Gerry Fitt, Paddy Devlin and John Hum e pu t the case for state 
reform in logical terms. Organisations m oulded on American civil 
rights groups em erged, such as the N orthern Ireland Civil Rights 
Association (NICRA) and the Derry Citizens Action Committee. On 
the basis of these movements, the constitutionalist nationalist, Social 
Democratic and Labour Party was established in 1970.3
The dilemma for new unionist leaders was that it was no longer 
possible to exclude Catholics from economic and political privileges 
on the basis of alleged subversiveness (O'Leary and McGarry, 1993, p. 
161). Terence O'Neill became Northern Irish Prime Minister in 1963 and 
responded to the new  breed of Catholic politics by claim ing to 
in troduce reform. How ever, despite rhetoric to the contrary and 
O 'Neill's visits to Catholic convents and schools, little change in the 
status of Catholics actually occurred. There was no local governm ent 
reform, housing reform or security force reform. Even the White Paper, 
hopefully entitled "The Reshaping of Local Government", provided for 
restructuring, but left representation issues well alone. The new  co­
operative spirit was evident only at one level: in tone, not substance.
U nder fire from both Nationalists and the Wilson Government 
in Britain, more substantial reform was introduced in 1968. This reform 
included prom ises to change housing allocation and to appoint an 
om budsm an. It also promised to w ithdraw  the Special Powers Act as 
soon as possible. It did not provide for one man one vote, a provision 
which w ould have been at the heart of any m eaningful democratic 
reform.
3 The N orthern  Irish parties will be discussed at greater length in 
chapter three.
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The reform was not enough for nationalists and Catholics in 
Northern Ireland. Yet, for unionists it was far too much. Clearly, the 
cause of O'Neillism was not greater unionist security or assurance that 
a Catholic Irish threat had dim inished, bu t socio-economic change. 
Both O 'N eill's co-operative tone and the initiation of cross-border 
contacts were worrying developments for traditional unionists. Thus, 
domestic pressures in N orthern Ireland em anating from the unionist 
cam p restric ted  both in ternal reform  and the cross-border co­
operative process. The continuation of unionist insecurity m eant that 
even O 'Neill's early cosmetic change was resisted by a segment of the 
unionist population. The mixture of nationalist disappointm ent and 
unionist fear contributed to the outbreak of violence in 1968.
The civil rights movements used a m ethod of peaceful protest 
m arches through certain designated areas of N orthern Ireland. The 
m archers insisted that, as the m arches w ere not in tended to be 
sectarian, they would m arch through both Catholic and Protestant 
dw elling  areas. In O ctober 1968, a m arch w as p lan n ed  to 
Londonderry/D erry. Unionist groups awaited the marchers in protest 
at their incursion to Protestant areas. As the marchers entered these 
areas, they were attacked by the police force (the RUC) who were 
supported by paramilitary unionist organisations.
The Northern Irish situation was to spiral in violence from 1968 
onw ards. M ore extrem e groups developed, such as the People's 
Democracy, which prescribed the use of defensive violence against 
a ttackers and was com m itted to a m ixture of socialism  and 
republicanism. In 1969, the UUP split. Later, Ian Paisley’s Democratic 
U nionist Party (DUP), representing the more hardline mem bers of 
unionism was established and the Alliance Party representing the more 
m oderate unionist camp was also founded. In Belfast, in 1969, mob 
violence by unionists aided by the RUC led to the death of six people. 
It w as clear that the m ediocre co-operation of O 'N eill and the 
participatory co-operation of civil rights groups had failed to resolve 
the N orthern Irish problem. The conflict deepened. It was a conflict 
w hich proved to be detrim ental to the cross-border relationship.
50
iv. The Cross-border Relationship. Phase Three: Crisis
Crisis Management
If the economic dem ands of m odernisation had ended the phase of 
insulation of the Irish government from N orthern Ireland, the outbreak 
of violence in Northern Ireland consolidated that end. The outbreak of 
the conflict led to a situation of peak crisis4 for decision makers. Not 
surprisingly, cross-border co-operation betw een unionists and  Irish 
policy makers ceased. Moreover, unionist suspicions of Irish intentions 
seemed founded, for in the Republic emotions ran high in response to 
the conflict.
The apparent justification for unionist fears was the Arms Crisis 
of 1969. It em erged that m em bers of the Irish governm ent had  
apparently organised contacts w ith the IRA, so as to sm uggle arms 
from the Irish state to nationalists in N orthern Ireland. The Arms crisis 
was telling in that it was a rem inder of the equivocal attitude of Irish 
policy m akers tow ards the use of violence. Thus, the crisis was a 
reminder of the semi-constitutional origin of the state.
The Irish Taoiseach, Jack Lynch, was not among the accused in 
the subsequent arms trial, however, he too appeared taken aback by 
the surge in violence in Northern Ireland. On television, Lynch made a 
virulent plea for action and condemned the Stormont regime. Lynch 
announced that the Irish Army w ould set up hospitals along the 
border and dem anded U nited N ations intervention. All this was 
needed, Lynch argued, because it was "clear that the Irish government 
can no longer stand by and see innocent people injured and perhaps 
worse" (quoted in Farrell, 1976, p. 261).
For the British government, the conflict initiated a time of peak 
crisis also. In the effort to contain the conflict, British troops entered 
Northern Ireland in 1969 the day after Lynch's dramatic speech. In 1972, 
Direct Rule from Westminster was imposed. Legislative action was the 
main prong of attack against the agents of violence. Internm ent without
4 It is arguable that the entire history of the conflict from 1968 to the 
present is a crisis situation for policy makers. However, the initial 
outbreak of violence caught policy makers unawares and it is clear that 
their initial behaviour constituted m ore sudden and spontaneous 
reaction than in subsequent periods of the conflict. Thus, the term 'peak 
crisis' is used to depict the early years of the conflict.
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trial was in troduced in 1972. However, as w ith previous security 
m easures by the N orthern  Irish state, in ternm ent victim ised the 
n a tio n a lis t com m unity  m ore th an  its u n io n is t ne ighbours . 
Consequently, the roots of nationalist frustration and anger, which had 
contributed to the outbreak of violence in the first place, were 
strengthened.
W hether or not the policy and behaviour of both the Irish and 
British governments were flawed, w hat was unequivocal was that both 
governments were obliged to intervene more deeply in N orthern Irish 
affairs. The Irish governm ent, clearly, em pathised w ith the Catholic 
minority in N orthern Ireland. The Arms Crisis, however, was the last 
episode of sem i-constitutional governm ental behaviour (Fitzgerald, 
1993) and, henceforw ard, Irish formal co-operation was w ith the 
constitutional nationalist SDLP.
Again, cross-border co-operation with unionists was weak, thus, 
m eaningful co-operation was absent. U nionists w ere alarm ed by 
Lynch's speech, as well by as the Arms crisis and it was clear that 
intervention did not necessarily imply co-operation. It was also clear 
that the emergency measures of internment and Direct Rule were not 
solutions to the conflict.
v . T h e  C ro s s -B o rd e r  R e la t i o n s h ip .  P h a s e  F o u r : 
Intergovernm entalism  and the Search for Solution
Intergovernmentalism
Following the period of peak crisis, policy makers began to fumble in 
search of a political settlement. The search was m arked firstly by the 
Sunningdale Agreem ent in 1973 and eventually culm inated in the 
formal intergovernm entalist approach adopted by British and Irish 
governm ents in the 1980s. Intergovernm entalism  had  significant 
implications for the cross-border relationship.
Anglo-Irish intergovernm entalism  refers to the co-operative 
relationship between the British and Irish governments, to resolve the 
conflict in Northern Ireland. The rationale for the intergovernmentalist 
approach is that whilst the British governm ent is formally responsible 
for N orthern  Ireland, the Irish governm ent is perceived , by 
constitutionalist nationalists, to be responsible for the nationalist 
minority in Northern Ireland. Thus, the SDLP and the Irish government
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moved towards the idea that in any settlement, the Irish governm ent 
m ust be a guardian of the nationalist m inority, a safeguard against 
violations of that community's rights.
It was agreed by both the SDLP and the Irish governm ent that 
there was an Irish  dimension' to any future successful settlement. The 
argum ent was that, if the nationalist minority felt that it was protected 
by the Irish government, then it would be less likely to turn to the IRA 
for protection and, consequently, the level of violence in N orthern 
Ireland w ould decrease. Intergovernmental co-operation was a way of 
incorporating such an 'Irish dimension' for, in communicating with the 
British governm ent, the Irish governm ent was kept abreast of British 
p lans and  could a ttem pt to influence policy form ulation  and 
implementation.
For the British governm ent, intergovernm entalism  had other 
pay-offs. In particular, through closer co-operation w ith the Irish 
governm ent, it was hoped that g reater cross-border security co­
operation w ould occur. The im provem ent of such co-operation was 
particu larly  necessary along the w inding  border w hich d iv ided  
N orthern Ireland from the Republic.
Thus, intergovernmentalism served the aims of the SDLP and 
the British and Irish governments. The Sinn Fein party (perceived to be 
the political wing of the IRA), which originally did not contest elections 
and, thus, which was not in the constitutional realm, was not included in 
any negotiations. However, even after 1982, when it decided to contest 
elections, Sinn Fein was excluded on the basis of its links w ith the IRA. 
Thus, it was not enam oured of the intergovernmental process.
Insofar as intergovernm entalism  w ould im prove the security 
situation along the border, it also aided unionist politicians. However, it 
was the cross-border element (the Irish dimension), which once again 
raised  unionist objections. The inclusion of an Irish dim ension 
obviously meant closer cross-border co-operation, if not with unionists, 
then w ith  the N orthern  Irish civil service and, obviously, w ith 
nationalists in Northern Ireland. The role of the Irish governm ent as a 
guardian of the nationalist minority in N orthern Ireland was perceived 
by unionists to be a step on the slippery slope to Irish unity, a barely 
veiled Irish irreden tist advance. In tergovernm entalism  was not 
favoured by unionists.
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Thus, both the Sunningdale Agreement of 1973, the Devolution 
Bill of 1982 and the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 were all opposed by 
unionists.
The Sunningdale Agreement
In 1973, an attem pted solution to the N orthern  Irish problem  was 
agreed upon by the British and Irish governments and members of the 
SDLP, the Alliance Party and the UUP at Sunningdale. The Sunningdale 
Agreement not only had implications for cross-border co-operation, it 
attem pted to institutionalise political cross-border co-operation.
The Sunningdale Agreement provided for a two tier Council of 
Ireland. The Council would consist of a Council of Ministers w ith seven 
N orthern  Irish and seven Irish members. The Council was to have 
executive powers in such areas as security, agriculture and electricity 
and it was intended that it w ould foster cross-border co-operation. 
A part from the executive, there w ould be a Consultative Assembly 
with Dail and Northern Irish parliamentary representation.
The meeting between British, Irish and the new N orthern Irish 
devolved government was the first between all three since 1925. A part 
from  th e  ex is ten ce  of th is  t r ip a r t i te  c o n fe ren c e , th e  
intergovernm entalist approach was evident from the actual outcom e 
of the conference. As in subsequent years, the SDLP and the Irish 
governm ent were closely aligned. The British governm ent for the first 
tim e appeared  to believe there was an Irish dim ension to any 
resolution of the conflict in Northern Ireland and observed in a Green 
Paper of 1972 that
N orthern Ireland was part of the geographical entity of Ireland and 
that it shared with the Republic certain common problems including 
the prevention of cross-border terrorism  and (from January 1973) 
common membership of the EEC, and consequently, 'it is therefore 
desirable that any new arrangem ents for N orthern Ireland should 
whilst meeting the wishes of N orthern Ireland and Great Britain, be 
so far as possible acceptable to and accepted by the Republic of 
Ireland (O'Leary, Elliott and Wilford, 1988, pp. 31-32).
At the subsequent Sunningdale negotiations, the then British Prim e 
Minister, Edward Heath, "threw his weight behind the SDLP and the 
Dublin government" (O'Leary, Elliott and Wilford, 1988, p. 36), so that
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the proposed  Council of Ireland w ould  be consulted  over the 
composition of a new police force in Northern Ireland.
The Republic, for its part, pledged to strengthen its campaign 
against the IRA and to foster cross-border security co-operation. 
M oreover, the Republic recognised tha t no change could occur in 
N orthern Ireland's status, unless a m ajority of the population there 
w anted such change. Given the sensitivity of the Irish constitutional 
claim to N orthern  Ireland Irish recognition of N orthern  Ireland 's 
constitutional status was of significance and was used by Faulkner, the 
leader of the UUP, in an attem pt to persuade unionists to accept the 
agreement (O'Leary and McGarry, 1993, p. 198).
However, the Irish power to intervene in the appointm ent of a 
police force was a particularly bitter pill for unionists to swallow, for it 
was in terpreted  as giving the Republic control of N orthern  Irish 
policing. The proposed Council of Ireland was firmly opposed by 
unionists and in dem onstration of their opposition unionist parties 
coalesced into a united  front, the U nited Ulster U nionist Council 
(UUUC), spearheaded by the Vanguard Party and the DUP. Moreover, 
the Faulknerite UUP faced the 1974 General Election unprepared, with 
no electoral machine and few candidates (Farrell, 1977, p. 315). The 
UUUC had a landslide victory, w inning 366,703 votes to Faulkner's 
UUP's 94,331 votes (Farrell, 1977, p. 315).
A general strike was called by a co-ordinating committee of 
unionists in the newly formed Ulster Workers Party and backed by the 
Ulster Army Council, a param ilitary committee. In May 1973, in the 
m idst of political and paramilitary pressure, electoral defeat and strike 
action, the N orthern  Irish pow er sharing executive resigned. The 
Sunningdale Agreement had failed. Irish /N orthern  Irish cross-border 
co-operation was as elusive as before.
The Prior Initiative
This brief flirtation with institutionalised cross-border co-operation had 
failed, bu t the intergovernm entalist approach d id  not die. It was 
resum ed m ore obviously, when Irish and British prim e m inisters, 
Charles Haughey and M argaret Thatcher met in 1980. The Republic of 
Ireland's and the SDLP's emphasis on an Irish dimension together with 
British omission of that dimension stalled the process in 1982. Events 
did not augur well for cross-border co-operation.
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In 1982, James Prior, then Secretary of State for N orthern  
Ireland, introduced a 'rolling devolution' plan, which aimed to ensure 
pow er sharing w ith m inority representation. The Prior initiative 
re in troduced  the N orthern  Ireland A ssem bly w hich had  been 
p rov ided  for under the Sunningdale A greem ent. H ow ever, the 
Assembly was to provide the N orthern Irish governm ent w ith few 
powers, until full devolution occurred. Devolution was to occur in 
stages, one departm ent at a time (O'Leary, Elliott and Wilford, 1988, p. 
68). Proposals for devolution would be m ade by the Assembly and six 
departm ents w ould be established by the assembly to over see the 
NICS.
For Irish politicians, there was no meaningful 'Irish dimension' in 
Prior's bill. N ationalists refused to take their seats and unionists 
dom inated the new Assembly. Consequently, "it became a talking 
shop, a forum in which the rival unionist factions competed with each 
other" (O'Leary and McGarry, 1993, p. 213). In June 1986, the plan was 
officially shelved and the Assembly was dissolved.
Both the Sunningdale A greem ent and the Prior initiative 
prepared  the way for the Anglo-Irish Agreement, in 1985. Clearly, 
neither of the form er two initiatives succeeded in im proving the 
Ir ish /N o rth e rn  Irish cross-border relationship . The A nglo-Irish 
Agreem ent w ent further in including an Irish dim ension and had 
consequent implications for the cross-border relationship.
v i . T h e  C r o s s - b o r d e r  R e la t i o n s h ip .  P h a s e  F iv e : 
In tergovernm entalism  and the A nglo-Irish A greem ent
Intergovernmentalism in the 1980s was m arked by its institutionalised 
nature. In other words, intergovernmental co-operation was not simply 
a question of ad hoc meetings and informal bargaining which could be 
suspended at whim. Instead, it was formal and treaty-based. Such 
intergovernmentalism was manifested by the signing of the Anglo-Irish 
Agreem ent in 1985. The 1985 Agreem ent was not a solution, but a 
framework for a solution to the conflict in N orthern Ireland. The aim 
was to achieve a devolved power sharing governm ent w ith adequate 
safeguards for minority representation in Northern Ireland. There were 
four main co-operative elements in the Agreement.
Firstly, the signing of the Agreement by the British and Irish 
governm ents represented intergovernmental co-operation. It reflected
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hours of careful and  deta iled  nego tia tion  betw een the  tw o 
governm ents. M oreover, representatives of both British and Irish 
governm ents, together with their civil servants were to m eet every 
three to four m onths in w hat was term ed the Intergovernm ental 
Conference (IGC). As w ith all international treaties, the Agreem ent 
could be suspended only with the m utual agreement of the signatories.
Secondly, the Agreement reflected the pivotal position of the 
SDLP. The SDLP became a prim e influence on Irish policy towards 
N orthern  Ireland and, thus, in the negotiations which led to the 
Agreement, an alliance between the Irish governm ent and the SDLP 
deepened. Thus, the Agreem ent reflected the fact that one party, at 
least, in Northern Ireland was enjoying co-operative relations with the 
Republic. However, again, the fact that party was a constitutionalist 
nationalist one lessened the significance of such co-operation.
Thirdly, there was an explicit cross-border co-operative element 
under the Agreem ent. Article 10 was entitled "Cross-Border Co­
operation on Security, Economic, Social and Cultural m atters". As its 
nam e suggests, it provided for functional cross-border co-operation 
and had clear overlaps with EC regional policy (see p. 107). It would 
also engage a large number of Irish and Northern Irish civil servants in 
cross-border functional co-operation.
The fourth co-operative elem ent also had  a cross-border 
dimension. The Irish governm ent insisted that any settlem ent m ust 
have an Irish dimension, that is, any proposed Agreement m ust allow 
for some sort of Irish protection of nationalist m inority rights in 
N orthern Ireland. One aspect of such protection was the establishment 
of a Secretariat at Maryfield, outside Belfast, to serve the community. 
The Secretariat acted as a type of om budsm an and was m ade up of 
both Irish and N orthern Irish civil servants. The Agreement gave the 
Irish governm ent the legal right to be consulted on all affairs of 
relevance to the nationalist minority in N orthern Ireland. Clearly, an 
Irish dimension was a significant pillar of the treaty. In this way, the 
AIA provided for, not simply functional5, but political cross-border co­
operation.
Theoretically, the logic was that the Agreem ent w ould force 
unionists to alter their behaviour by preventing them from having an 
effective voice, unless they partic ipated  in a co-operative and
5 The functional aspects of the AIA will be discussed in chapter five.
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constructive manner. Consequently, unionists were not consulted in 
the negotiations which preceded the Agreement. Thus, the Agreement 
in itself did not include a cross-border co-operative element as regards 
unionists in N orthern Ireland. It did, however, contain a potential co­
operative dimension. If unionists agreed to enter into negotiations on 
British and Irish term s, then they too w ould form  p a rt of the 
intergovernmental process.
In the meantime, in an attem pt to reassure unionists, the Irish 
governm ent recognised that the border did exist and that its demise 
could only occur if the Northern majority so wished. This recognition 
did little to calm unionist anger that not only the Republic, but now 
Britain were threatening unionist identity.
The effect of the Anglo-Irish Agreement on the cross-border 
relationship
The AIA was drafted w ith extrem e delicacy and sensitivity. Its 
ambiguities were in a sense intentional, in that both British and Irish 
governm ents wished to appeal to as a wide an audience as possible. 
However, because of its ambiguity, the AIA was interpreted differently 
by unionists and nationalists. For unionists, it represented an erosion of 
British sovereignty and a form of power sharing between the UK and 
the Republic of Ireland. In contrast, for extreme nationalists, the Irish 
recogn ition  of N o rth ern  Ire lan d 's  s ta tu s , v io la ted  the Irish  
constitutional claim to Northern Ireland.
Unionists were vehemently opposed to the Agreem ent on the 
grounds that it allowed the Republic of Ireland to be consulted on 
in te rn a l N orthern  Irish m atters, if those m atters concerned the 
nationalist m inority. Thus, U nionists argued that the A greem ent 
eroded British sovereign rule of N orthern Ireland and not only this, 
that it was signed by the head of a British government. In fact, the AIA 
fell far short of Anglo-Irish joint authority. For example, the then Irish 
Taoiseach, G arrett Fitzgerald, w ished to have an Irish m inister 
perm anently based in Maryfield. In contrast, the IGC had no executive 
powers (O'Leary and McGarry, 1993, p. 224).
Unionists also resented the fact that, although the SDLP was 
consulted in the drawing up of the Agreement, they were ignored. In 
protest, the unionist-controlled councils called a local governm ent 
strike, w hereby councils w ould refuse to set local rates and
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consequently all activity would freeze. In actual fact, the protest was 
not a success, for local auditors threatened to take action against the 
strikers (O'Leary and McGarry, 1993, p. 253). Given the failure of the 
local strike, unionists were divided on how best to destroy the Anglo- 
Irish Agreement (O'Leary and McGarry, 1993, p. 225). Evidently, the 
A greem ent had  done little  to induce cross-border political co­
operation with unionists.
Nor did the Agreement win the support of hardline nationalists, 
or indeed the constitutionalist Fianna Fail party in the Republic. Whilst, 
Fianna Fail's subsequent governm ent supported  the AIA once it 
gained office, the IRA and Sinn Fein, the IRA's political wing, remained 
in resolute opposition to the intergovernmental process. The AIA was 
condem ned as an abandonm ent of the Irish constitutional claim over 
N orthern Ireland. Thus, Sinn Fein aimed "to ensure that the AIA 
w ould not produce minority confidence in British governm ent of the 
region tempered by an Irish dimension" (O'Leary and McGarry, 1993, p. 
270).
The combination of both unionist and nationalist opposition led 
to a deteriorating security situation. In 1986, fatal casualties increased 
by twenty one per cent, largely because of loyalist activity (Arthur, 1986, 
p. 103). Both nationalist and unionist param ilitaries expanded their 
definition of w hat constituted a legitimate target to include persons 
who were not members of the security forces (O'Leary and McGarry, 
1993, p. 270) and in the ensuing years the IRA increased its activities in 
Britain.
Yet, in the m idst of the division, there were signs of political 
movement. Suggestions m ade by unionist leaders began to take the 
form of proposals for new  political arrangem ents w ithin N orthern 
Ireland, on condition that the Intergovernm ental Conference cease its 
activities. Thus, the UDA suggested a devolved governm ent, if the 
A greem ent w ould be suspended. Sim ilarly, the DUP and UUP 
produced the "Task Force Report" in which they too m entioned a 
devolved governm ent with power sharing, if the Agreement would be 
suspended.
By 1991, under the adm inistration of the then Secretary for 
N orthern Ireland, Peter Brooke, the "Strand talks" discussion began. 
The new strategy involved dividing negotiations into three separate 
strands. In the first strand, Brooke w ould speak to each party 's  
representatives separately. In the second strand, nationalists (excluding
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Sinn Fein) and unionists within Northern Ireland would meet together 
in conference. In the third strand all party talks between unionists and 
Irish politicians would take place. The third strand would signify cross- 
border co-operation. In 1991, the Intergovernm ental Conference was 
suspended to allow the initiation of "Strand Two" talks. It was intended 
that these bilateral talks would be followed by Strand Three talks. Yet, 
the path to the Strand Three stage was a tortuous one. The Strand Two 
talks were delayed because delegates could not agree to a venue or 
chairman. In the midst of the controversy, Sinn Fein's suggestion that 
the talks take place in its Belfast office was particularly novel (Arthur, 
1992, p. 113). Thus, the prospects for the cross-border talks seemed dim, 
for even the inter-party talks were ridden with obstacles.
As for the cross-border relationship, there was no shortage of 
tangible divisions. First and foremost, the 1937 Irish constitutional claim 
to N orthern Ireland remained. The unionist argum ent was that this 
claim continued to cause fears of Irish irredentism  and that some 
reassurance was required by unionists before they could engage in 
cross-border, all-party talks.
There was not a clear cut consensus among Irish politicians. 
Some politicians, including some members of the Labour party, the 
newly formed Progressive Democrats (1986) and the W orkers Party, 
argued that unionist dem ands should be adhered to in this respect. 
Others, most notably, the Fianna Fail party, resisted such constitutional 
change, on the grounds that unionists w ould have to guarantee that 
they would reciprocate, before Articles Two and Three were amended. 
Arguably, the constitutional question was one barrier to co-operation. 
Yet, the worry that, even if change occurred, unionists would still refuse 
to co-operate belied the Irish suspicion that Articles Two and Three 
were not the real barrier at all, but that the onus rested on unionist 
politicians.
A second and related obstacle to cross-border co-operation 
was that the Irish state did not appear to have m oved closer to 
secularism, at least in its constitutional provisions. Thus, divorce and 
abortion were prohibited and unionists argued that to legislate against 
these acts was an example of Catholic authoritarianism. Consequently, 
there was little encouragement for unionists, or indeed Protestants to 
engage in all-party talks. The Irish governm ent, it was argued, had 
made its position clear.
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On top of these issues, tensions in the Anglo-Irish process 
overshadow ed cross-border relations. Though, the A nglo-Irish 
relationship is not the concern in this chapter, it is notew orthy that 
there were differences of opinion betw een both governm ents over 
British adm inistration of justice; over security policy in N orthern  
Ireland and extradition in the Republic (Keatinge, 1990, p. 10) and over 
the failure to achieve fair employm ent in N orthern Ireland (O'Leary 
and McGarry, 1993, p. 262).
By 1993, there was little evidence of significant Irish /N orthern  
Irish cross-border political co-operation, although Anglo-Irish co­
operation had increased. The tw in necessities of comprom ise and 
bargaining in any political co-operative relationship were m arkedly 
absent from the Irish /N orthern  Irish relationship. On one level, it 
appeared that the intergovernmental process had failed to improve the 
cross-border relationship. Moreover, conflict continued.
Yet, it was also the case that the constant of death  and 
destruction, the slogans of an ancient quarrel, m asked the more subtle 
changes of Northern Irish politicians. Thus, some observers claimed 
that the Anglo-Irish Agreem ent aim ed to bring about "attitud inal 
change" (Arthur, 1992, p. 111). In contrast to previous phases of the 
cross-border relationship, unionists were forced to negotiate, if not with 
the Republic, initially at least, then w ith the SDLP and the British 
government. The attitude of 'No Surrender' did not prove as effective a 
unionist weapon as on previous occasions.
Consequently, there is an argum ent that, although cross-border 
political co-operation was not underw ay by 1993, over time, both sides 
would make concessions and would engage in compromise. The new  
Irish governm ent, in 1993, w ith the Labour leader, Dick Spring as 
M inister for Foreign Affairs, appeared less averse to the prospect of 
constitutional change, if not now, then later. Thus, a unionist leader 
speculated tentatively, that "there may be bilateral contacts, but these 
haven't developed yet" (McGuinness, 1993).
Such argum ents do not alter the conclusion that cross-border 
political co-operation between unionist politicians and Irish politicians 
is absent for the period under survey. Moreover, for those who are at 
the heartland of the violence in N orthern  Ireland, argum ents that 
depend on 'long run ' scenarios are indeterm inate, as grey as those 
which claim that economic co-operation can lead to political co­
operation.
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C onclusion
On one level, little has changed in the political relationship between 
N orthern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland in over seventy years. 
Given the necessity that cross-border co-operation is not sim ply 
betw een nationalists in N orthern Ireland and policy m akers in the 
Republic, but between unionists in N orthern Ireland and Irish policy 
makers, then none of the above phases in the cross-border relationship 
contain significant change.
H ow ever, the very identification of different phases does 
indicate that there are landm arks in the cross-border political 
relationship. One clear change is the difference in Irish and British 
policy towards Northern Ireland since 1921. Thus, insulation turned to 
in te rs ta te  contact, then  to panic in te rven tion  and  lastly  to 
intergovernmentalism. Though unionist behaviour remained strikingly 
similar for most of these phases, reaction to the Anglo-Irish Agreement 
did soften, as we have seen.
However, from the perspective of a study of the European 
Community and cross-border co-operation, what m atters is that for the 
period 1988 to 1993, the existence of political cross-border co-operation 
betw een N orthern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, was absent. 
There was a clear distinction between the UK and Irish governmental 
relationship in the 1980s and 1990s and the relationship between Irish 
and N orthern Irish politicians. Thus, the Irish /N orthern  Irish cross- 
border relationship rem ained weak. M oreover, a major stum bling 
block to Irish /N orthern  Irish co-operation was unionist fear that any 
cross-border co-operation was ideologically pain ted  in shades of 
green. Conversely, for Irish policy makers, the suspicion remained that 
Irish concession-making would not be reciprocated by unionists. These 
fears have persisted from 1921 to the time of writing.
The relevance of these points is that m uch of the ground is 
cleared in terms of evaluating the EC's potential role in the cross- 
border relationship. It cannot be argued that political co-operation will 
lead to functional econom ic cross-border co-operation betw een 
unionist and Irish politicians, because political co-operation between 
unionist politicians and their Irish counterparts is absent for the period 
under exam ination. M oreover, even cross-border functional co­
operation has been thwarted in the past, because of the constitutional
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issue. In contrast, the EC may indeed be perceived to be a m ore 
neutral agent.
However, despite these positive assertions, one m ust enter 
words of caution. The IGC which was set up under the aegis of the AIA 
involves civil servants from both Northern Ireland and the Republic. It 
is to be expected that civil service cross-border co-operation w ould 
increase because of the AIA. Thus, for specific g roups of actors of 
activity, the AIA m ay indeed increase cross-border co-operation. 
Politicians constitute only one group of agents to be studied in this 
thesis. Although, the AIA has not increased cross-border co-operation 
betw een politicians, it m ay increase co-operation betw een civil 
servants, between business people and it may even exert an influence 
over the Com m ission itself in EC policy tow ards the N orthern  
Ireland/Irish  relationship. In the rem ainder of this thesis, the relative 
significance of the AIA and the EC in im proving the cross-border 
Irish /N orthern  Irish relationship across four groups of actors will be 
examined. The case studies begin w ith an exam ination of how  the 
Commission itself views its role in the cross-border relationship.
Chapter Three
The Commission and Cross-Border Co-operation
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In tro d u c tio n
The weakness of the Irish/N orthern  Irish cross-border relationship is 
evident from the previous chapter. Neo-functionalism emphasises the 
im portance of the European Com m ission in upgrad ing  common 
interests so as to improve such a weak cross-border relationship. The 
Com m ission is assum ed to exert a dynam ic influence on state 
behaviour. A central question in this thesis is whether the Commission 
does indeed provide the dynamism and leadership to achieve a closer 
cross-border relationship between N orthern Ireland and the Republic 
of Ireland. Evidence of dynam ism  falls into two categories: first, 
evidence that there is a greater num ber of common interests between 
N orthern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, as a direct consequence 
of EC policy initiated by the Commission. Second, evidence that the 
Commission is aware of and sensitive to the existence of conflict in 
N orthern Ireland and seeks to use its policies so as to resolve that 
conflict.
In this chapter, I examine both these issues. In section two, I 
examine the specific EC policies which potentially up-grade common 
interests between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. These 
policies are: the creation of a Single European M arket (SEM), EC 
regional policy; and the CAP reform of the Com m unity's Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP). In section three, I examine the question of 
whether the Commission is aware of the conflict in N orthern Ireland 
and whether it perceives itself to have a role in resolving that conflict. 
Section three is based upon interviews with members of the European 
Com m ission and w ith mem bers of the UK and Irish perm anent 
representations in Brussels.
In conclusion, I will argue that EC policy may form a basis for 
increased cross-border co-operation and that, in this w ay, the 
Commission may have provided a general dynamism  and may have 
upg raded  common interests betw een N orthern  Ireland and the 
Republic of Ireland. However, w hether or not such up-grading is 
successful depends upon the reaction of Irish and N orthern  Irish 
actors to EC policies. Moreover, the Commission follows the lead of 
the Anglo-Irish process in its approach to the conflict in N orthern 
Ireland and, although individual Commission m em bers are keenly 
aware of the need to resolve the conflict in N orthern Ireland and to 
im prove the cross-border relationship , there is no Com m ission
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strategy as such. If there is a general observation to be m ade of the 
Com m ission's approach to the Irish /N o rth ern  Irish cross-border 
relationship, it is that the Commission is largely confused by and 
ignorant of the conflict in Northern Ireland.
It is essential before examining the Commission's specific role in 
the N orthern  Irish /Irish  cross-border relationship to exam ine the 
theoretical role of the Commission in the EC's general decision making 
process. In the next section, I examine the role of the Commission in 
the EC's decision-making process, both in theory and in practice.
i. The Role of the Com mission in the EC's D ecision Making 
Process: Theory and Practice
Neo-functionalism , neo-realism and the formal powers of the 
Commission
For the devisers of the Treaty of Rome, the Commission was of central 
importance. Its role was set out as being three fold: to be the guardian 
of the Treaty of Rome, that is to ensure that the Treaty's aims and 
provisions w ould be im plem ented; to be the conscience of the 
Com m unity and to guide the Com m unity, and, finally, to initiate 
Com munity policy. Of these roles, the initiation of policy is the most 
important. Under the Treaty, the Commission m ust be independent of 
national governments and m ust prom ote and defend the interests of 
the Community (Arbuthnott and Edwards, 1979, pp. 21-23). Its policies 
m ust be compatible with this stipulation.
The power to initiate Community policies was vital, in allowing 
the Commission to up-grade the common interests of its members in 
the way that neo-functionalists wished (see p. 12). The Commission 
w ould identify common interests so as to elim inate disagreem ents 
between states. It would interpret its formal role so as to extend its 
power and then it would include national policy makers in its policy 
form ulation process. Thus, the Commission w ould exercise pow er in 
certain policy areas and w ould do so in conjunction w ith m em ber 
states. Consequently, an integrated Europe under Commission control 
would develop.
The Council of Ministers was established under the Treaty of 
Rome to represent the ministers of all member states at EC level. For 
example, in discussions of the EC's CAP, agricultural ministers would
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m eet under the aegis of the Council. Sim ilarly, the in tended  
p redom inance  of in te rest g roup  dem ands in develop ing  the 
C om m ission's pow ers (see chapter one) w as reflected by the 
establishment of the Economic and Social Council (ESC), which would 
represent European umbrella interest groups. Moreover, the European 
Parliament (EP) was established to represent the parties of Europe. The 
Commission would consult w ith the EP, the ESC and with the Council 
when form ulating its policies. The implication was that Com m unity 
interest and individual state interests w ould be synonym ous. The 
Commission would become the government of Europe. In this way, the 
Commission was deemed to be the "motor of integration" (Lodge, 1989, 
p. 37).
In contrast to this neo-functionalist vision, there was a contrary 
image of the Commission's role. Put bluntly, the Commission could not 
overcome the national interests of EC m ember states. According to 
neo-realists, the Commission's power to initiate policies is lim ited by 
the dem ands and interests of EC m em ber states. The Commission 
reflects the interests of these states and, consequently, its dynamic role 
in developing an integrated Europe is undermined.
The evolution of the EC's actual decision m aking process 
provides mixed evidence as to the validity of neo-functionalist thought. 
The Com m ission is d iv ided  into tw enty  three departm ents, or 
D irectorates General (DG), w ith seventeen Com m issioners. All 
Commissioners meet weekly in the college of Commissioners. Each 
DG is divided into divisions with responsibility for a particular area of 
one general policy. Junior officials in each division are involved in the 
first steps of drafting a policy proposal. This draft then moves up along 
the Commission hierarchy, being revised where deem ed necessary, 
until it reaches the college of Commissioners. Commission decisions 
on a proposal are reached normally by a qualified majority vote, but 
those in the minority are bound to the decision (Lodge, 1989, p. 39).
At all stages of the policy formulation process the Commission 
sounds out the opinions of other EC institutions. The Commission also 
consults w ith national civil servants in a m anner which has been 
term ed 'bureaucratic  in te rpene tra tion ': "the in term ing ling  and  
enmeshing of civil servants at all levels and across the ever-widening 
range of EC decision-m aking" (Lodge, 1989, p. 40). Such was the 
significance of the Commission's interaction with the Council, that the 
decision m aking process has been described as "an in teraction
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between the Commission and representatives of the governm ents of 
member states" (Coombes, 1979, p. 86). Theoretically there was nothing 
w rong with such interaction for neo-functionalists. It was perfectly 
com patible w ith the neo-functionalist concept of engrenage, or 
meshing, whereby the Commission w ould engage states in its policy 
form ulation process. The problem  for neo-functionalists was that 
increasingly the Council of Ministers came to dominate the content of 
EC policy outcomes (Wallace, Wallace and Webb, 1983, p. 53). The 
interests of the Commission and of the Council did not mesh together. 
M oreover, the Council could block a Commission proposal by one 
state exercising its veto power.
The Commission for its part depended on Council support. It 
d id  not wish to antagonise member states w ith whom  it w ould be 
w orking again and, consequently, it aim ed always to achieve a 
consensus of opinion (Ludlow, 1992, p. 88). The result of this consensual 
style was that EC policy was watered dow n to comply with the wishes 
of as m any member states as possible. Compromise was essential to 
the final policy outcome and, consequently, policies were incremental 
(Nugent, 1989, p. 249). The Commission did not appear to be able to 
exercise a leadership role, rather it was a hostage to the various self- 
interests of EC member states. In this way, the neo-realist analysis of 
the Commission's role appeared to be vindicated.
It appeared  that the Com m ission had  failed to up-grade 
common interests and that citizens of the EC's member states had not 
transferred legitimacy to the EC. Neo-functionalism looked remarkably 
foolish in the cold light of the 1970s. However, the SEA appeared to 
reflect a renewed Commission strength and dynamism. Institutional 
changes were introduced, the most significant of which was that no one 
state could block a Commission proposal. Instead, in all m atters 
relating to the establishment of the SEM, a Council's qualified majority 
of votes in favour of a proposal w ould ensure that proposal's safe 
passage.
These institutional changes, by reducing the relative power of 
the Council and by attempting to increase the EP's power (see chapter 
five), appeared to reflect the Commission's dynamism and leadership 
qualities. It m ediated, lobbied and harnessed national interests to its 
cause. The Commission was claimed to be "at the heart of the 1992 
programme" (Ludlow, 1992, p. 85). One of the principal factors alleged 
to have contributed to the SEA was "the parachuting into office, from
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1985 onward, of a remarkable group of politicians and officials, headed 
by Jacques Delors" (Ludlow, 1992, p. 86).
Arguably, the Commission, through its influence on the signing 
of the SEA, had upgraded  comm on in terests betw een N orthern  
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. If this "remarkable group" that was 
the Commission was a source of dynamic change, then could it not 
play a role in resolving the conflict in N orthern  Ireland and the 
intertw ined tense cross-border relationship? In the next section, I 
examine the policies which the Commission initiated in the 1980s and 
which may up-grade common interests between Northern Ireland and 
the Republic of Ireland.
ii. The Com m ission and  the U p-G rading of Irish  and  N orthern  
Irish  Com m on Interests
In the afterm ath of the SEA, the argum ent was heard that there was 
now  a clear basis for Irish /N orthern  Irish cross-border co-operation. 
The prescriptive argum ent was that in a Europe of the Regions the 
conflict in Northern Ireland was anachronistic and should be resolved, 
but there was also the argum ent that the SEA had provided a clear 
economic rationale for Irish /N orthern  Irish cross-border co-operation
Three main policies form ed the basis of the economic logic of 
cross-border co-operation: the creation of the SEM, the reform of the 
CAP and the reform of EC regional policy. Arguably, the Commission 
by initiating these three policies up-graded common interests between 
N orthern  Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. In this way, neo­
functionalism  appeared  to be validated . Of course, for neo ­
functionalism to be upheld it m ust first be shown that the Commission 
has, in practice, created a rationale for cross-border co-operation. I will 
now explore the above three EC policy changes, so as to determine the 
extent to which the Com mission did indeed create a rationale for 
Irish /N orthern  Irish cross-border co-operation, that is the extent to 
which it up-graded common interests.
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The Single European A ct and the Single European Market 
The establishment of the SEM
In 1985, a White Paper, entitled 'Completing the Internal M arket'1 was 
presented to the European Council by the Commission. The broad 
aim of this paper was to lay the foundations for the creation of a Single 
European M arket (SEM). There w ere three m ain elem ents to the 
program m e: the first was to weld together the tw elve individual 
members of the EC into one market; the second element was to ensure 
that the single market would be an expanding market; the third element 
was to ensure that resources of people and capital could flow to areas 
of greatest economic advantage. The establishm ent of the SEM 
entailed the removal of physical barriers to trade (customs posts), the 
removal of technical barriers (different technical and safety standards 
in member states) and the removal of fiscal barriers (different tax rates 
in member states).
The rationale for the SEM arose from the relatively slow growth 
rates of EC m ember states compared to those enjoyed by the USA 
and Japan in the 1970s and early 1980s. Neo-liberals argued that the 
USA enjoyed faster growth than European states because it benefited 
from free trade within its large market. Free trade in Europe w ould 
deliver similar benefits to EC m ember states. The argum ent held by 
traditional trade theorists was that there were substantial gains to be 
m ade from free trade and the creation of a single market, where states 
concentrated on producing those goods which they produced m ost 
efficiently and im ported all other goods. The argum ent was that by 
allowing free trade, im ports and exports w ere m ade cheaper and 
economies enjoyed the benefits of greater efficiency (NESC, 1989, p. 17). 
The example of the USA, where free trade existed w ithin a federal 
structure, was taken to support the argum ent that a single m arket 
w ould improve the economic prosperity of the EC.
The SEA encapsulated the aim of achieving the SEM and it 
reflected both the Commission's and the Council's support for the idea 
of the single m arket. The role of the Com m ission was vital in 
harnessing support for the single market and in mediating between the
1 Com m ission of the European Communities, White Paper (June 1985), 
Completing the Internal Market, (Luxembourg).
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representatives of various member states (see p. 12). Such support was 
hardly surprising. An integrated Europe necessitated an integrated 
European economy. Thus, the SEM was a vital step towards a united 
Europe.
The SEM sought to erode economic barriers betw een states. 
Consequently, it had substantial implications for the Irish /N orthern  
Irish cross-border relationship. The m ove tow ards the SEM w ould 
presum ably increase trade and other contacts betw een EC m em ber 
states. The proximity of N orthern Ireland to the Republic of Ireland 
w ould provide ample opportunity  for the logic of cross-border co­
operation in the SEM to unfold. The SEM w ould provide common 
opportunities for cross-border co-operation. The removal of barriers to 
trade between N orthern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland w ould 
create common incentives for actors on both sides of the border to 
trade. The establishment of the SEM was thus a clear example of how a 
C om m ission policy could up-grade  com m on in terests betw een 
Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.
However, the effect of the SEM on the cross-border relationship 
was, potentially, far deeper than simply increasing trade between the 
two regions. The SEM did not simply mean that Northern Ireland and 
the Republic of Ireland, like any other EC regions in a single market, 
w ould trade. On the contrary, the SEM had implications for Northern 
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland which were specific to those two 
regions alone. The SEM up-graded their common interests in both a 
general way (by removing barriers to trade) and in a specific way. I will 
now consider the specific effect of the SEM on the Irish /N orthern  Irish 
relationship.
The SEM and the Periphery Regions.
The traditional exposition of the benefits of free trade was based upon 
certain assumptions. These assumptions allowed free trade theorists to 
contend that free trade would benefit all economies equally. In fact, a 
rival school of thought argued that a single market w ould actually harm 
the economies of poorer regions, the so-called peripheral regions.
The m ost fundam ental classical assum ption in econom ics 
assum es perfect com petition (NESC, 1989, p. 21). In actual fact, 
em pirical evidence showed that industrial production was highly 
concentrated. A small num ber of firms produced a relatively large
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share of total output. These firms m ay have g reater access to 
technology than other firms. M oreover, certain firms enjoy greater 
economies of scale than others. Thus, they possess an advantage in 
trade over other firms, because they face lower costs of production.
These imperfections in the market imply that free trade does not 
benefit all members of a free trade regime. According to at least one 
econom ist free trade increases economic inequality betw een richer 
and poorer economies (NESC, 1989, p. 27). The rich get rich and the 
poor get poorer. Large firms will continue to grow in a larger market. 
Indeed, the average size of industrial enterprises is correlated with the 
size of the relevant m arket (ibid). For example, the grow th of trade 
betw een 1963 and 1978 increased the size of production units in 
Germany, Italy and the UK (ibid).
Those regions which possess larger firms and economies of 
scale, as well as having access to technological innovation, will be more 
efficient in a free market. Given the free flow of capital and of people 
within a SEM, investment will flow to the richer areas of the SEM, given 
uniform  wage rates. Consequently, the poorer areas of the EC will 
suffer from under investment. Moreover, in a free m arket, poorer high 
cost economies will be flooded by cheaper more com petitive goods 
from richer regions of the EC. Economic growth will be stunted in these 
poorer areas. The SEM far from benefiting all regions of the EC will in 
fact benefit the richer so-called Golden Triangle of the EC, which in 
1988 was said to encom pass Germany, France, the South East of 
England and the Benelux.
The relevance of these economic effects to the Irish /N orthern  
Irish cross-border relationship is that both N orthern Ireland and the 
Republic of Ireland share common economic problem s. The EC has 
identified both regions as poorer regions of the EC (Report of the 
ERDF, 1988). In 1985, the Republic was the region with the second most 
severe economic problems in the EC, whilst N orthern Ireland had the 
fourth  m ost severe problem s (NIEC and NESC, 1988, 3.7) These 
problems included low economic growth and high unemployment.
M oreover, with the completion of the Channel Tunnel, both 
N orthern  Ireland and the Republic of Ireland will be the only EC 
regions separated by sea from continental Europe. These regions will 
face higher transport costs which will underm ine their competitiveness. 
As poorer regions, both areas will suffer the detrim ental effects of the
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SEM: under- investm ent, loss of com petitiveness, and  increased 
outside competition on the home market.
The problems faced by N orthern Ireland are not shared to the 
same degree by their nearest neighbour, Britain. Britain is nearer to 
continental Europe than are N orthern Ireland and the Republic of 
Ireland and, although it is the fourth poorest state in the EC, it is 
nonetheless wealthier than both N orthern Ireland and the Republic of 
Ireland. The difference betw een the N orthern  Irish and  British 
economies leads to the argum ent that N orthern Ireland has more in 
common economically with the Republic of Ireland, than it does with 
Britain. Consequently, N orthern  Ireland should  co-operate m ore 
closely with the Republic of Ireland in its economic policy.
The argum ent is not simply prescriptive. On the contrary, it is 
argued that the Republic of Ireland and N orthern  Ireland by co­
operating w ith each other can m inimise the economic losses which 
m ay em anate from  the SEM and m axim ise benefits from  the 
op p o rtu n ities  of the  SEM. Businesses on e ither side  of the 
Irish /N orthern  Irish border, by co-operating w ith each other, m ay 
m axim ise econom ies of scale, so as to decrease their costs of 
production. Thus, they will be more competitive. Arguably, then, the 
SEM provides strong economic incentives for actors in N orthern  
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland to co-operate w ith each other, not 
only by increasing trade, bu t by forcing actors to develop business links 
so as to combat the SEM's threat. In this way, the Commission, by 
providing the dynamism for the SEM, has up-graded common interests 
between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.
The potential of the SEM to accentuate economic differences 
betw een rich and poor regions of the EC necessitated  greater 
Commission emphasis on its EC regional policy, so as to compensate 
these poorer regions for their losses. The consequent reform  of EC 
regional policy in 1988 provided another example of the Commission 
upgrad ing  common interests betw een N orthern  Ireland and the 
Republic of Ireland.
European Community Regional Policy
The Single European Act's emphasis upon achieving a Single European 
M arket by 1992 (later the deadline became 1993) m eant that poorer 
regions of the EC were threatened by the prospect of weakening
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economic performance, whilst their richer neighbours w ould benefit 
from the SEM. A stronger EC regional policy was im perative to 
compensate the poorer regions of the EC for the losses they w ould 
incur. M oreover, such a regional policy was necessary, to gain the 
support of Spain, Portugal, Greece and the Republic of Ireland, for the 
SEA. The result of these pressures for change was the 1988 reform of 
EC regional policy. It is this reform which has the potential to upgrade 
common interests betw een N orthern  Ireland and the Republic of 
Ireland.
The 1988 reform of EC regional policy
EC regional policy, from the foundation of the Community to 1988, was 
w eak .2 Up until 1984, each state was guaranteed a fixed share of EC 
regional aid. Regional policy funds consisted of this quota section, 
whereby every member was entitled to a certain quota. As such, the 
Commission could not refuse to give the fixed sum of financial aid and, 
consequently, it could not influence the type and location of regional 
projects undertaken in the member states.
Although two reforms of EC regional policy, in 1979 and in 1984, 
gave the Commission greater control over how EC money was spent 
by introducing non-quota section aid, the impact of the EC on its 
m ember's regional policy was minimal.3 By 1987, the total size of the 
European Regional and Development Fund’s budget was only 8 per 
cent of the total Community budget (Armstrong, 1989, p. 179). The 1988 
reform of EC regional policy altered this situation4 and appeared to 
give the Commission more influence over how EC money was spent 
by m em ber states. It also appeared to provide grater incentive for 
Irish /N orthern  Irish cross-border co-operation.
The 1988 reform provided more money for regional policy. The 
am ount of regional aid for the period 1989 to 1992 was doubled. Rather
2 For a brief histroy of EC regional policy, s e e  Armstrong, H., (1985), T he  
Reform of EC Regional Policy’, in Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 23, 
No. 4, June, pp. 319-343, and Armstrong, H., (1989), 'Community Regional 
Policy’, in Lodge, J. The European Community and the Challenge of the Future, 
(London, Pinter), pp. 167-186.
2 Council regulation (EEC), No. 1787/84, of June 19 1984, on the European 
Regional Development Fund, Official Journal of the European Communities, OJ 
L35, 9 .2 .79, and OJ L169, 28/6/84.
4 Official Journal of the European Communities, OJ L374, 31.12.88.
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than spread EC money thinly over m any EC regions, the decision was 
m ade to concentrate money on the poorest regions of the EC. Four 
different regional funds: the ERDF, the European Social Fund (ESF), the 
G uidance section of the E uropean A gricu ltu ral G uidance and  
G uarantee Fund (EAGGF) and the European Investm ent Bank (EIB) 
were all subsumed under one umbrella: the Structural Funds. Thus, the 
disparate funds were integrated into one EC regional strategy. The aim 
was to achieve better co-ordination of EC regional policy.
The EC identified its poorest regions as priority  regions and 
called them  Objective One regions. These regions were identified on 
the basis of their unem ploym ent and growth rates and their average 
income per head of population. Objective One regions were those 
w hose overall econom ic status was at least 75 or less of the 
C om m unity average. A successful Objective One applicant could 
receive up  to 75 per cent of the total cost of a project. The EC by 
providing more money provided incentives for Objective One regions 
to co-operate closely with Commission officials.
The Com m ission attem pted  to m ake use of its financial 
bargaining power by including a greater element of conditionality in its 
regional policy. Under the new rules governing EC regional policy, 
successful applicants had to meet a num ber of EC conditions, before 
they could receive EC aid. The Commission stipulated that states draw  
up  a national developm ent p lan  and  subsid ia ry  program m es 
(operational program m es) to cover various policy areas. These 
program m es w ould be financed by w hat was called the Com munity 
Support Frameworks (CSFs). The Commission stipulated that central 
authorities, when drawing up the programmes, would consult with sub­
national actors — local councillors, local agencies and  business 
communities. If such consultation did not occur, then an operational 
program m e would not be accepted by the Commission.
In this way, the Commission was intent that its aid be m ade 
conditional on states applying the principle of subsidiarity to decision 
making, where no decision would be made at central level, unless the 
central level could make that decision with greater efficiency than local 
level. M oreover, the Commission m ade its aid conditional on a 
principle of partnership, whereby central actors, sub-national actors 
and Commission representatives would participate on committees so 
as to oversee the implementation of the operational program m es. To
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this end, m onitoring committees w ere established to supervise the 
programmes.
The 1988 reform also provided money for Com m unity special 
p rog ram m es.5 This m oney w ould be provided over and above that 
provided by the CSFs. Again, the provision of m oney was contingent 
on states complying w ith certain EC conditions. The Commission 
em phasised a general program m e approach to regional policy. It 
sought to develop a long term European regional strategy, rather than 
short term  ad hoc projects. Its insistence that each state draw  up a 
strategic four year development plan reflected this aim.
Thus, special cross-border program m es were introduced, which 
w ould not simply be back to back projects, bu t had to be form ulated 
jointly by two state authorities. These program m es had to be overseen 
by a m onitoring committee, which represented sub-national, central 
and Commission representatives In 1990, the Commission introduced 
the Interreg programme:
to assist both  in ternal and  external border areas of the 
Com m unity in overcoming the special developm ent problem s 
arising from their relative isolation within national economies 
and from the Community as a whole (Com, 90/c 215/04)6.
A pplications for Interreg aid were open to all EC m em ber states, 
including the Republic of Ireland and the UK. An Interreg program m e 
was agreed on the Irish/N orthern Irish border regions, which included 
all of N orthern Ireland (apart from Belfast) and the five Irish counties 
which adjoined N orthern Ireland. Consequently, EC money was ear­
marked for Irish /N orthern  Irish co-operative schemes. Thus, Northern 
Irish and Irish policy makers were given the incentive to co-operate 
w ith each other if they were to receive EC aid. Such money clearly 
u pgraded  common interests betw een N orthern  Ireland and the 
Republic of Ireland. If these regions did not co-operate with each other, 
they would both lose EC money.
Similarly, the Leader program m e was introduced for community 
involvem ent in rural developm ent. U nder this program m e, local
5 For a more thorough account of the EC’s Special Programmes, s e e  chapter 
four.
6 Notice laying down guidelines for operational programmes which member 
sta tes are invited to establish in the framework of a Community initiative 
concerning border areas (Interreg), Official Journal. OJ L 215 30/8./1990.
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com m unities could app ly  for EC m oney, to un d ertak e  sm all 
developm ent projects. Thus, theoretically, local com m unities who 
shared similar geographical and land difficulties on either side of the 
Irish /N o rth ern  Irish border could send in a sm all developm ent 
proposal to the EC. Leader, although not a cross-border program m e 
had  cross-border im plications for the Republic of Ireland and 
Northern Ireland.
All these changes u p g rad ed  com m on in te rests betw een 
N orthern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The Republic of Ireland 
was identified as an Objective One region in toto. Similarly, N orthern 
Ireland was identified as an Objective One region and was the only 
Objective One region in the UK.7 This common status implied that the 
Commission perceived Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland 
to have common economic problems. The argum ent that the SEM 
would have a similar and potentially damaging effect on both Northern 
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland w as thus reflected by the 
Commission's decision. In this way, the existence of common interests 
between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland was highlighted 
by the Commission.
The 1988 reform  of EC regional policy upgraded  common 
interests between N orthern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The 
move towards the SEM and the reform of EC regional policy coincided 
with EC intentions that the CAP would also be reformed. The reform of 
the CAP is a third policy change which potentially up-grades common 
interests between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.
The Reform o f the Common Agricultural Policy
Both N orthern  Ireland and the Republic of Ireland share another 
significant common interest, apart from being peripheral regions of the 
EC. Both are significantly dependent on agriculture. Consequently, 
both are dependent upon the EC's Common Agricultural Policy for 
economic support. The reform of the CAP, to curb farmers' production 
in the EC, threatens both Northern Irish and Irish interests. Just as the 
SEM by threatening N orthern  Irish and Irish interests provides 
incentives for cross-border co-operation, then theoretically so too does
7 In January 1993, the Commission announced that Scotland and Merseyside 
would be designated as Objective One regions.
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the threat posed by CAP reform, encourage cross-border co-operation. 
The implication is that farmers' unions on both sides of the border will 
co-operate and to lobby jointly EC and national authorities against 
CAP reform.
To understand  fully the scope for such cross-border co­
operation, it is essential to examine why the CAP is so im portant for 
Irish and Northern Irish economies and w hy its reform is so potentially 
dangerous to both these economies.
The CAP of the European Community
Articles 38 to 45 of the Treaty of Rome provided for the establishment 
of a Common Agricultural Policy. The aim of this policy was at that 
time primarily to increase production of food supplies. Apart from this 
aim, the CAP sought to ensure fair standards of living for farmers and 
to ensure reasonable prices for consum ers (Treaty of Rome, 1958, 
Article 39). Emphasis was placed upon m aintaining farm income and 
developing a price support system for agricultural producers.
The price support system entails the setting of a price level, 
which ministers wished to exist within the Community (a target price). 
Should prices fall below a certain level, the EC guarantees that it will 
buy up  stocks of surplus at a guaranteed price (the intervention price). 
Thus, prices can move only between the limits of the target price and 
the intervention price (Marsh, 1989, p. 151). Moreover, levies could be 
placed upon im ports of agricultural goods, should these goods fall 
below the target price. Thus, outside competition was prevented from 
threatening the m arket for agriculture w ithin the EC. Money for the 
price support system came from the Guarantee Section of the EAGGF.
In contrast, the Guidance Section of the EAGGF provided 
financial help for farmers to modernise their farms. It encouraged the 
am algam ation of small unproductive farms into large efficient farm 
units. A num ber of m ethods were introduced to stim ulate structural 
change. For example, interest rate subsidies were introduced to help 
finance investm ent in farm modernisation. Loans were guaranteed by 
the EC, for those farmers who lacked security to guarantee re-payment 
(Fennell, 1987, p. 181).
There was a strong potential overlap between the work of the 
Guidance Section and that of the ESF and the EIB. For example, for 
those farmers who left their land, there would be retraining for another
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profession (Fennell, 1987, p. 177). However, the significance of overlap 
betw een the CAP and EC regional policy was not im m ediately 
apparent. Farmers and national representatives of the farm ing states 
were far more enthusiastic for the CAP'S price support system than for 
its structural policy. The Guarantee Section of the CAP which financed 
price support, accounted for over 63 per cent of Com m ission 
expenditure in 1985, whereas the Guidance Section accounted for only 
2 per cent (Fennell, 1987, p. 73). The Guidance Section was very much 
the poor relation of the Guarantee Section.
The greater emphasis placed upon the Guarantee section of the 
CAP suited Irish and N orthern Irish farmers. Both the Republic of 
Ireland and Northern Ireland gained from the price support system. As 
both economies were relatively dependent upon agriculture, the EC's 
subsidisation system benefited these two regions. In N orthern Ireland, 
1.1 hectares out of every 1.4 is used for agriculture (NIEC and NESC, 
1988, 5.8). The agricultural sector employs twice as m any people in 
N orthern  Ireland as in Britain (ibid). In the Republic of Ireland, 
agriculture employs five times as m any people as in Britain and twice 
as m any as in France (ibid). Similarly, if expressed as a percentage of 
GDP, agriculture is twice as im portant for N orthern Ireland than for 
Britain. Moreover, the structure of farming in N orthern Ireland is more 
sim ilar to that of the Republic of Ireland than that of Britain. In 
Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, holdings are smaller and 
there is greater dependence on grass land products than in the UK.
The implication is that N orthern Ireland and the Republic of 
Ireland have a keener interest in the m aintenance of the CAP price 
support system, than has Great Britain. This implication is strengthened 
by the fact that whilst N orthern Ireland and the Republic both benefit 
from CAP expenditure and from EC regional policy, Great Britain's 
authorities argue that such EC expenditure underm ines Great Britain's 
econom ic interests. Thus, w hilst Irish politicians w elcom ed the 
protection of small and medium -sized farms, in a 1991 Commission 
'reflections' paper, British representatives w ere opposed to the 
shielding of small farmers on the grounds that it w ould burden the 
Community (European Commission, 1991).8
8 European Commission, London, Background Report: Reforming the Common 
Agricultural Policy, 24 March 1991.
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UK authorities argue that the UK pays more to the EC than it 
actually receives in the form of EC handouts. In contrast to Northern 
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, the UK as a whole is a net 
contributor of finance to the EC. The former regions are net recipients 
from the EC. Overall, whilst the price support system was welcomed 
by Irish and N orthern  Irish policy m akers, it stim ulated British 
dem ands for a lessening of the CAP burden of expenditure.
In short, N orthern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland share 
common agricultural interests and in this respect are economically 
separate from their nearest neighbour. Agriculture w ould have been 
im portant to N orthern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland in the 
absence of the CAP. Farm structure w ould no doubt have been 
broadly similar in the absence of the CAP. The CAP did not create a 
common interest in agriculture, however, both Northern Irish and Irish 
policy makers and farmers did have a shared interest in the continued 
existence of the CAP, in particular of the price support system. In this 
way, the CAP upgraded the Irish and Northern Irish shared interest in 
agriculture.
This shared interest was all the more m arked because N orthern 
Ireland, as a region of the UK, relied on UK ministers to protect its 
interests in Brussels. However, given that the British governm ent did 
not share N orthern Irish agricultural interests, it would be potentially 
difficult for Northern Irish policy makers to influence the CAP as they 
would wish. The fact that Irish farmers' interests were represented fully 
by Irish ministers of state in Brussels gave Irish farmers a channel of 
influence. Arguably, N orthern Irish farmers w ould benefit m ore by 
joining with their Irish counterparts and being informally represented 
by Irish m inisters in Brussels, than by unsuccessfully lobbying an 
unsym pathetic Whitehall. Thus, theoretically, the need to preserve the 
price support system in the face of British dislike of that system  
p ro v id ed  an incentive for cross-border co-operation  betw een 
Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.
Consequently, the m aintenance of the EC's price support 
system constituted a shared interest between Irish and N orthern Irish 
policy makers. Any threat to the existence of the price support system 
had the potential to up-grade this common interest. The proposals by 
the Commissioner for Agriculture, Ray MacSharry, to reform the CAP 
in 1987 proved to be the m ost far reaching reform  proposal for 
agriculture in the Community. As such, the MacSharry proposals were
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another example of the Commission up-grading common interests 
between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.
The MacSharry CAP Reform Proposals.
Between 1977 and 1981 production of cereals, sugar and milk had 
increased by between 20 and 25 per cent (Neville-Rolfe, 1984, p. 9). 
Moreover, guarantee spending increased by over 40 per cent between 
1984 and 1987 from ECU 18,372 m. to ECU 27,305 m. (NIEC and NESC, 
1988, 5.3). Three product categories were responsible for more than half 
the total am ount of expenditure in 1987: milk, cereals and beef. The 
increase of surpluses in these products and the increasing burden of 
CAP expenditure had been criticised long before 1987. However, the 
fact that the CAP accounted for 75 per cent of total Com m unity 
expenditure in 1987, m eant that resources which were badly needed to 
im plem ent the provisions of the SEA (for exam ple, the reform ed 
regional policy), instead were being spent on the CAP. Thus, the 
establishment of the SEM necessitated the reform of the CAP.
The Commission called for the control of production and of 
CAP expenditure and for the reduction of its su rp lus stocks of 
agricultural goods (Com (87) 100)9. In effect, the Commission set about 
dism antling the price support system so valued by Irish and Northern 
Irish farmers. In particular, the attem pt to lessen the cost of dairy and 
beef sectors was a threat to N orthern  Ireland and the Republic of 
Ireland. Both these product ranges were of high significance to farmers 
on both sides of the border.
In 1991, it was proposed that the price of cereals would be cut by 
35 per cent. Similarly, the intervention price for beef would be cut by 15 
per cent and milk prices w ould be reduced by 10 per cent. The 
Commission emphasised that farmers would be paid compensation to 
help them adjust to the price cuts. Moreover, it was argued that, in the 
long run, agriculture would actually be healthier.
Farmers in the Republic of Ireland and in N orthern  Ireland 
w orried  that direct aid was an im perm anent policy and a poor 
substitute for price support. Farmers organisations and civil service 
departm ents set about forecasting the damage which w ould occur to
9 European Comm\s\or\,"Making a Success of the Single Act - A New Frontier for 
Europe, COM (87) 100 final, Brussels, 15 February 1987.
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farming income and, indeed, to the Irish and Northern Irish economies. 
If the existence of a common threat up-graded common interests 
betw een N orthern  Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, then the 
MacSharry proposals fit the bill. The Commission by attem pting to 
dism antle the price support system had provided a common external 
threat for N orthern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. In this way, a 
third Commission initiative in the late nineteen eighties up-graded Irish 
and N orthern Irish common interests.
However, although the existence of three fundam ental policy 
initiatives provides tangible evidence that the Commission up-graded 
comm on interests betw een N orthern  Ireland and the Republic of 
Ireland, it is clear that the actual effect of EC policy reform depends 
partly  on the degree to which actors in N orthern  Ireland and the 
Republic of Ireland respond to EC initiatives. This question is, of 
course, the subject of this thesis. However, there is another factor which 
determ ines the effect of the Commission policies on the cross-border 
relationship and that is the attitude and behaviour of the Commission 
itself.
EC regional policy, the establishment of the SEM and the reform 
of the CAP are all general EC policies. Although these initiatives may 
have the effect of up-grading common interests betw een N orthern  
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, they were not devised solely with 
the Irish /N o rth e rn  Irish cross-border relationship  in m ind: "the 
Com m ission tries to w iden borders. It is a general principle" 
(confidential interview, European Commission). Many of the poorer EC 
states lobbied for regional policy reform, including Spain, the Republic 
of Ireland and Greece. Similarly, the SEM and the reform of the CAP 
were EC-wide policies. It is necessary, then, to examine the extent to 
which the Commission wishes to take advantage of these up-graded 
common interests, so as to im prove the Irish /N orthern  Irish cross- 
border relationship specifically. To w hat extent does the Commission 
care about the specific problem of the Irish/N orthern  Irish relationship 
and the deep-rooted conflict, which has hindered that relationship's 
developm ent?
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iii. The C om m ission and  the Irish /N orthern  Irish  Cross-B order 
R elationsh ip
The role of the Commission in im proving the Irish /N orthern  Irish 
cross-border relationship is open to various interpretations. On the one 
hand, the Commission may upgrade interests between both regions by 
initiating the above policies and, in so doing, the Commission plays a 
dynamic leadership role (Sandholtz and Zysman, 1989, pp. 107-108).10 
Such dynam ism  w ould im ply that the Commission has the will to 
devise strategies and specific policies, to im prove the cross-border 
relationship and to help resolve the conflict in Northern Ireland. Such a 
will would not be surprising, given the fact that conflict in any region of 
the EC is an impediment to integration.
On the other hand, the Commission upgrades common interests 
between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland 'by  accident', in 
that the establishment of the SEM, the reform of regional policy and 
the CAP were decided upon because they reflected the interests of 
specific EC states, not because of the Irish/N orthern  Irish cross-border 
relationship. According to this view, the Commission may fulfill neo­
functionalist hopes only partly by initiating policies which up-grade 
common interests betw een N orthern  Ireland and the Republic of 
Ireland. However, the Commission does not provide dynam ism  and 
does not have a policy for Northern Ireland. It does not concern itself 
with that conflict. EC regional policy would be expected to affect the 
Irish/N orthern Irish cross-border relationship, but only as it w ould any 
other peripheral regions in the EC. Such change is not p a rt of a 
Com mission dynam ism  w ith respect to N orthern  Ireland and the 
Republic of Ireland.
I w ill now  exam ine these tw o in te rp re ta tio n s  of the  
C om m ission 's role in the I r ish /N o rth e rn  Irish  c ro ss-bo rder 
relationship, in the light of evidence gathered from interview s w ith 
m em bers of the European Com mission and of the UK and  Irish 
Permanent Representations in Brussels. Members from the relevant EC 
Directorates General were interviewed, that is, from the Regional Policy
10 It must be noted that, although I cite Sandholtz and Zysman here, in their 
1989 article they do not contend that the Commission is the only decisive factor 
in explaining the SEA, but focus also on 6lite bargaining relations. Rather than 
being d escrib ed  a s  n eo-fun ctionalists, they are intergovernm ental 
institutionalists. However, they do em phasise the leadership role of the 
Commission.
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Directorate (DGXVI), the Agricultural Directorate (DG XI) and also the 
now abolished Structural Funds Co-ordination Directorate (DGXXII).11 
Following an examination of how the Commission m ight be perceived 
to be a dynamic force in im proving the cross-border relationship, I 
argue that, in fact, the Commission is passive in its approach to the 
conflict in Northern Ireland.
The Commission as a Dynamic Leader
A vital precondition for the Commission to be dynamic and to play a 
leadership role is that it is united into one body and as such represents 
the European Community, not individual member states, and develops 
an in tegration strategy in a rational co-ordinated m anner. It is 
im portant to determine the extent to which the Commission is such a 
corporate body w ith respect to N orthern Ireland. If it is not, then, 
arguably, there will be little evidence of a strategic approach to the 
conflict in Northern Ireland. In this section, I present the argum ent that 
the Commission is such a unified rational actor.
In an im pressionistic sense, the Com mission can be seen to 
override the petty  protection of state interests. British, G erm ans, 
Italians and Irish w ork together on com m on program m es w ith  
common aims. They may have a strong affection for that country w ith 
which they are working, regardless of their own national origin. The role 
of the President of the Commission is vital in m oulding members from 
different national backgrounds into one unit (Tugendhat, 1987, p. 141). 
Jacques Delors has been given particular credit for ensuring a unified 
and, of course, dynamic Commission. Thus, the Commission "sees itself 
as becoming a government, with the President chosen indirectly by the 
Council, endowed with a rubber stamp democratic legitimacy by the 
Parliam ent, and then able to choose one Com missioner from  each 
state" (Brewin and McAllister, 1991, p. 386).
Thus, for m any writers, the Commission is assum ed to be a 
corporate entity whose aim is to protect the European Community and 
to prom ote the common interest between its members:
From the outset, the European Com m unity was an arena for
negotiations over the definition of common interests in relation
to substan tive  issues ... Those w ho w orked w ith in  the
11 DG XXII was abolished in January 1993.
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Com m unity institutions were continuously preoccupied w ith 
extending its policy scope and the authority  of the EC as a 
m eans of achieving the dynam ism  from  w hich political 
integration m ight follow (Wallace, Wallace and Webb, 1983, p. 
44).
Similarly, a member of the UK Perm anent Representation in Brussels 
comm ented that "the Commission institutionally is an organisation 
looking for European integration and using Interreg to achieve it" 
(Interview, official UK Permanent Representation, April 21993).
In this way, the Commission does have a strategy with respect 
to N orthern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Interreg is a part of 
this strategy to achieve European integration by improving the Irish / 
N orthern Irish cross-border relationship. The Commission has two 
objectives in implementing Interreg: the first is to help the Republic of 
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland to adapt to the SEM and the 
second is to advance cross-border co-operation (Interview, European 
Commission, March 31, 1993). On the basis of these two objectives, 
Interreg was developed. True it was not developed purely for Northern 
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, but the Commission is well aware 
of using Interreg's potential so as to help alleviate "suffering" in 
Northern Ireland (Interview, European Commission, April 5, 1993). The 
argum ent proposed by some members of the Commission was that:
Interreg can ... contribute to getting com m unities to w ork 
together. In the last two years, a lot has started happening. The 
Confederations of Industry and the Chambers of Commerce 
have started  w orking closer together (Interview , European 
Commission, April 2,1993).
Interreg is the mainstay of Commission officials' rhetoric, when asked 
about the I r ish /N o rth e rn  Irish  cross-border rela tionsh ip . The 
negotiations which preceded the first Interreg program m e are cited as 
evidence of the Commission's effect on the Irish /N orthern  Irish cross- 
border relationship. The Commission drafted its proposals for the 
Interreg initiative in February 1989. Irish and N orthern  Irish civil 
servants, excluding members of the N orthern Ireland Office and the 
Anglo-Irish Division, were invited to meet with the Commission in that 
same year. The Irish and Northern Irish representatives:
... became one team and once they copped on to w hat the 
Commission wanted, they worked ou t how  to suit it ... The
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Commission had more say — we wanted cross-border schemes, 
not back to back (Interview, European Commission, April 5, 
1993).
The Irish and Northern Irish dv il servants engaged in a process 
of horsetrading under the watchful supervision of the Commission. For 
exam ple, the Irish representatives agreed to include a project to 
develop  Lough N eagh  at the behest of the  N o rth ern  Irish  
representatives and, in return , the N orthern  Irish representatives 
agreed to put in a joint proposal w ith their Irish colleagues to complete 
the Ballyconnell canal (Interview, European Commission, April 5,1993). 
Such bargaining is a clear exam ple of co-operation. Co-operation 
existed because neither the Irish nor the N orthern Irish w ould ever 
turn down EC money (Interview, European Commission, April 5,1993).
In this way, the Commission provided a very real incentive for 
cross-border co-operation. Commission officials who were engaged in 
the negotiations were keenly aware of how EC money m ight be used 
so as to improve the cross-border relationship:
How the money is used need not be insignificant, even if the size 
is. We can say "No we won't fund it, if you don't comply". The EC 
has spread co-operation further dow n ... bu t w ithout entering 
into the politics of the thing — holding out that this makes sense 
... Occasionally, things get political, bu t we don 't pay any 
attention ... We've done our best to be even handed (Interview, 
European Commission, April 5,1993).
Thus, Interreg is a key argum ent for those who claim that the 
Commission has played a role in helping to improve the cross-border 
relationship. N ot only is it the principle of Interreg that is im portant — 
that Irish and Northern Irish representatives are sitting at the same 
table bargaining and implementing — but Commission officials also 
cite m ore tangible aspects. For exam ple, a num ber of Commission 
officials believed that the amount of money to be provided for Interreg 
for the next Programme period would be substantially larger than that 
provided for the period 1991 to 1993. Consequently, the Commission 
should  p rov ide an even g reater incentive for cross-border co­
operation.
Another example of the Com m ission's dynam ic role in the 
Ir ish /N o rth e rn  Irish  cross-border re la tionsh ip  rela tes to the  
designation of Northern Ireland as an Objective One priority region. 
N orthern Ireland with an average income per head that was 77 per
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cent of the Community average, did not meet the EC condition that 
Objective One regions should have an average income of, at most, 75 
per cent of the Community average. However, Northern Irish officials 
lobbied vigorously that N orthern Ireland should be defined as an 
Objective One region.
The main reason Northern Irish lobbyists gave for their dem and 
was that the Republic of Ireland was also lobbying to be an Objective 
One region and N orthern  Irish representatives w ished to develop 
cross-border projects w ith  the R epublic of Ireland  (Interview , 
European Commission, 2.4.93). This explanation, however, was deemed 
by one Commission official to be "a pretty  lame excuse" (Interview, 
European Commission, 2.4.93). The real reason was that N orthern Irish 
representatives wanted the increased amount of EC aid which would 
be forthcoming, should N orthern Ireland be an Objective One region. 
However, the reason w hy the Commission assented to the N orthern 
Irish request to be an Objective One region was purely because of the 
existence of conflict in N orthern  Ireland (Interview , European 
Commission, 2.4.93). The case of N orthern  Ireland 's Objective 
One status reveals two main points. The first is that the Commission 
appears to be aware of the specifics of the conflict in N orthern Ireland. 
So much so, that it bent its own rule, so as to accommodate N orthern 
Ireland as an Objective One region. The second point is that Northern 
Irish representatives w ere prepared  to use the cross-border co­
operation  carrot, so as to receive m ore EC m oney. Thus, the 
Commission apparently has substantial bargaining power in improving 
Irish /N orthern  Irish cross-border co-operation.
These points imply that the Commission is indeed a dynamic 
force in the Irish /N o rth e rn  Irish cross-border relationship . The 
Commission is argued to be a unified strategic policy maker. Through 
Interreg, it has deliberately increased cross-border co-operation. 
M oreover, the Commission is willing to provide m ore m oney for 
Interreg in the future. It is aware of the conflict in Northern Ireland and 
it has been willing to alter its criteria for identifying Objective One 
regions, so as to help alleviate suffering there. In this way, the effect of 
policies which up-grade common interests between N orthern Ireland 
and the Republic of Ireland on the cross-border relationship, is not 
merely accidental. These policies are harnessed by the Commission so 
as to have specific effect on the Irish /N o rth ern  Irish cross-border
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relationship. However, as I explain in the next section, there are 
num erous problems with the above argument.
The Commission as a Passive Reactor
The Commission far from leading N orthern Ireland and the Republic 
of Ireland to co-operate is actually passive in its response to the 
conflict in N orthern Ireland and the poor Irish /N orthern  Irish cross- 
border relationship. The neo-functionalist image of the Commission as 
a dynamic force in the Irish/N orthern Irish cross-border relationship is 
open to criticism. There is evidence to suggest that the Commission is 
lim ited in its effect on the cross-border relationship. There are four 
m ain criticisms of their statem ent that the Com m ission provides 
dynam ism  to increase Irish /N orthern  Irish cross-border co-operation: 
First, contrary to what was suggested above, the Commission is not a 
unified strategic actor; second, the Commission is not a supranational 
actor; third, the Commission does not always make allowances for the 
conflict in Northern in its policy, as it d id  w hen it defined N orthern 
Ireland as an Objective One region and, finally, the policy initiatives 
which are claimed by some to up-grade common interests between 
Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, may not be so effective.
The Commission as a Unified Strategic Leader
The m ain assum ption to be questioned more deeply is that of the 
Commission being a unified corporate entity which aims to protect the 
Community interest. If the Commission is not such a unified institution, 
then it is more difficult to speak of it having any strategy at all with 
respect to N orthern Ireland and the Irish /N orthern  Irish cross-border 
relationship. On the contrary, individuals within the Commission may 
have their views on N orthern Ireland, but the Commission as such 
does not. It is necessary to distinguish between the Commission as an 
institution and the Commission as groups of individuals, each w ith 
their own priorities and interests.
This point was confirmed by a majority of those who were 
interviewed: "You have to look at the individuals involved in the 
Commission. Look at their aspirations in the Irish unit — there's a fair 
am ount of opportunity to act on your own discretion" (Interview, UK 
Perm anent Representation to the EC, April 2, 1993). In contrast, it was
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remarked that "the EC as such, doesn't have a view" [on the conflict in 
N orthern Ireland] (Interview, European Parliament, March 31, 1993). 
Similarly, another official stated that "There isn't a Commission line on 
Ireland" (Interview, European Commission, March, 31,1993).
P erhaps the m ost telling evidence of the  absence of a 
Commission strategy for N orthern Ireland and the Irish /N orthern  
Irish cross-border relationship is a revealing quote from Jacques 
Delors m ade during his visit to D erry/L ondonderry  in 1992. There, 
w hen asked about the EC's m anagem ent of the crisis in the former 
Yugoslavia, he replied: "We don't even understand N orthern Ireland, 
never m ind Yugoslavia" (Jacques Delors, cited by two interviewees, 
European Commission, April 1, 1993). According to one official:
The problems in Northern Ireland are perceived, but he [Jacques 
Delors] sees that they're local and small and is quite puzzled as to 
w hy there's a conflict (Interview, European Commission, April 1, 
1993).
Given the importance attached by theorists to the role of the President 
of the Commission, Delors's apparent puzzlem ent does not bode well 
for prospects of the Commission exercising dynamic leadership with 
respect to N orthern  Ireland and the cross-border relationship . 
Moreover, another official stated bluntly that: "The Commission runs 
scared of the conflict" (Interview, European Com mission, 5.4.93). 
Similarly, another official observed that: "There's a reluctance among 
Commission officials to go there [to Belfast], because your behaviour 
w ould be restricted. It's dangerous" (Interview, European Commission, 
24.93).
Yet, despite the absence of a Com mission approach to the 
conflict in Nortrhern Ireland, it is possible that Irish and Northern Irish 
individuals within the Commission are very much aware of the conflict 
and of the potential to use EC policy to maximise cross-border co­
operation. Many of the officials who are involved in the regional policy 
and CAP divisions with respect to N orthern Ireland and the Republic 
of Ireland, are Northern Irish and Irish civil servants on secondment to 
the EC. These representatives may indeed pay regard to the conflict 
and may indeed attem pt to harness EC policy change, to improve the 
Irish /N o rth ern  Irish cross-border relationship: "British and Irish 
m em bers [of the Commission] tend to be aw are of the conflict" 
(Interview, European Parliament, 31.3 93).
8 9
The absence of an official corporate and unified Commission 
view on Northern Ireland does not therefore necessarily imply that the 
Commission does not exercise dynamic leadership. A small num ber of 
people may be equally, if not more dynamic in bringing about policy 
change. For example, in examining four EC external agreements in the 
1960s and 1970s, Rosenthal concluded that:
In each instance, a small highly m otivated extremely dynamic 
group of officials from the external relations directorate general 
of the EEC Commission, pushed and pulled, m anipulated and 
cajoled, literally "took over", when it looked as if negotiations 
w ould be interm inably bogged dow n in intergovernm ental 
wrangling. One of the interesting features that comes to light 
here is the effectiveness of such a small group of administrators 
against the weight of hostile, or totally disinterested forces (1975, 
p. 59).
The personality of these small cliques and their particular values are 
argued to be central to understanding EC policy outcomes:
Political figures do indeed bring to their jobs a set of attitudes, 
predispositions, ways of looking at the world which, along with 
such traditionally recognised influences as party , executive 
leadership and lobby pressures, affect the way they speak and 
act. It is the attitudes, predispositions and ways of looking at the 
world of the men involved in decision-making in the EC, which 
seem to have emerged ... (ibid).
An analogous argum ent would hinge upon the ability of small 
groups involved with Northern Irish and Irish affairs to carve out their 
ow n stra tegy  and to p rov ide  dynam ic leadersh ip  w ith in  the 
Irish /N orthern  Irish policy sphere. In fact, although the Irish and 
N orthern Irish citizens w ho were interviewed were knowledgeable, 
they had only limited ability to develop strategy so as to help resolve 
the conflict. Their activity was subordinate to the activity of the Anglo- 
Irish Intergovernmental Conference. Because of this subordination to 
the Anglo-Irish process, the cliques within the Commission, who work 
on N orthern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, do not lead policy 
w ith respect to these areas. Instead they follow the policy of two 
member states: the UK and the Republic of Ireland.
This point was reiterated by many interviewees: "An Irish unit 
exists in the Commission, but at the end of the day, the realisation
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exists that its up to the national governments" (Interview, European 
Commission, 2.4.93 ). According to one official:
The UK says 'Stay out of it. This is an internal conflict'. If the 
Com m ission was given encouragem ent, they ’d in tervene. 
They've been actively discouraged at high level. I think, to be
honest, that the situation is so d irty , tha t I doubt if the
Commission would be capable of understanding it (Interview, 
European Commission 2.4.93).
The view that the Northern Irish conflict is the dom ain of Irish, British 
and N orthern Irish citizens was reiterated by a mem ber of the UK 
representation:
The EC is an example of how people work together, but it's for 
N orthern Ireland, the UK and the Republic to do it. There’s no 
separate EC thinking on Northern Ireland. It reflects Anglo-Irish 
advice (Interview, UK Permanent Representation to the EC, 31.3. 
93).
Far from "the men behind" the EC decisions "taking over" w hen
"bogged down by intergovernmental wrangling" (Rosenthal, ibid), the
Com m ission is excluded from having a leadership  role by the 
sensitivity of the Anglo-Irish process and by the Commission's tacit 
agreement that it does not have the right to develop its own specific 
scheme for N orthern Ireland. The Commission itself does not w ant to 
play a large role in a conflict which it has difficulty understanding. As 
such, the Commission is passive in its behaviour towards the conflict in 
N orthern  Ireland and it follows the lead of British and  Irish 
governments.
This passivity is the main argum ent against the neo-functionalist 
claim that the Com mission provides dynam ic leadership, so that 
econom ic cooperation spills over to political co-operation. This 
exam ple shows how  British and Irish state behaviour dom inates 
Commission behaviour in the Irish /N orthern  Irish policy sphere. The 
Com m ission treads carefully. The dom inance of the Anglo-Irish 
process and of the IGC over the Commission behaviour w ith respect 
to Northern Ireland suggests that the AIA is the fundamental influence 
on the Northern Irish /Irish  relationship.
This evidence supports the neo-realist argum ent in two ways: 
First, the AIA, as a coercive consociationalist agreement, represents 
neo-realist theory. Second, British and Irish state dom ination of the
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Commission implies that the Commission's behaviour is limited by the 
interests of two EC m em ber states. As such, the case of N orthern  
Ireland remains firmly within the dom ain of interstate politics, outside 
the w orld of the EC. In this way, neo-realism appears to provide a 
be tter und ers tan d in g  of the C om m ission 's behav iou r tow ards 
N orthern Ireland. Moreover, it is debatable w hether the Commission 
in its approach to the conflict in N orthern  Ireland, behaves as a 
supranational institution.
The Commission as a Supranational Institution
The conventional exposition of the Com m ission's role in the EC 
decision making process is that it represents the common interest of 
the Community. However, this view is open to criticism. In contrast, the 
members of the Commission may not be so neutral (Nugent, 1989, p. 
56). Commissioners themselves are national nominees. Thus, they m ay 
be prey to political pressures from their parties.
Two relevant points emerge from the Com mission's approach 
to the conflict in Northern Ireland. The first is that Irish and N orthern 
Irish members may not aim for European integration wholeheartedly. 
They may tem per their communautaire approach w ith their years of 
experience working in national/regional civil services. In the absence of 
a specific corporate Commission strategy w ith respect to N orthern 
Ireland, the possibility that Irish and Northern Irish civil servants do 
not "m ould into one" (Tugendhat, ibid) may ham per their ability to 
develop EC policy w ith respect to N orthern  Ireland to its fullest 
potential (even if British and Irish governments gave them the freedom 
to do so). Thus:
In practice ... the Commission tends not to be so detached, so
far-seeing , or so en th u s ias tic  in p ress in g  the e s p r i t
communautaire as some would like (Nugent, 1989, pp. 86-87).
There may not be one common interest among Commission members. 
For example, an Irish civil servant from the Departm ent of Tourism, on 
secondm ent to the Com mission, m ay realise that the Commission 
dem ands for Irish /N orthern  Irish cross-border tourism  co-operation 
will harm  the Republic's tourist trade. Perhaps, s /h e  will know the 
probability that he r/h is  Irish departm ent can be persuaded to alter its 
position on cross-border co-operation in tourism. Consequently, this
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official sets limits on how much co-operation the Commission should 
ask of the Irish government. In practice, then, the Commission may 
"look to the short term, rather than to the long term, and to what is 
possible, rather than what is desirable" (Nugent, 1989, p. 87).
Similarly, a Northern Irish civil servant may know the threat an 
integrated Europe may pose for Northern Ireland's unionists who wish 
to m aintain the Irish border. H is/her enthusiasm  for integration may 
be tem pered by the limits set by political sensitivity in N orthern 
Ire lan d . The C om m ission  deals w ith  s ta te s  and  reg iona l 
rep resen ta tives again and again. It needs the ir su p p o rt and , 
consequently, it does not engage in adversary  politics. It seeks a 
consensual decision (Ludlow, 1992, p. 88). The Commission cannot ride 
roughshod over these limits. Thus, members from specific states may 
balance support for integration with their knowledge of the domestic 
situation at home. Consequently, the Commission may not possess a 
grand design.
Moreover, members may bring their national biases with them 
to the Commission. Thus, one official, on secondm ent from the 
Northern Irish Civil Service, commented that:
Good neighbours can have high fences and still lend one 
another a law n mower. It doesn 't m ean you w ander into each 
other's back garden (Interview, European Commission, 31.4.93).
Despite the author's interventions that high fences and the inability to 
move freely appeared to be against the spirit of European integration, 
the official remained resolute in his tempered approach. The possibility 
that national orientations continue to influence Commission officials 
means that the Commission is not necessarily supranational. Thus, its 
members too may be victims of selfish national self-interest, as realists 
would contend.
A nother doub t about the C om m ission 's supranationalism  
emerges from the Commission's approach to the Irish /N orthern  Irish 
cross-border relationship. The fact that it is mainly Irish and N orthern 
Irish officials who are involved in this field and that other non-Irish, 
non-N orthern  Irish and non-British officials are confused by the 
conflict and wary of developing policies to help alleviate it indicates 
that m utual sensitivity and common interest does not exist w ithin the 
Commission, with respect to the conflict.
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Despite the significance of a conflict within one region of the EC 
for European integration, it is still only Irish and N orthern Irish and 
some British officials who attem pt to understand it, never m ind try to 
alleviate it: "A num ber of people who deal with Northern Ireland have 
read the standard works" (Interview, European Commission, 2.4.93). 
There is a veil of ignorance around m any other Commission officials, 
with respect to the conflict in Northern Ireland.
The compartmentalisation of Irish /N orthern  Irish interests into 
specific divisions, which are run mainly by representatives of N orthern 
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, implies that the Commission in its 
approach to the conflict does not behave entirely as a supranational 
institution. It is Irish, Northern Irish and British officials who are most 
concerned with the conflict in Northern Ireland and the Irish/N orthern  
Irish cross-border relationship. M oreover, the decision to exclude 
N orthern Ireland from the new Cohesion Fund does not indicate that 
either the Commission as an institution, or its Irish and Northern Irish 
officials, prioritise the use of EC regional aid so as to help resolve 
conflict.
Northern Ireland and the Cohesion Fund
The Cohesion Fund was established under the Treaty of European 
Union (Maastricht Treaty). The fund provides double the am ount of 
m oney available from the Structural Funds, for a stronger regional 
policy from 1993 onwards. Only states are eligible to receive money 
from the Cohesion Fund. Regions of states, such as the Mezzogiorno in 
Italy, may not apply. Consequently, Northern Ireland as a region of the 
UK is not eligible to receive money from the Fund.
The obvious question is why the Commission did not make an 
exception and allow N orthern Ireland as a region to be part of the 
Cohesion Fund, when it made an exception of N orthern Ireland in 1988, 
by allowing that region to be an Objective One region, although it did 
not meet EC conditions. According to one official, the UK governm ent 
did not lobby the Commission to have N orthern Ireland included in 
the Cohesion Fund. If a more sustained effort had been m ade to have 
N orthern  Ireland included, then N orthern Ireland may have been 
included:
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The UK should have m ade the case more strongly that they 
[N orthern Ireland] were in the same position [as the Irish 
Republic] in terms of geographical peripherality  (Interview, 
European Commission, 1.4.93).
However, another official commented that if N orthern Ireland had  
been included in the Cohesion Fund, then the question w ould have 
been raised as to w hether the M ezzogiorno w ould be included 
(Interview, European Commission, 5.4.93). As one reason for the new 
eligibility rule was to exclude any region of Italy from receiving 
maximum EC regional aid (Interview, Departm ent of Finance, 7.1.92), 
the  M ezzogiorno 's inclusion  w ou ld  have  been  p rob lem atic  
(unattributable interview). However, this official did confirm that the 
UK did not lobby to include N orthern Ireland in the Cohesion Fund 
(Interview, European Commission, 5.4.93). N or did the Republic of 
Ireland lobby for Northern Ireland's inclusion in the Cohesion Fund:
H um e did more to lobby than anyone in the N orth  ... The 
Republic didn't attempt to ... There was no reason why they felt 
they should (Interview, European Commission, 5.4.93).
The om ission of N orthern  Ireland  from  the C ohesion F und  
counterposes the decision to define N orthern Ireland as an Objective 
One region in 1988. It reflects the Commission's reluctance to make 
allowances for the conflict and to include N orthern  Ireland in the 
Cohesion Fund. The implication of the above quotations is that if EC 
m em bers had lobbied for N orthern Ireland to be included in the 
Cohesion Fund, then perhaps it w ould have been. However, in the 
absence of lobbying, the Commission did not include Northern Ireland 
in that Fund. The possibility of using the Cohesion Fund to help resolve 
the conflict was not a priority for the Commission. Only if pressurised, 
w ould it consider taking special account of N orthern Ireland in this 
regard.
The Cohesion Fund decision is interesting on a num ber of 
counts. From an Irish/N orthern  Irish perspective, it is interesting that 
only John Hume, the SDLP leader appears to have been active in 
lobbying the Commission. Cross-border co-operation and the plight of 
N orthern Ireland was not the prim ary concern of either Irish or UK 
governm ents. This point will be expanded later. (See chapter four). 
From an EC perspective, the decision not to allow Northern Ireland to
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be p art of the Cohesion Fund provides further evidence of the 
limitations of Commission activity with respect to Northern Ireland.
The new Cohesion Fund had to satisfy a num ber of states. Once 
a formula was reached which partially satisfied all members, then the 
Commission was presum ably reluctant to upset the delicate balance. 
Hence, the argum ent that the M ezzogiorno w ould have dem anded 
inclusion in the Fund, if Northern Ireland was included. However, if the 
Mezzogiorno was included then other states, in particular Spain would 
have been angered. The decision to exclude Northern Ireland reflected 
the Commission's delicate task in gaining member state support for its 
policy initiatives.
It is not necessarily the case that the Commission does not care 
about the conflict in Northern Ireland, but it does have other priorities. 
In the absence of determ ined and w idespread  lobbying, these 
priorities determine policy outcome. The Commission did not take the 
initiative to allow Northern Ireland to be part of the Cohesion Fund. 
Thus, the case of the Cohesion Fund shows the lim itations of the 
Com mission in providing dynam ic leadership to help resolve the 
conflict in Northern Ireland.
There is a fourth criticism of the argum ent that the Commission 
p rov ides dynam ism  to the Ir ish /N o rth e rn  Irish  cross-border 
relationship. It is that EC policy changes may only have marginal effect 
on cross-border co-operation. This possibility is the final criticism of 
the Commission’s role in the cross-border relationship considered in 
this chapter.
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The Role of EC Policy
For those m em bers of the Com m ission w ho argue  tha t the 
Commission has an effect on the conflict in Northern Ireland and the 
Irish/N orthern  Irish cross-border relationship, Interreg is crucial. There 
are tw o problem s w ith their argum ent. The first is tha t for other 
Commission officials, Interreg's role is perceived to be minimal. The 
second problem is that Commission "optimists" did not refer to all the 
other EC policy initiatives which theoretically should effect the cross- 
border relationship, whereas those Commission officials who were 
m ore negative about the Com mission's im pact d id  refer to other 
Commission policy initiatives. Their argum ents were both wider and 
deeper.
Interreg has its share of problem s according  to som e 
interviewees. There are practical difficulties in finding suitable projects. 
A ccording to one official: "A farm er's horizon  is 15 m etres". 
Consequently, it is difficult to find program m es which straddle the 
border (Interview, European Commission, 1.4 93). Money that has been 
spent has not been well used. The recession is blamed by one official 
for causing a less than enthusiastic response to Interreg for applicants 
still have to invest a proportion of their own money in a cross-border 
scheme. Thus, a poor investment climate inhibits the EC's cross-border 
endeavours (Interview, European Commission, 1.4.93).
Similarly, the Leader initiative has had little  cross-border 
implications: "We've encouraged them to co-operate w ith groups in 
Ireland ... The degree of co-operation isn ’t m uch estab lished" 
(Interview, European Commission, 1.4.93). Another official observed 
that as regards Leader, he "visited one in the South, built against one in 
the N orth, and they're not in touch w ith each other!" (Interview, 
European Commission, 2.4. 93).
Officials who were interviewed argued that a large problem in 
their endeavours had been that of additionality. The additionality  
problem  refers to member states substituting EC money for m oney 
they w ould have spent anyway from the national exchequer, rather 
than making EC money additional to national expenditure. The UK has 
been particularly criticised by the Commission for not making its EC- 
financed regional expenditure additional to its national expenditure. As 
long as EC money is not additional to national monies, the impact of 
EC money is less (Interview, European Commission, 1.4.93).
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The UK's general approach to the EC was criticised as 
hampering the EC's attempts to influence the cross-border relationship. 
On an anecdotal level, one official noted that the UK had to be 
persuaded at length to place EC plaques next to those developments 
which the EC had funded (unattributable interview). Thus, some Irish 
and N orthern  Irish m em bers of the Com m ission th ink  that the 
Commission's role in the cross-border relationship is im peded by state 
behaviour. These members recognise the Com mission's successes in 
overcoming such limitations, but they also feel they are involved in an 
on-going struggle with national authorities. EC money is no guarantee 
of EC success in policy im plem entation. Consequently, for some 
officials, the Commission's effect on the conflict in N orthern Ireland 
and on the cross-border relationship is very constrained.
To be fair, these same officials were cautiously optimistic about 
the Commission's future effect on the cross-border relationship. They 
felt that the am ount of m oney m ade available for cross-border co­
operation  w ould increase (unattribu tab le  interview ). They also 
detected improvements in business cross-border co-operation and in 
national authorities consultation procedures w ith local and regional 
groups (Interview, European Commission, 1.4.93).
Overall, though, the above comments offer a useful contrast to 
the m ore up-beat references to Interreg. For m any Com mission 
officials who work with the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, 
the effect of Commission policies is lim ited by problem s faced in 
implementing those policies. The Commission cannot tell states what 
to do (Interview, European Commission, March 1991). At times, states 
and regions may not comply with the Commission's wishes. Thus, the 
policies which arguably up-grade interests between N orthern Ireland 
and the Republic of Ireland may be hindered by Irish and N orthern 
Irish behaviour. These policies m ay not stim ulate economic cross- 
b o rd er co-operation , never m ind political co-operation . The 
Commission by initiating policies may try to provide dynamism, but it 
may not succeed.
iv . C o n c lu s io n : T he R ole of th e  C o m m iss io n  in  th e
Irish /N orthern  Irish  Cross-Border R elationship
There is a balance sheet of evidence as to whether the Commission is a 
dynamic leader in its approach to the conflict in N orthern Ireland and
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the Irish /N orthern  Irish cross-border relationship. On the one hand, 
the Commission does not have a unified strategic approach to the 
conflict and is generally ignorant of it. In that sense, the Commission is 
not a dynamic force in the Irish /N orthern  Irish relationship. As its 
activities are subordinate to those of the Anglo-Irish process (and, 
therefore, to the British and Irish states), neo-realist theory appears to 
be a m ore accurate depiction  of the C om m ission than  neo ­
functionalism. The Commission does not appear to be a supranational 
actor in its behaviour towards N orthern Ireland. M oreover, even its 
cross-border program m es and its new  policy initiatives are no t 
perceived to be entirely successful by some Commission officials.
However, on the other hand, the Com mission has initiated  
general policies which potentially up-grade interests between N orthern 
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The Commission m ust be given 
som e credit for attem pting to increase the num ber of com m on 
interests between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, even if 
N orthern Irish and Irish actors do not react to these common interests. 
M oreover, those who work in the Irish /N orthern  Irish units w ere 
aw are of how  some EC policies could be used to im prove the 
Ir ish /N o rth e rn  Irish cross-border relationship . N eo-functionalist 
emphasis on economics as an incentive for cross-border co-operation 
is not necessarily invalidated.
It does seem that EC policy has provided a basis for cross- 
border co-operation, albeit an imperfect one. Even those Commission 
representatives who were m ore pessim istic about the EC's effect 
pointed to the existence of such a basis. For example, they noted the 
increase in business cross-border co-operation. The question is 
whether the basis provided by EC policy is sufficient to increase cross- 
border co-operation. Commission officials themselves saw limitations, 
bu t the effect of the Commission's policy initiation can only be fully 
determ ined by examining the behaviour of Irish and N orthern Irish 
actors themselves.
In the rem ainder of this thesis, I examine the reaction of Irish 
and N orthern Irish actors to the new EC policies of the 1980s. Is it 
possible that these policies have indeed increased cross-border co­
operation, despite the limitations of the Commission's behaviour, w ith 
respect to N orthern Ireland? If so, then, neo-functionalism need not be 
totally abandoned, but may be stripped down and refined to provide a 
better exposition of the Irish/N orthern Irish cross-border relationship.
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In the next chapter, I examine the effect of the SEM, EC regional policy 
-and the CAP reform on Irish/N orthern Irish civil service co-operation.
Chapter Four
The Civil Service and Cross-Border Co-operation
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In tro d u c tio n
The previous chapter highlighted the influence of the Anglo-Irish 
process on the behaviour of the Commission. In this chapter the 
relative significance of the EC and the ALA on civil service behaviour 
will be examined, so as to determ ine w hether the EC is increasing 
cross-border civil service co-operation or w hether it is political co­
operation in the form of the AIA which influences the cross-border 
administrative relationship. If the AIA is the main influence on the civil 
service cross-border relationship, then contrary to neo-functionalist 
logic, spillover does not occur from economic to political co-operation, 
bu t in fact, political co-operation is a necessary precondition for 
economic co-operation. Hence, the neo-functionalist argum ent would 
be weakened.
Four main points emerge from this examination of civil service 
behaviour. First, the reform of EC regional policy and the introduction 
of CAP reform proposals have not increased levels of civil service co­
operation dramatically. Second, change that has occurred is limited to 
a small num ber of specific divisions and does not spillover to other 
divisions, despite the existence of overlapping policy interests. Third, 
there is a general perception among the civil servants interviewed, that 
cross-border co-operation is prim arily the responsibility of the Inter­
governmental Conference and of those civil servants in the Anglo-Irish 
Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Finally, the above findings lead to the conclusion that, for the 
civil service at least, economic co-operation is prim arily the response 
to political rather than economic concerns. Despite the EC, economic 
factors dictate that Northern Ireland and the Republic far from being 
prospective co-operators, are in fact economic rivals. Economic co­
operation in areas where common interests do exist will not spillover 
to co-operation in those where they do not exist. Moreover, economic 
co -o p e ra tio n  can n o t tran sfo rm  co n flic tu a l in te re s ts  in to  
complementary interests, without political resolve, if even then.
The chapter will begin with a description of the role of the civil 
service in the decision-making process in N orthern Ireland and the 
Republic of Ireland. Following this description, I examine the main 
cross-border initiatives which may affect civil service cross-border co­
operation. These initiatives fall into two categories: those which are EC 
schemes and those which are AIA schemes. The adm inistration of
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each cross-border initiative is detailed. Following this description, I 
exam ine w hether contacts betw een civil servants have increased 
because of each venture. In the third section, the relative importance 
for civil service departments of each scheme is determined. Finally, the 
implications of the findings for the neo-functionalist argum ent are 
deduced.
The reform of the CAP will not be considered as having an effect 
on cross-border civil service co-operation in this chapter. Both civil 
services act through their governm ents w ith respect to agriculture. 
There is no scope for cross-border civil service co-operation as a 
response to the CAP reform. Interviews with civil servants confirmed 
this point. Consequently, in this chapter the civil service's reaction to 
EC special programmes, to the Structural Funds, to the International 
Fund and to the Intergovernmental Conference set up under the terms 
of the AIA will be examined.
i. The Role of the Civil Service
The civil service plays a vital role in liberal dem ocratic political 
systems. The key factor in civil service power is that its m embers may 
have a higher level of expertise and experience than have ministers. In 
the face of new in-coming government, the existence of experienced 
senior adm inistrators is an invaluable asset, which gives the civil 
service an im portant position in the policy community. The extent of 
this significance depends to a large extent on the policy-m aking 
environm ent. For exam ple, a high turn-over of governm ents, or 
political instability lessens the ability of politicians to learn more about 
a certain policy area and hence gives relevant civil servants greater 
scope to influence the policy-making process.
The significance of the civil service is particularly m arked with 
respect to N orthern  Ireland. The weakness of local governm ent in 
N orthern Ireland has led to even greater civil service influence in the 
North than in the UK as a whole:
Since Direct Rule in 1972, the involvement of local politicians in 
the policy network has declined and the influence of bureaucrats 
and W estm inster politicians has increased (Connolly and 
Loughlin, 1990, p. 10).
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In practice this greater involvement has meant that the NICS is more 
involved in political affairs since 1972:
Civil servants in the NIO and N orthern Ireland departm ents, 
being im m une to local party  pressure, also enjoy greater 
discretion than their counterparts in Britain and the Republic 
(O'Leary, 1991, p. 15).
Similarly, one former senior civil servant in the NICS has commented 
that since the imposition of direct rule in N orthern Ireland "m any 
senior members of the NICS found themselves more closely involved 
with political affairs than ever before..." (Connolly and Loughlin, 1990, p. 
10).
There are in all six departm ents in the NICS — Finance and 
Personnel, Economic Development, Environment, Education, Health 
and Social Services and Agriculture. Added to this is the N orthern 
Ireland Office (NIO) which was established in 1972. Its main task is to 
advise the Secretary of State on political matters. The main focus of 
attention in the context of EC-sponsored cross-border co-operation 
are the departments of the Environment, of Agriculture and of Finance 
and Personnel. The relationship between the latter and the Treasury is 
a significant component of the overall decision-making process. The 
Treasury in the UK negotiates separately with the Commission at the 
final bargaining stage. All other departm ents have their say at earlier 
stages. However, of the Northern Irish departments, the Department of 
Finance and Personnel has the main responsibility for cross-border EC 
m atters, with the Departm ents of Agriculture and the Environm ent 
playing a secondary role.
Similarly, in the Republic, the civil service plays a key role in the 
decision-making process, although it is less politically involved than in 
N orthern Ireland. The role of the senior civil service is to collect and 
appraise data and to identify possible courses of action:
Those who prepare the m em oranda, p u t up  the papers and 
explain the issues to the minister might in some circumstances, 
have an im portant, even decisive influence upon the outcome 
(Chubb, 1982, p. 174).
As regards the Irish civil service, the main focus of attention in this 
chapter are the Departments of Agriculture, Tourism and Transport, 
Environment, Foreign Affairs and Finance. Again, the latter departm ent
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plays the most significant role with respect to negotiating w ith the 
Commission on regional policy initiatives. The Anglo-Irish Division in 
the D epartm ent of Foreign Affairs is involved w ith cross-border 
initiatives which fall under the aegis of the IGC, or of the International 
Fund for Ireland.
For both Northern Ireland and the Republic, the civil service is a 
key actor in the policy-making environm ent. Before exam ining the 
extent to which these influential organisations on both sides of the 
border are engaging in EC-induced cross-border co-operation, it is 
necessary to clarify the main sources of cross-border co-operation.
ii. The Sources of Cross-Border Co-operation
Previous chapters have highlighted the fact that the EC is not the sole 
source of cross-border co-operation betw een N orthern Ireland and 
the Republic of Ireland. The possibility that the AIA also influences 
that relationship complicates any examination of the EC's effect on the 
cross-border adm inistrative relationship. It is necessary to describe 
both EC and AIA schemes in more depth  before determ ining the 
effect of such schemes on the Irish /N o rth ern  Irish cross-border 
relationship.
The European Community
The two pillars of EC regional policy are the Structural Funds and the 
special programmes (chapter three). The relationship between them  is 
at first sight confusing. The main point is that the special program m es 
make additional money available over and above that agreed upon in 
the national operational programmes. Hence, there are various sources 
of EC aid. Figure 4.1 below lists those sources which have implications 
for cross-border co-operation in the sectors studied in this thesis.
The Operational Programme for Rural Development w a s  
approved by the Commission in December 1990. This program m e 
followed the Pilot Program m e for Rural Developm ent which was 
completed in 1990. The Rural Development Program me is defined as 
being part of an overall strategy for rural developm ent and works in 
conjunction with all the other programmes. Indeed, the Commission 
intends that all the above initiatives should complem ent each other
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and form an in tegrated plan for the overall developm ent of the 
economy (chapter three).
Figure 4.1: Sources of EC aid
Source of Finance EC Assistance (millions)
N.I. ROI
Rural Development 100 71
Tourism 34 165
Transport 105 562
Interreg 58 to be shared by N. I. and ROI
Leader 21
Table: EC initiatives with cross-border implications 
Note: Figures calculated in Irish pounds, millions, 1990
Source: Europe in Northern Ireland, No. 65 - December 1990, (adapted), European 
Commission Office in Northern Ireland; EC Structural Funds in Ireland, November 
1992, Department of Finance, Dublin
More specifically, the rural developm ent program m e aims to 
diversify the rural economy to increase employment and raise income 
levels. Emphasis is placed on the "bottom up ' approach, i.e., on the 
principle of subsidiarity (see p. 73). This emphasis implies that statutory 
au thorities and local com m unities shou ld  w ork together. The 
im portant factor in the context of this study is that the Less Favoured 
Areas (LFAs) receive a greater am ount of aid from the scheme 
(successful applicants from the LFAs receive 50 per cent of the cost of 
the proposed scheme as opposed to 40 per cent in the other areas). 
However, although the Less Favoured Areas in the N orth W est of 
Ireland adjoin Northern Ireland, there are no special provisions for 
cross-border co-operation. Em phasis is p laced on the Leader 
program m e (see below) and in this way there is an indirect link to 
cross-border initiatives.
The Operational Programme for Tourism like the  ru ra l 
developm ent program m e is relevant to cross-border co-operation 
indirectly because it complements other EC programmes, in particular, 
the In terreg  program m e (see below). The tourism  program m e 
operates on a 26 and 6 county basis. That is to say, it is not a cross- 
border program m e. For example, for the Republic of Ireland, the 
program m e's negotiators intended that the num ber of tourists visiting
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the Republic w ould be doubled by 1993, w ith an accompanying 5 
million Irish pounds increase of revenue and the creation of 25,000 
jobs. N one of these aims refer to the cross-border dim ension. 
However, the Interreg program m e emphasises the tourism  sector and 
thus tourism does have a cross-border dimension.
The Operational Programme for Transport is the  m ost 
im portant of the operational programmes for cross-border relations. In 
this program m e the aim is to overcome N orthern  Ireland and the 
Republic's peripherality by im proving its transport infrastructure. 
Because the Republic and N orthern  Ireland share their peripheral 
status, the Commission pressed for a transport network covering the 
island as a whole. M oreover the creation of high speed links 
connecting major national cities in the Community is a main priority of 
the EC Transport Directorate. The transport program m e consists of 
two main sub-programmes. The first is to develop national prim ary 
roads and the second is to develop secondary roads, to develop 
tourism  and industry  in particular regions. The key cross-border 
elements include the proposed Dublin-Belfast m otorway, roadw ays 
linking Sligo and Donegal to Belfast and an im proved Dublin-Belfast 
rail link.
Interreg is the C om m unity  p rogram m e for tran sfron tier 
developm ent. The N orthern  Irish /Irish  Interreg program m e was 
draw n up by the British and Irish governments jointly and covers the 
border regions in the Republic — Donegal, Monaghan, Cavan, Leitrim 
and Sligo and all of N orthern Ireland apart from Belfast. The overall 
aim is to:
assist both internal and external border areas ... in overcoming 
the special developm ent problems arising from their relative 
isolation, ... in the interests of the local com m unity and in a 
m anner compatible with the protection of the environm ent (OJ 
No C215/4 30.8.90).
A further aim is w orth citing, that of prom oting "the creation and 
developm ent of networks of co-operation across internal borders and 
where relevant, the linking of these networks to w ider Com m unity 
initiatives" (ibid). Consequently, Interreg's activities overlap with those 
of the tourism , transport and rural developm ent program m es. For 
exam ple, In te rreg  em phasises the d ev e lopm en t of tou rism  
infrastructure (e.g. roads along the border regions), the development of
107
agri-tourism (on-farm accommodation for tourists) and environmental 
p ro tec tio n  m easures (p reserv ing  the  ru ra l com m unity  and  
environment). In this way Interreg combines elements from all the 
other Structural Fund initiatives.
Leader aims for the developm ent by the rural community of its 
own area in accordance with its own priorities:
the initiative is designed to establish a netw ork of local rural 
development action groups ... enjoying a substantial degree of 
flexibility in implementing at local level the initiatives financed 
by national global grants (OJ No C73/35 19.3.91).
More precisely, Leader measures include the provision of technical 
support for rural development, vocational training, the development of 
tourism  and also the advancem ent of small enterprises and local 
services. The relevance of Leader to cross-border co-operation is that 
in many cases the same local community exists on both sides of the 
border. Hence, increased cross-border comm unication is needed to 
draw  up an integrated plan for rural development.
The Anglo-Irish Agreement: The Intergovernmental Conference 
and the International Fund for Ireland
The second main source of influence on the Irish/N orthern  Irish cross- 
border relationship is the Anglo-Irish Agreem ent (AIA). As the IGC 
which was established under the AIA is attended by civil servants, as 
well as ministers, Irish civil servants, the NICS and the NIO are bound 
to be affected by the Conference's activities. Apart from aiming to deal 
w ith political, security, legal and co-operation matters, economic co­
operation is provided for under Article 10 of the AIA:
The tw o G overnm ents shall co-operate to p rom ote  the  
economic and social developm ent of those areas of both parts 
of Ireland which have suffered most severely...and shall consider 
the possibility of securing international support for this w ork 
(Anglo-Irish Agreement, Article 10).
Article 10 of the AIA also states that:
the Conference shall be a framework for the prom otion of co­
operation between the two parts of Ireland concerning cross- 
border aspects of economic, social and cultural matters (ibid).
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The significance of the EC for the work of the Anglo-Irish Conference 
was highlighted in 1989 when under the review of the AIA, greater 
emphasis was placed on the process of EC integration:
The two Governments have considered also the implications of 
the internal market in the European Community in 1992. They 
recognise that these will be far-reaching and will generate 
common opportunities for both parts of Ireland as well as 
common difficulties arising from peripheral island status and 
other factors including the increase of competition (Review of 
the Working of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, 1989).
Apart from this reference to cross-border co-operation, there was also 
a stated  com m itm ent to extending the areas discussed in the 
Conference. As a result of this statem ent, the Conference included 
discussion of Rural Developm ent Policy in its Septem ber m eeting 
(1991). The emphasis of the discussion was on the potential for cross- 
border co-operation in rural developm ent and a special steering 
committee was established to examine progress on local program m es 
and to co-ordinate a response to cross-border initiatives. Again, 
reference was made in the September meeting to the EC, specifically a 
welcome was given to the Interreg initiative.
The decision to extend the ambit of the Conference is reflected 
in an examination of the wide range of subjects discussed since the 
1989 review. These subjects have included tourism, transport, energy, 
the environm ent, health, education and N orth-South trade. For 
example, in 1993, the IGC:
W elcomed the special focus on trade, business and tourism  and 
underlined that closer cross-border co-operation in these areas 
could result in considerable m utual economic and com m unity 
benefit ... They agreed that the coming into effect of the Single 
M arket w ould bring progressive benefits N orth and South of the 
border (Joint Statement, Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference, 
March 1993).
Thus, there is a significant overlap between the Conference's activities 
and those of the EC and the Conference has agreed to decide upon 
cross-border projects which might gain EC aid (Joint Statement, Anglo- 
Irish Intergovernmental Conference, February 1993).
However, in the context of this study, it is im portant that the 
political will manifested by the signing of the AIA, is at the basis of the
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this economic co-operation (see p. 22). Consequently, should the 
Conference successfully achieve cross-border economic co-operation, 
it does so because it reflects political agreement among the signatories 
of the AIA. In this way, political co-operation leads to economic co­
operation ra ther than vice versa. Similarly, the IFI, which was 
established under the AIA reflects a political agreement. However, it 
too provides for economic cross-border co-operation.
The International Fund for Ireland (IFI) which was set up under 
the AIA also has a cross-border dimension. Its two m ain aims are to 
prom ote economic and social advance and to encourage contact, 
d ialogue and reconciliation betw een nationalists and  unionists 
throughout Ireland (au thor's em phasis). Hence, cross-border co­
operation is an integral part of the Fund's activities. The Fund was 
established in 1986 and receives contributions from the United States, 
Canada, New  Zealand and from the EC. Between 1986 and 1992, 
£UK164 million had been received by the Fund. Two thousand three 
hundred  projects have been aided by the fund with a total of 600 
projects receiving IFI money in 1991 (IFI, p. 5). Of these projects, the 
Business Enterprise scheme has en explicit cross-border dim ension 
under which the Confederation of British Industry  (CBI) and the 
Confederation of Irish Industry (CII) have em barked upon a joint 
initiative to prom ote job creation through increased cross-border 
trade. Similarly under the Tourism scheme there is a joint m arketing 
project which advertises the island as a whole as an attractive location 
for visitors.
In the Science and Technology and A griculture Program m es 
there is money provided for cross-border initiatives in post-graduate 
and general research training. The Joint North-South projects advance 
both managerial and what is termed "young workers" cross-border co­
operation. A part from these specific schemes, CRISP and CERS 
emphasise the importance of local community involvement. Again, as 
with Leader, many of the relevant communities straddle both sides of 
the Border.
It is clear that there are overlaps between all three areas — the 
EC, the IGC and the International Fund. This fact should be a source of 
encouragem ent to those seeking a "harm onisation strategy" to 
reconcile communities on each side of the Irish/N orthern  Irish border. 
H ow ever, the m ere existence of cross-border schem es does not 
necessarily carry any positive weight unless such schemes are used
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constructively. In other words the adm inistration of the schemes and 
the degree to which their potential benefits are actively pursued  
determines their value.
iii. The Administration of Co-operation
The role of the civil service can be expected to be significant in the 
adm inistration of cross-border co-operation. However, to w hat extent 
are civil services on both sides of the border actively involved in cross- 
border schemes? The question is do these civil servants know  each 
other better and exchange inform ation more effectively because of 
cross-border schemes.
The Monitoring System: A m onitoring system for all the above 
co-operative schemes exists. In principle, each m onitoring system is 
the same. The committees meet to ensure that each project is being 
conducted according to the objectives it set out to achieve. A num ber 
of indicators are used to prove the effectiveness of the scheme. For 
example, for the Operational Programme for Transport, indicators of 
effectiveness are divided into specific categories — physical, e.g., the 
additional capacity provided by a specific road; financial, e.g., the target 
revenue desired; and impact, e.g., the impact of a road on access costs 
to Ireland.
Under the reform of the Structural Funds, each governm ent was 
obliged to set up a monitoring committee to implement the approved 
projects. Therefore, in the case of EC-sponsored transport schemes 
(those covered by the O perational Program m e on T ransport), 
m onitoring committees consist of representatives of the relevant 
central governm ent (civil servants), of the Commission and of local 
governm ent. Under the Operational Programme for Transport there 
will be one monitoring committee to cover all schemes in operation. Of 
these transport schemes, three relate particularly to cross-border co­
operation. Meetings between members of the m onitoring committee 
are intended to occur approxim ately every six weeks. In the case of 
cross-border schemes, civil servants from the Departm ent of Tourism 
and Transport on both sides of the border attend.
Similarly, Interreg has its own monitoring committee consisting 
of representatives of relevant departm ents, of local governm ent, of 
state-sponsored bodies and of the Com mission. There are seven 
committees under the five main sections of the Interreg program m e.
I l l
The International Fund also has representatives on the Interreg  
committees. There are in all approxim ately six m em bers on each 
committee. A considerable bulk of activity took place over the summer 
of 1991, when the Interreg program m e was being compiled by civil 
servants. At that time, there were approxim ately four m eetings at 
individual departm ental level draw ing up  the different parts of the 
program m e. Eight cross-border m eetings took place, betw een both 
civil services. Finally, the Departments of Finance (in the Republic) and 
Finance and Personnel (in N orthern  Ireland) m et to p u t the 
program m e together.
U nder the Rural Development Programme there is also a 
monitoring committee, as for all the above EC schemes, consisting of 
the relevant departm ental m em bers, state-sponsored bodies, the 
Commission and local authorities, as well as representatives of the 
core groups. However, the Leader and Rural Development schemes 
have a slightly different system to that of the transport and Interreg 
initiatives. For example, for Leader schemes there are core groups 
consisting of about ten representatives of the local com m unity and 
these groups are assisted by official co-ordinators. Hence, given that 
there are seventeen projects under the Leader program m e, there will 
be seventeen core groups. A competition takes place to recruit people 
to each group.
Within the IGC framework there is a new m onitoring system to 
accompany the existence of rural developm ent on the Anglo-Irish 
agenda. A Steering Committee was established (September 1991) to 
examine "bottom-up" developments on both sides of the border. The 
com m ittee's in troduction  was announced follow ing discussions 
betw een the then N orthern Irish M inister for A griculture, Jeremy 
Hanley and his Irish counterpart at that time, Michael O'Kennedy. Two 
or three mem bers from each side of the border attend and work 
closely together. Meetings take place every three to six months.
Finally, the IFI is governed by a Board which is appointed by the 
British and Irish Governments. It is assisted by an advisory committee 
which consists of senior officials representing both governm ents and 
by a secretariat and two Director Generals (one based in the Irish civil 
service in Dublin and one in the Northern Irish civil service in Belfast). 
All the civil servants involved are from the Irish Department of Foreign 
Affairs and the N orthern Ireland Office. Board m eetings take place
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every four to six weeks and the Advisory Committee meets before 
each Board meeting.
There are in all 22 m onitoring schemes covering cross-border 
co-operation. Of these schemes, 20 cover EC aided program m es and 
two concern AIA initiatives. Approximately two civil servants from 
both sides of the border participate in the committees. The existence 
of 22 committees working in the same area is confusing, but the fact 
that this separation is entrenched by the segregation of civil servants 
from  each other, despite  the fact that m any w ork in the sam e 
departm ent, may baffle the observer. Many civil servants work in the 
same cross-border policy area, but are ignorant of each other's work. 
Civil service m em bership differs on each committee, not m erely 
according to Departm ent, bu t according to each Division, or sub­
division of each Department. For example, different civil servants work 
on the Leader scheme, on the Interreg scheme, on the Operational 
P rogram m e for Rural D evelopm ent and on the IGC Rural 
Development Steering Committee.
There is evidence from the interviews which were conducted 
that the Operational Programme for Transport and Interreg have had 
an effect on levels of cross-border co-operation. However, this effect 
on cross-border civil service co-operation has been confined to those 
individuals who are directly involved in a specific scheme, i.e., on a 
handful of people within each relevant department. Moreover, there is 
evidence that cross-border contacts between civil servants waxes and 
wanes according to the issue at hand. One official observed that there 
had been increased contact over the summer of 1991 over the question 
of the Dublin-Belfast rail link (Interview, Department of Finance senior 
official, 7.1.92).
Indeed, the civil servants who are involved in specific schemes 
do not always know about the activities of other relevant cross-border 
projects. For example, an official in the N orthern Irish Departm ent of 
Transport who is involved in the Dublin-Belfast rail link proposal 
com m ented that he and his section were not m aking m uch use of 
Interreg because there was no need to. He continued that he himself 
had "precious little interest" in it and as a result did not know who 
exactly was involved in it (Interview, Departm ent of the Environment 
for Northern Ireland Senior official, 22.1.92).
Similarly, an official in the same departm ent who is involved in 
the Structural Fund cross-border road schemes, was unsure as to
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whether or not the monitoring committee for Interreg operated at the 
time of interview  (Interview, D epartm ent of the Environm ent for 
Northern Ireland, senior official, 22.1.92). Another example of the lack of 
spillover between cross-border projects is that of the D epartm ent of 
Tourism and Transport in the Republic. Here, the principal of the EC 
Division advised b lun tly  that cross-border in itiatives w ere the 
responsibility of the Anglo-Irish division, not Tourism and Transport 
and that talking to him was "a waste of time" (Interview, Department of 
Foreign Affairs, senior official, January 1991). Similarly, the principal of 
the Roads Division explained that "It doesn't really bother me whether 
it's [investment] cross-border or not, bu t in the Anglo-Irish Division 
they're anxious to foster co-operation" (Interview, Departm ent of the 
Environment senior official, 2.1.92).
However, civil servants involved in a specific scheme pointed 
out that when there is a need to contact colleagues over the border, 
then obviously such contact is made. It was noted that contacts have 
increased generally in the period 1986 to 1992, because of the IFI as 
well as Interreg. (Interview, Departm ent of the Environment, 2.1.92). 
Moreover, initiation of a joint project involving the building of a canal 
straddling the border from Ballinamore to Ballyconnell is cited as a 
cross-border success. This project hopes to encourage p rivate  
investm ent in the area. (Interview, Departm ent of the Environment, 
senior official, 2.1.92). The monitoring committee system for this project 
as for all EC cross-border scheme provides opportunities for cross- 
border communication. However, the IGC provides the m om entum  
for all these cross-border schemes (Interview, D epartm ent of the 
Environment, senior official, 2.1.92).
Moreover, there is a general problem that the am ount of money 
available for cross-border schemes is relatively sm all, to date. 
Although the EC is vital to the Republic's economy, only a small per 
cent of the total am ount received is devoted to cross-border co­
operation. Hence, given that the numbers involved in each scheme are 
small and that the m onetary value of each scheme is also relatively 
small, the potential for broader co-operation is limited.
The Leader and Rural Development schemes are only in their 
fledgling stages and therefore it is more difficult to determ ine their 
implications for cross-border co-operation. However, the same point 
emerges as above, that only those civil servants who are involved 
directly  w ith each scheme can expect to increase cross-border
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contacts and the num ber of those involved in each scheme is small. On 
the other hand, although the size of schemes is small in the Leader and 
R ural D evelopm ent p rogram m es, there  are n u m erous ru ra l 
developm ent schemes which overlap with IGC developm ents and 
complement Interreg and the Operational Programmes.
Despite these new initiatives, the general im pression received 
from civil servants interviewed is that the Departments of Agriculture 
on both sides of the border "have always had a close relationship" 
(Interview, Department of Agriculture and Food, senior official, 28.1.92). 
There was a general caution in ascribing too much influence to the EC 
in the field of agricultural cross-border co-operation. For example, 
w hen asked about a steering committee for rural developm ent co­
operation set up by the IGC, the above official com m ented that: 
"Setting up steering committees is simply a political developm ent.... It's 
not necessarily the EC that encouraged it" (Interview, Departm ent of 
Agriculture and Food, senior official, 28.1.92).
The main point conveyed by civil servants who worked in the 
agricultural sectors was that cross-border co-operation in this sector 
had existed anyway, irrespective of EC influence. This point emerged in 
relation to all the EC schemes. For example, in the field of disease 
eradication there have been strong links between both departm ents on 
either side of the border. Moreover, two officials from the departm ent 
of Foreign Affairs commented separately, that so much else coincided 
with Irish and British membership of the Community, it was impossible 
to judge the effect of the EC (Interview, Department of Foreign Affairs, 
senior officials, 21.1.92 and 27.1.92).
The conflict in N orthern Ireland began in 1968, membership of 
the EC occurred in 1973, as did the Sunningdale Agreement (chapter 
two). The AIA was signed in 1985 and the SEA was signed only two 
years later in 1987. Cross-border co-operation had always existed to 
some degree. These civil servants cited the examples of Lemass' visit 
to N orthern Ireland in 1965 (chapter two) and of cross-border studies 
w hich were com m issioned in 1977. Yet, despite the difficulty in 
determ ining the independent effect of each factor on the cross-border 
relationship, be it the EC, or the AIA, civil servants w ho were 
interviewed generally believed that the AIA had been the dom inant 
influence on the Irish /N orthern  Irish cross-border relationship in the 
1980s.
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iv. The Anglo-Irish D ivision and Civil Service Co-operation
W hat em erges from all the interview s w ith  civil servants is the 
centrality of the Anglo-Irish Division of the Departm ent of Foreign 
Affairs and of those members of the NIO who are involved in the AIA 
to the overall Irish /N orthern  Irish cross-border relationship. The 
importance of these divisions in advancing cross-border co-operation 
arises from the fact that for many Irish and N orthern Irish civil servants 
there are no short term benefits perceived to exist from engaging in 
cross-border co-operation. In fact, in certain areas of civil service 
activity, Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland are perceived to 
be rivals, not co-operators. In contrast, the Anglo-Irish Division has an 
over-riding political interest in encouraging cross-border co-operation. 
It has increasingly emphasised the importance of advancing economic 
cross-border co-operation so as to achieve this aim.
There are a num ber of areas w here economic conflicts of 
interests exist between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. 
Put bluntly by one civil servant: 'I f  you were Dev, w e're all Irish, but we 
fight like cats and dogs over particu lar industries" (Interview , 
Departm ent of the Environment, senior official, 26.2.91). Tourism is a 
case in point. There have been conflicts between both parts of Ireland 
over the prom otion of tourism . The continuation  of conflict in 
Northern Ireland has led Bord Failte (the Irish tourist board) to detach 
itself from any association with Northern Ireland. Bord Failte fears that 
because of the conflict in Northern Ireland, tourists do not visit that 
region. If the Republic co-operates in tourism  with N orthern Ireland, 
then the Republic will suffer from N orthern Ireland's negative image. 
The Irish departm ent of tourism is also keen to increase the num ber of 
visitors to the Republic. It fears losing visitors to N orthern Ireland. In 
contrast, those who are involved with the AIA are keen to advance 
cross-border tourism  co-operation. The N orthern  Ireland Tourist 
Board (NITB) would prefer to sell the island of Ireland as one tourist 
destination, precisely because the conflict w ithin the six counties is a 
disincentive to visitors. It feels that N orthern Ireland w ould benefit 
from the Republic's green and peaceful image.
Hence, there is a difference in priority between the Anglo-Irish 
Division and the departm ent of tourism , the form er departm ent 
encouraging e.g., joint m arketing of Ireland to potential tourists, the 
latter claim ing to "in troduce an elem ent of reality" (Interview ,
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Departm ent of Tourism, Trade and Industry, senior offical, 2.1.92). 
There is also a difference in priority  betw een the N orthern  Irish 
tourism  division and its Irish counterpart. For the N orthern  Irish 
tourism  division, cross-border co-operation w ould  benefit the 
N orthern Irish tourist trade, but for the Irish departm ent it is not 
perceived to be of benefit.
Another area where contrasting priorities are held by the Anglo- 
Irish Division, NIO and other civil service departm ents is the field of 
transport. Here there are two main difficulties. The main one related in 
1991 to the proposed Dublin-Belfast railway im provem ent scheme. 
According to a member of the Departm ent of Transport in London, 
originally the Irish governm ent proposed the im provem ent of the 
Dublin-Cork rail link, but then suddenly shifted to proposing that the 
Dublin-Belfast link be improved (Interview, Departm ent of Transport, 
(UK), official, 14.11.91). The decision to improve this link was eventually 
announced in 1992 after considerable delay. Before its announcem ent 
pressures m ounted on the Irish governm ent to im prove the link. A 
letter was sent from Richard Needham , then Minister for Economic 
Development, Northern Ireland, to Seamus Brennan, then Minister for 
Tourism and Transport, in January 1992, in an attem pt to encourage the 
scheme, but it m et with no response. (Interview, D epartm ent of the 
Environment for Northern Ireland, senior official, 22.1.92).
Similarly, the consultants Coopers and Lybrand advised that the 
Dublin-Belfast im provem ent rail scheme should begin as soon as 
possible. The problem  for the Irish governm ent was not one of an 
absence of common economic interest with Northern Ireland, as much 
as a difficulty in choosing between various competing economic and 
political dem ands in a climate of economic recession. The scheme 
itself was too costly, according to the D epartm ent of Finance 
(Interview, Departm ent of Finance, senior official, 7.1.92). H ow ever, 
more to the point the Irish government had to weigh up the num ber of 
votes gained by developing the Dublin-Belfast link compared to that 
gained by investing m oney in some other area of the twenty-six 
counties (Interview, 14.11.91). Overall, as one civil servant said: "We [the 
Republic] have to look after our own interests first and let the UK look 
after N orthern Ireland" (Interview, Departm ent of the Environm ent, 
senior official, 26 2.91).
There is also a difference in priorities among Irish and N orthern 
Irish civil servants with respect to the significance each civil service
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attaches to the EC. As long as the UK continues to subsidise the 
Northern Irish at the existing rate, EC aid will be less im portant to the 
Northern Irish economy than to the Irish economy. In 1991-1992, the 
UK donation am ounted to 1.7 billion per annum  w hereas the 
C om m ission 's donation  am oun ted  to 100 m illion (In terv iew , 
Department of Finance and Personnel, senior official, 20.1.92). By 1993, 
the UK's donation was over 3 billion pounds (O 'Leary et. al, 1993, 
A ppendix 1). The general them e running  through N orthern  Irish 
discourse in the interviews conducted, was that N orthern Ireland is 
part of a "rich European nation" and that "the pay-masters m ust be the 
crown". (Interview, D epartm ent of the Environm ent for N orthern  
Ireland, senior official, 22.1.92). It is encapsulated by the statement that: 
"Financially, we [Northern Ireland] will never be dependent on Europe, 
we will always be dependent on the UK" (Interview, Departm ent of 
Finance and Personnel 20.1.92).
In contrast to the above N orthern  Irish civil servant, civil 
servants in the Republic emphasised the significance of the EC to the 
Irish economy, reflecting the fact that EC receipts account for 7 per 
cent of GDP. As one official pu t it: "The Com mission's capacity to 
influence is dictated by money ... the Irish [Republic] have to listen 
closely" (Interview, Departm ent of the Environment, senior official, 
26.2.92). Therefore, the Commission may have a potential influence on 
levels of cross-border co-operation as described in chapter one, but 
this influence is determined by the am ount of money provided by the 
Commission for cross-border schemes and by the degree to which 
member states are dependent on that money.
The Republic of Ireland 's strong desire to receive EC aid is 
reflected in its efforts to meet Commission conditions so as to receive 
maximum aid. For example, in the negotiations for the 1993-1996 
allocation of S trucutral Funds, the C om m ission con tinued  to 
emphasise the necessity that partnership between the region, the EC 
and the state would occur.
The Commission was im pressed by the fact that the Republic's 
approach to the idea of partnership had attem pted to accomodate 
these EC conditions (Interview, European Commission, 2.4.93). For 
example, the Irish Minister for the Environment travelled to each of the 
seven sub-reg iona l com m ittees to consu lt w ith  th e ir local 
representatives. On the basis of these consultations, the Irish National
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Development Plan was draw n up (Interview, European Commission, 
24.93).
In contrast, N orthern  Ireland show ed less desire to m eet 
Commission demands. In this way, it relected its smaller dependence 
on EC funds. In N orthern  Ireland, there w as "a very m inim alist 
approach" (non-attributable interview). For one official the behaviour 
of the NICS followed that of Whitehall. According to this official the 
UK has "a general habit of belittling w hat the EC does" (non- 
attributable interview). The NICS "when in doubt" follows the UK's 
example (non-attributable interview). "W hen things get difficult, they 
[the NICS] w ithdraw  behind the W hitehall line" (non-attributable 
interview). In this way, the NICS and the Irish civil service do not share 
a common approach to the EC.
The fact that the NICS is dependent upon the UK means that it is 
m ore influenced by W hitehall in its behaviour tow ards the EC. As 
Whitehall is less enthusiastic about EC regional policy than is the Irish 
civil service (see p. 79), then the NICS is forced to exhibit a different 
response to EC regional policy. Moreover, there is less freedom to re­
organise the N orthern Irish planning system than in the Republic. In 
particular, it would be highly difficult to increase the pow er of local 
governm ent in Northern Ireland, given the political sensitivity of local 
government (see pp. 42 and 48).
Thus, if the NICS places less importance on EC receipts than does 
the Irish civil service, it would be wrong to assume that its response to 
these funds is entirely of its own volition. It is more constrained in its 
response to the EC than is its Irish counterpart. For example, m any 
NICS civil servants who w ere interview ed com plained about the 
additionality problem and were aware of the existence of a conflict of 
interests between the NICS and W hitehall in this regard. They did  
desire to receive more EC aid, but the attainm ent of their wishes was 
im peded by the UK governm ent's approach to the EC. However, the 
fact rem ains that the NICS, because of UK subvention, needs EC 
money less than does the Irish civil service. Thus, there are different 
priorities held by Irish and N orthern  Irish civil services in their 
approach to EC aid.
A nother exam ple of the existence of conflicting in terests 
between N orthern Ireland and the Republic is that of the Irish ports. 
The ports in Northern Ireland, in particular Larne compete w ith those 
in the Republic, in particular Dublin. D uring the 1988 negotiations
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between Irish, Northern Irish and Commission representatives a major 
difference revolved around the Commission's desire to invest in one 
port which would serve the island of Ireland as a whole. Larne was 
suggested as a suitable investm ent venture, but the suggestion was 
much opposed by the Irish delegation, because it feared that its Irish 
po rts  w ould  lose custom ers to N o rth ern  Ire land  (In terv iew , 
Departm ent of the Environment, senior official, 2.2.92). Similarly, any 
concentration of EC aid on Dublin port was an anathem a to the 
Northern Irish.
Whitehall, negotiating on behalf of Northern Ireland presented a 
"com prom ise" proposed by the Republic, as a so lu tion  to the 
stumbling block. The proposed solution entailed im proving N orthern 
links to Dublin, so that hauliers in the N orth could use the Dublin- 
Holyhead link more easily. The outcome would be to shift investment 
away from Larne to Dublin. In the face of N orthern anger at this 
proposal, no decision was reached on the port issue.
The existence of different priorities between N orthern Irish and 
Irish civil services implies that there is no autom atic link betw een 
specific cross-border initiatives and spillover to broader cross-border 
civil service co-operation. For many civil service departm ents there are 
no perceptible short term benefits to be derived from cross-border co­
operation. The EC has not provided adequate financial incentives to 
overcome the possible losses which would result, for example, from, 
developing Dublin port at the expense of Larne. Long-run efficiency 
becomes a speculative argum ent and it is short term  profit and loss 
which dominate civil servant thought. In the short term N orthern Irish 
and Irish civil servants perceive there to be losses for their regions in 
some sectors because of cross-border co-operation. In these areas, 
N orthern  Ireland and the Republic of Ireland are rivals not co- 
operators.
Civil servants departm ents which are involved in the overall 
planning of the economy have been criticised for having "clear sight 
over short distances", in the Republic at least. The National Economic 
and Social Council (NESC) in the Republic, has repeatedly voiced its 
concerns that the poor level of planning in the Republic will ham per 
development. In 1989, for example, it emphasised the need for a long 
run coherent strategy which would prepare the Irish economy for the 
SEM and bemoaned the fact that no such strategy existed (NESC, 1989, 
p. 215). Similarly, Garvin has commented that the usual Irish reaction to
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a potential or future problem is to ignore the problem until one trips 
over it (Garvin, 1989).
These criticisms m ay be applied  to the NICS also. It too 
perceives a conflict of interests between itself and the Irish civil service, 
in the areas discussed above and this conflict of interests is arguably 
based upon shorter term  perception. For example, its assertion that 
Northern Ireland does not need the EC as much as does the Republic 
rests on the assum ption of UK willingness to subsidise the N orthern 
Irish region. In the long run this willingness and, indeed, ability may not 
exist. Hence, although the EC theoretically creates common interests 
between both parts of Ireland, as described in chapter three, a short­
term perspective am ong certain civil service departm ents prevents 
w idespread civil service cross-border co-operation co-operation.
This emphasis on "short termism" is not as great for those civil 
servants who are involved in Anglo-Irish affairs. The depth  and 
longevity of conflict in Northern Ireland means that its resolution is 
likely to be a gradual process. Thus, the Anglo-Divisions in the 
Northern Irish and Irish administrations share a long-term approach to 
policy-making. The AIA itself was posited not as a solution, but as a 
framework for a solution to the N orthern Irish problem and there is a 
general consensus that activities of relevance to Northern Ireland will 
move slowly:
The way to make progress is not to get carried away on the 
political side, but to take a pragm atic step by step approach, 
rather than get involved with nationalists or unionists w ho'll 
block things (Interview, D epartm ent of Tourism, Trade and 
Industry, senior official, 2.2.92).
S im ilarly , a N o rth ern  Irish  official no ted  th a t in itia lly  the  
im plem entation of Interreg had  to be executed sensitively, b u t 
observed that over 1991 this need for sensitivity had dim inished and 
that unionists did not wish to be seen to block an EC-sponsored 
initiative (Interview, Departm ent of Finance and Personnel, senior 
official, 20.1.92). Thus, the approach of policy makers in this domain is 
cautious and gradual. Any change in behaviour, even small, is 
perceived to be encouraging.
The different approaches of the A-I division, the NIO and other 
departm ents were recognised by interview ees. W hen asked the 
question of whether there was a problem based on short-term versus
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long-term  approaches to decision-m aking, a senior official in the 
Anglo-Irish Division assented that the Anglo-Irish Division "certainly 
had a broader vision" (Interview, Department of Foreign Affairs, senior 
official, 21.1.92). Clearly, the Anglo-Irish Division has its objectives and 
other departm ents have theirs. By definition, the Anglo-Irish Division 
thinks w ithin a thirty-tw o county fram ework, because it aims to 
reconcile com m unities in N orthern  Ireland as well as reconciling 
communities in Northern Ireland with those in the Republic of Ireland. 
Similarly those civil servants in the NIO who are engaged in Anglo- 
Irish affairs are concerned not only with Northern Ireland but also with 
the Republic. In contrast other departm ents operate w ithin the Irish 
context or w ithin the N orthern Irish context, but not w ith respect to 
both contexts, because their priority is to adm inister either the Irish 
state or the Northern Irish region. Thus, responsibility for cross-border 
co-operation is delegated by these civil service departm ents to the 
Anglo-Irish Division.
A part from this adm inistrative division of labour, there is a 
genuine reluctance on the part of non-Anglo-Irish Division members 
to interfere w ith w hat is a very sensitive area of civil service and 
political activity. For example, the head of the EC Division in the Irish 
Department of Foreign Affairs commented that for political reasons he 
tended not to get in touch with the N orth directly over an EC matter, 
bu t contacted the Anglo-Irish Division (Interview, D epartm ent of 
Foreign Affairs, senior official, 27.1.92).
The above paragraphs establish that the Anglo-Irish Division 
holds a key position in the adm inistration  of cross-border co­
operation. There is no widespread co-operation among all civil service 
departm ents. Instead such co-operation occurs in sm all pockets. 
Arguably, the influence of the AIA on cross-border co-operation 
m eans that its overshadow s that of the EC. H ow ever, the EC's 
influence on the Irish /N o rth ern  Irish civil service cross-border 
relationship has been examined in the above paragraphs only by 
default i.e., by exposing that the Anglo-Irish Division has chief 
responsibility  for cross-border in itiatives and tha t cross-border 
initiatives in other departments are limited. In the next section, the EC's 
role will be examined explicitly, so as to determine more accurately its 
relative weight vis-^-vis the Anglo-Irish Division and to evaluate its 
overall effect on cross-border co-operation.
v. The European C om m unity and Co-operation
It is clear that w hat is lacking in the administration of cross-border co­
operation is a formal policy of co-operation which w ould cross-cut 
departm ental spheres of activity and lessen civil servants' perceptions 
th a t c ross-bo rder in itia tives are  the  A nglo -Irish  D iv isions ' 
responsibility. One m ain question is w hether or not the absence of 
such a formal policy impedes the EC from increasing cross-border co­
operation between N orthern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. This 
question was addressed by one civil servant who commented on w hat 
he perceived to be the academ ic's desire to give a structure  to 
everything, when in practice "structure isn 't all" (Interview, Department 
of Foreign Affairs, senior official, 27.1.92). This civil servant's argum ent 
assumes that each program m e trundles along and achieves its own 
aims quietly. The absence of a formal co-ordinating structure or of a 
w idespread co-operative effort among civil servants does not hinder 
the activities of those involved in each co-operative venture. In fact, so 
this argum ent goes, in the context of the political situation in N orthern 
Ireland it can do more harm  than good to have a structure, for any 
formality only gives publicity to activities and may cause a backlash 
from extremists in Northern Ireland.
Therefore, the EC can have an im pact on cross-border co­
operation, despite the absence of a cross-cutting co-operative policy 
which runs through all departments. The Anglo-Irish Division through 
the activities of the IGC, harnesses EC initiatives and provides the 
dynamism which increases co-operation. The AID itself performs a co­
ordinating role. Its members know  who exactly is involved in the 
various EC cross-border schemes. Thus, the lim ited involvem ent of 
other civil service departm ents is inconsequential. The result of all 
these individual cross-border program m es will be increased cross- 
border co-operation, whether or not all or m any civil servants are 
involved in these programmes are not.
For example, if under Interreg minor roads along the border are 
to be im proved and under the Operational Program me for Transport 
the Dublin-Belfast motorway is to be improved, then the absence of a 
coherent policy in the Departm ent of Tourism and Transport as a 
whole, or of some co-ordinating structure linking the two programmes 
does not necessarily hinder the building of either road. Moreover, the 
reaction of people in both parts of the island does not rest on the
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premise that a co-ordinating structure exists. The relationship is simple: 
the existence of common economic interests leads to the existence of 
individual sets of cross-border program m es which lead to general 
cross-border co-operation.
Once again we are back to the assum ption that there is a 
sufficient num ber of common economic interests to allow widespread 
civil service cross-border co-operation. One official claim ed, for 
example, that there are so m any areas of common interest to work 
upon, the areas of conflict are insignificant (Interview, Departm ent of 
Foreign Affairs, senior official, 21.1.92). However, the argum ent in this 
chapter has been that on the contrary, there are not sufficient bases for 
civil service co-operation, for if there were then individual departments 
on both sides of the border would have forged increased and closer 
links w ith  each other and w ould be m ore w illing to assum e 
responsibility for cross-border initiatives. If sufficient common interests 
were perceived to exist by civil servants to achieve cross-border co­
operation, then there w ould be m ore w idespread know ledge of 
existing cross-border schemes among those civil servants who were 
interviewed.
There is another argum ent which proposes that the EC has 
succeeded in increasing cross-border co-operation. The idea is that the 
EC, even if it is not affecting all civil service departm ents equally is 
influencing the cross-border dimension of the Anglo-Irish divisions. It 
is providing scope for the adm inistration of increased cross-border 
economic cross-border co-operation, through its regional policy. EC 
regional policy has created further incentives for cross-border co­
operation among Anglo-Irish division civil service departments.
There are three main problems w ith the above argum ent. The 
first counter-argum ent is that yet again, the evidence of sufficient EC 
money to finance cross-border initiatives is not there. Given limited EC 
aid for cross-border schemes, the effect of EC initiatives on the 
activities of the Anglo-Irish Division is limited. Secondly, co-operation 
for our purposes refers to a situation w here there are conflicts of 
interest (see p. 17). These conflicts are not so evident between the EC 
and the Anglo-Irish Division. The EC's interest in advancing cross- 
border co-operation com plem ents the w ork of the A nglo-Irish 
Division. The relationship between the Anglo-Irish Division and the 
theme of cross-border co-operation is one of harmony.
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For the effect of the EC on civil service cross-border co­
operation to be meaningful, there would have to be evidence that the 
EC had altered the perspective of those departm ents where conflicts 
of interest existed. In other words, evidence is needed that the EC has 
transformed rivals into allies. No such evidence exists.
A third counter-argum ent is that even if the EC, through the 
Anglo-Irish Division, had affected overall civil service co-operation, the 
concept of spillover from economic to political co-operation cannot be 
up-held. Because the Anglo-Irish Agreement, which has fostered the 
activities of the IGC, is a political agreement, any response of other 
departm ents to its dem ands for economic co-operation is a response 
to political co-operation. Only if civil service departm ents respond 
directly to the EC can the neo-functionalist argum ent that economic 
co-operation spills over to political co-operation be upheld. If the EC’s 
influence was sufficiently strong, then civil servants w ould indeed be 
responding directly to the Commission. As it is, the small Anglo-Irish 
Division is most affected by the EC.
By complementing the A-I division's work and by affecting 
those civil servants who are responsible for specific cross-border 
schemes, the EC has had some effect on cross-border civil service co­
operation. However, the EC has "changed things at the m argins" 
(Interview, Department of Finance, senior official, 7.1.92).
The impression that the EC's effect on civil service cross-border 
co-operation has been limited is heightened by other interviewees. For 
exam ple, one official com m ented that overall, the area of EC- 
sponsored cross-border co-operation is weakened because there is 
not a series of structured meetings. He added that:
If the Brooke talks had succeeded to Strand Two, then I would 
foresee an increase in co-operation, but then again I w ouldn 't 
w ant to exaggerate it. There isn 't an enorm ous am ount of 
money, but you are talking about som ething m ore structured 
(Interview, Department of Foreign Affairs, senior official, 21.1.92).
Again, for this interviewee the A-I process and the talks process is the 
m ain influence on cross-border co-operation, not the EC. Similarly, 
another official of Foreign Affairs while attem pting to w eight the 
significance of the EC returned to the IGC: "I w ou ldn 't w ant to 
underestim ate the part played by the Anglo-Irish Agreement. It has 
focused things a lot better" (Interview, Department of Foreign Affairs,
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senior official, 27.1.92). Another official observed that: "It is political will 
which is bringing the thing together" (Interview, Department of Foreign 
Affairs, senior official, 21.1.92). The conclusion is draw n that, to date, the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement and not the EC has been the m ain determ inant 
of civil service cross-border co-operation betw een N orthern  Ireland 
and the Republic of Ireland.
vi. Conclusion
There are possible qualifications to be m ade to w hat appears to be a 
rather gloomy analysis from the perspective of neo-functionalism. The 
main qualification is that the above analysis may be criticised for being 
narrow  in vision. It assumes that the amount of money m ade available 
by the Commission for cross-border initiatives will rem ain small. It is 
im portant to note that this study concentrates only on the period to 
1993. The possibility that the EC may have a greater im pact in the 
future is not ruled out. However, a num ber of conditions m ust be met, 
if there is to be a future impact on civil service cross-border co­
operation.
Obviously, the am ount of money m ade available by the EC 
m ust increase substantially, so that conflicting policy interests may be 
transformed into common interests. In this way, the am ount of money 
available for cross-border projects becomes large enough to persuade 
civil servants that there is a short-term as well as a long term benefit to 
be reaped from engaging in cross-border co-operation. N or m ust an 
increase in EC financial aid imply that national governments substitute 
EC money for money they would have spent them selves anyway. 
A dditionality m ust apply. The large scale UK subsidisation of the 
N orthern  Irish economy is an im pedim ent to the existence of a 
stronger EC influence in Northern Ireland. Some shift in the balance of 
EC versus UK financial aid is necessary to give the EC a stronger voice.
Secondly, the existence of the Com m ission's political will is 
fundam ental in increasing levels of Irish /N orthern  Irish cross-border 
co-operation. The am ount of money it provides to this end reflects its 
determination to affect the relationship between N orthern Ireland and 
the Republic. It is essential in this regard that the Commission does not 
perceive the Irish /N orthern  Irish border as one case among m any of 
an inland border, bu t to make a more concerted effort to use the EC
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framework as a means to overcome the specific and intense political 
conflict in Northern Ireland.
Assuming that these conditions are met, then, it is possible to 
conceive of the EC increasing levels of civil service co-operation 
betw een N orthern  Ireland and the Republic, in the future. Civil 
servants who were interview ed w ere responding rationally to the 
incentives for co-operation they perceived to exist. To increase cross- 
border co-operation, the short-term as well as long term benefits from 
such co-operation m ust increase. Civil servants do not perceive there 
to be adequate  incentives for cross-border co-operation as yet. 
W hether civil service reaction to EC policy typifies the reaction of 
other Northern Irish and Irish actors is examined next.
Chapter Five
Economic Elites and Cross-Border Co-operation
\
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Introduction
There is little evidence from the previous chapter that adm inistrative 
cross-border co-operation is increasing significantly as a result of the 
EC's influence. Instead, the co-operation that is evident appears to be 
motivated more by the Anglo-Irish Agreement and the activities of the 
IGC. However, the question remains as to how economic elites are 
responding to EC regional policy reform and to the creation of the SEM.
In this chapter I argue that levels of economic elite cross-border 
co-operation vary according to which sector, agriculture, tourism  or 
transport, is examined. In some areas of the transport sector there is 
evidence of change in the cross-border economic relationship. In 
particular, the Irish and Northern Irish Confederations of Industry (CII 
and CBI-NI) have embarked upon co-operative schemes. In contrast, the 
farm ers' unions in both parts of Ireland have not altered  their 
relationship w ith each other and rem ain distant from each other's 
activities. Hence, I will argue that the case of economic groups provides 
mixed evidence as to the EC's effect on the Irish /N orthern  Irish cross- 
border economic relationship, but that it is clear that the EC is altering 
that relationship.
The groups which will be studied are perceived to be the principal 
ones whose activities im pinge upon the agriculture, transport and 
tourism sectors. The term elite is used in a loose fashion to describe the 
key influential economic powers in N orthern Ireland and the Irish 
Republic. The UFU (Ulster Farmers Union), the IFA (Irish Farm er's 
A ssociation), the C onfederations of Industry , the C ham bers of 
Commerce, Bord Failte, the Northern Irish Tourist Board (NITB) and the 
bus and rail companies are taken as a sample of economic elites in both 
regions.
The activities of business groups in the cross-border co-operative 
sphere relate mainly to demands for transport improvements. Hence, the 
term "business sector' and 'transport sector' will be used synonymously 
for the purposes of this chapter. Executive agencies of the governm ent 
are included in this chapter (that is, rail, bus and tourism  prom otion 
companies), as opposed to the civil service chapter, because employees 
of these bodies are exposed at first hand to purely economic factors
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(profit margins and costs). These factors dictate their preferences and the 
information which is supplied to governm ent. The possibility that 
preferences are different from those of the government implies that these 
agencies may play a lobbying role.
Trade union officials were not interviewed for this chapter. The 
reason for this omission was because many explanations for the signing 
of the SEA have focused upon the role of European businesses in 
influencing that act (see p. 13). Business in particular has been argued to 
have a vested interest in the deregulatory provisions of the SEA and in 
the creation of the SEM (ibid). This chapter is a direct response to that 
argument. Business group activity is taken as a critical test of neo­
functionalism, because if these groups are not engaging in increased 
levels of cross-border co-operation because of EC policy changes, then, 
given the alleged significance of these policies for business, it is unlikely 
that other economic interest groups will be engaging in cross-border 
activities. Ideally, trade unions would be examined to illustrate this 
point, however, given time and word constraints, it was not practical to 
include such an examination.
There are key topics which demand elaboration before discussing 
the response of interest groups to EC initiatives. In the first chapter, I 
examine the role of interest groups at the European level. In section two, 
I provide a brief outline of the Irish and Northern Irish economies and 
describe the theoretical rationale for cross-border co-operation in each 
sector. Section three focusses on the response of interest groups both 
N orth and South of the border to EC initiatives. In the final section, the 
neo-functionalist argument will be examined in the light of the findings 
and the grounds for neo-functionalist optimism will be evaluated.
i. The Role of Economic Elites in the National and EC Decision- 
Making Processes
Economic Elites m ay influence decision-making processes formally 
through their membership of interest groups, for example, farmers in the 
Republic are represented by the IFA. It is necessary to examine the role 
of these organised interests in the decision-making process. In this 
section I examine the role of interest groups in the decision-making
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process as well as the general influence of agriculture and of business on 
regional/national decision-making outcomes.
Business and Agricultural Influence in the Irish Republic and Northern 
Ireland
Businesses and agricultural actors may organise themselves into interest 
groups. Interest groups are an im portant part of the political and 
economic fabric of N orthern Ireland and the Irish Republic. In the 
Republic the m ost efficient interest groups belong to the industrial, 
commercial and agricultural sectors (Chubb, 1992, p. I l l ) ,  that is, to 
those sectors which are examined in this thesis. These groups are clear 
examples of 'insider' groups with access to governmental officials:
The strongest economic pressure groups, the major agricultural and 
em ployer organisations, have very efficient intelligence and 
representational services. Trade unions ... are less well equipped, 
because they are less affluent (Chubb, 1992, p. 121).
Representatives of these groups lobby civil servants, advisers to 
ministers and the EC. The degree of consultation with interest groups 
has increased dram atically over the past three decades leading one 
commentator to observer that:
Increasingly in Ireland, as in many democracies, the making of 
governmental decisions is not a majestic march of great majorities 
united upon certain m atters of basic policy. It is the steady 
appeasement of relatively small groups (Chubb, 1992, p. 121).
This feature of the Irish decision-making process means that interest 
groups in the Republic have large scope to influence decision outcomes. 
The im portance of the business and industrial sectors to the Irish 
economy implies that these sectors, in particular, form a potentially 
powerful force in Irish planning.
Similarly, the role of interest groups is not insubstantial in 
Northern Ireland. Moreover, the business and agricultural sectors have 
traditionally enjoyed a prominent position in the politics and economics 
of Northern Ireland. The Ulster Farmers' Union has been closely linked 
to the UUP (see below) and given the dominance of that party  for so
much of Northern Ireland's existence, the UFU was clearly an influential 
power. The importance of agriculture to the N orthern Irish economy 
ensures that the UFU is still in an influential position. Similarly, 
business representatives in Northern Ireland have traditionally been of 
unionist persuasion1 and have enjoyed a prominent position.
The importance of business in Northern Ireland arises also from 
the fact that the British government has been inclined to give business 
people prom inent positions in the adm inistration of the region's 
economy. The proliferation of quangos (Cradden and Erridge, 1990, p. 
102) has facilitated this decision. Moreover, the appointm ent of business 
people to administrative positions has occurred because business people 
may be perceived to be less divisive than Northern Irish politicians. 
Moreover, the small size of the Northern Irish region means that often 
the same people are found in various influential positions, both in the 
private and the public sector. In this way, Northern Irish interest groups 
are particularly influential:
In a close knit industrial and commercial community ... you have 
the advantages of shorter lines of communication — a frequency 
of individual, personal and on-going contact ... The speed and 
effectiveness of communications here are likely to make for the 
early resolution of difficulties (Rigby, quoted in Cradden and 
Erridge, 1990, p. 103).
How ever, the im portant distinction betw een interest group 
activity in N orthern Ireland and that in the Republic arises from 
Northern Ireland's status as a region of the UK. Northern Irish unions 
are affiliated to 'parent' organisations in the UK. The CBI-NI is part of 
the CBI and the UFU is affiliated to the NFU in London. The Northern 
Irish unions may enjoy an intimate relationship with the NICS, but they 
are further removed from the ruling governm ent in W estminster. In 
contrast, Irish unions have direct access to the Irish government. Despite 
this distinction, however, the argum ent remains that interest groups in 
both N orthern Ireland and the Republic are influential bodies in the
1 Cradden and Erridge note that "so far as the political future of Northern Ireland 
concerned, the CBI-NI is committed to the union with Britain” (1990, p. 101).
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decision-making process. Increasingly, these groups are also focusing 
their attention on the EC's decision making process.
Interest Group Participation in the EC's Decision-making Process
Neo-functionalists advocated a central role for interest groups in the EC's 
decision-making process (see p. 11). Changes in the national and 
European environm ent w ould lead to a coalition betw een European 
interest groups (EIGs) and the Commission. However, the potential for 
interest groups to influence the EC's decision-making process needs to 
be examined in practice. Lobbying occurs at three phases of EC decision­
making process. Following the formal adoption of a proposal, interest 
groups concentrate their lobbying activity on the rapporteurs of the 
European Parliam ent (EP) and Economic and Social Council (ESC) 
committees. Each committee drafts an opinion and this opinion is voted 
upon in a plenary session. At the final stage of the EC's decision-making 
process, before the final adoption of a proposal, the most sensitive issues 
of the relevant decision still remain. For interest groups this stage is the 
most critical one (Magowan, 1992, p. 5). Interest group lobbying takes 
two forms: first, EIGs make a joint and concerted effort to influence the 
Council as a whole; and, second, EIGs lobby their national m inisters 
(ibid). Ministers themselves seek out allies among their EC partners who 
may support their opinion on a particular issue. Much horsetrading 
occurs at this point between potential allies.
Interest groups are a vital source of inform ation for the 
Commission (Kirchner and Schwaiger, 1981, p. 10). It is unlikely that the 
Commission could know the specific conditions of individual member 
states unless interest groups provided this specific information (ibid). 
Moreover, if the EIGs were not consulted, they could influence the 
Council to block a particular proposal (ibid).
It is clear that there is indeed a potential role for interest groups at 
the EC level to lobby and influence the decision-m aking process. 
However, in practice the influence of interest groups varies across 
different policy domains. The main determ inants of EIG success in 
influencing EC policies are the existence of a coherent Community policy 
and also the dem onstration effect of one set of in terest groups
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successfully lobbying the Community (Kirchner and Schwaiger, 1981, p. 
32). It has been argued that agriculture, private industry and banking 
constitute the most well-developed sectors of EIG activity (Kirchner and 
Schwaiger, 1981, p. 31). Transport, small business and white-collar trades 
unions are the least developed sectors, w ith the Chambers of Commerce 
and public enterprise in-between. Thus, the sectors of interest group 
activity to be studied here, agriculture and industry, fall into the well 
developed category.
A ttem pts have been m ade to apply  both p luralism  and 
corporatism to the activity of EIGs, bu t neither theory can be applied 
generally to all cases of activity (Greenwood & Ronit, 1992, pp. 6-7). 
Hence, the relationship between farmers' interests and the EC has been 
described as 'quasi-corporatist', (Mazey and Richardson quoted in 
Greenwood & Ronit, 1992, p. 7), while the inability of interest groups in 
general at EC level to agree on anything other than the lowest common 
denominator decision has also been noted (Grant, quoted in Greenwood 
and Ronit, 1992, p. 7). Thus, both the EC and the regional/national 
governm ent form foci of interest group activity, but to date national 
government has been the more im portant focus of activity. In the next 
section, I examine the rationale for economic elite cross-border co­
operation either at EC or at national/regional level.
ii. Economic S tructure and the R ationale for C ross-Border Co­
operation
The economic context
Peripherality is a word which is often used in relation to N orthern 
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Peripherality refers not only to 
geographic location, but also to economic indicators, such as high 
unemployment rates and low economic growth. The economic context of 
this study is obviously bleak. Some statistics will serve to illustrate the 
context within which economic interest groups operate, amplifying the 
data included in the early part of this study.
The unemployment figure for the Republic of Ireland is 20 per 
cent of the labour force, one of the highest rates of unemployment in the
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EC (Keane, 1993, p. 9). In Northern Ireland, in 1991 the unemploym ent 
rate was 19 per cent, the highest in the UK (Ireland in Europe, 1992, p. 
29). As regards growth, the picture is scarcely consoling. In the Republic, 
the growth rate, defined as the increase in Gross Domestic Product per 
annum, has been an average of 5.3 per cent per annum  in the period 1986 
to 1990 (Ireland in Europe, 1992, p. 5). A lthough this figure is 
comparatively high, the large burden of debt repaym ent accrued in the 
late 1970s means that the actual effect of this export led grow th is not 
reflected in increased employment. In Northern Ireland the growth rate 
for the period 1986 to 1990 was 1.8 per cent, substantially lower than that 
of the Republic (Ireland in Europe, 1992, p. 5). A nother difference 
already noted is the high level of UK subsidies granted to the Northern 
Irish economy (see p. 116).
Figure 5.1 presents a breakdown by sector of the two economies. 
The im portance of agriculture to both regions is obvious, as is the 
significance of the service sector. The data do not autom atically 
strengthen the case for interest group co-operation. How ever, the 
similarities in the plight of the Irish and Northern Irish economies has 
created, theoretically at least, incentives for cross-border co-operation 
(see p. 71). The incentives for cross-border co-operation in business and 
in agriculture will be examined in greater depth in the next section.
Figure 5.1: Percentage D istribution of GDP by Broad Sector in  1990
N. I. ROI
Agriculture 4 10
Industry 28 35
Services 68 55
Source: Ireland in Europe: A Shared Challenge, 1992: 24, (adapted)
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The business sector
The creation of the SEM is an all-encom passing ven tu re  w ith 
implications for the economy as a whole. Hence, the threat to Irish and 
N orthern Irish industries and the opportunity  for cross-border co­
operation can be defined as a general one. Both Northern Ireland and the 
Irish Republic will face increased competition from other EC economies 
(see pp. 71-72). A part from the handicap of peripherality, N orthern 
Ireland and the Republic face the w orldw ide phenom enon of 
concentrated ownership. For small economies like that of the Republic 
and N orthern Ireland, the rem oval of barriers to trade opens the 
floodgates to highly competitive im ports from abroad w ith adverse 
consequences for both economies.
The opportunities for cross-border co-operation hinge upon 
m axim izing Irish m arket opportun ities so as to stem  ou tside  
competition. If both the economy's and the firm 's small size is the major 
weakness of Irish and Northern Irish industry, then the obvious move is 
to realise potential market size and to rally existing forces together so as 
to combat outside competition. Doing so entails that both parts of 
Ireland act as one economic unit. In practical terms this action means 
that joint ventures occur between firms on both sides of the border. For 
example, two firms from each side may join to make a tender for an 
outside building contract, or in the extreme both companies merge, so 
that economies of scale are maximised.
The second way of maximising business opportunities is by 
penetrating unexplored markets and then developing these markets. In 
other words, co-operation implies increased trade between N orthern 
Ireland and the Republic. The developm ent of m arkets necessitates 
m arket research and information which, in turn, dem ands increased 
levels of personal cross-border contact between business interests. In the 
field of tourism, it can mean selling the island of Ireland as one product, 
that is, a joint marketing strategy.
A final m ethod of co-operating in the business sphere is by 
lobbying government to create the conditions which facilitate such co­
operation. The main condition is the existence of adequate transport
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infrastructure between the two regions, so as to lessen the costs of trade 
and of communication. In this way, the transport sector is an integral 
part of business co-operation. Thus, there is spillover between those 
industries which do not appear to be related to transport industries and 
those industries whose profit arises directly from transport — the bus 
and rail companies. It is clear that all such sectors have an incentive to 
lobby for the improvement of inland infrastructure.
From interviews for this chapter it is clear that the extent of such 
cross-border co-operation was not large before to the 1989-1993 period. 
In contrast to the general effect of the SEM on all business activity, the 
CAP reform effects particular sectors of the agricultural domain.
The agriculture sector
The threat posed to agriculture on both sides of the border by the reform 
of the CAP is large. However, the potential for cross-border co-operation 
in agriculture depends on the relative im portance of each specific 
agriculture product to both economies on each side of the border. If one 
product is less im portan t to one econom y than to another, then 
obviously any threat posed by CAP reform in the given product sector is 
not common to both economies and the basis for co-operation is 
weakened.
Three main areas constitute the most vital sectors for agriculture 
in N orthern Ireland and the Republic are milk products, cereals and 
livestock. Milk products, cereals and beef/veal are responsible for 50 per 
cent of FEOGA expenditure, that is, of total CAP price policy 
expenditure. N ot surprisingly, it is these sectors which are attacked 
strongly by the reform proposals. The 1991 Commission Tteflections 
Paper7 on CAP reform proposes a cut in overall prices. For cereals, the 
envisaged cut is 35 per cent; for milk, 10 per cent; and for beef the 
intervention price (the price at which the EC buys up surplus beef) will 
be cut by 15 per cent. The degree to which compensation will be offered 
for these cuts depends on the livestock to land ratio, that is, the stocking 
rate. Those farms with high stocking rates, that is larger farms, stand to 
lose more from the MacSharry proposals.
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The Commission argues that the price cut in cereals will lead to 
lower input prices for those sectors which are based on animal grazing, 
where cereals are used to feed animals. Therefore, lower prices in the 
milk and livestock sectors are justified because of lower production 
costs. Moreover, a compensation scheme will operate to offset the lower 
farm income received by those farms which are hard hit by the CAP 
reforms.
The Commission's pledge to reform the CAP has also been caused 
by pressure from the EC's GATT partners, especially from the USA, who 
dem anded a weakening of the EC's protectionist policy. By September 
1993, the outcome of the GATT negotiations seemed likely to threaten 
agricultural interests. Strong French opposition to the Blair House accord 
was supported quietly by the Irish and Spanish governments.
The structure of agriculture on both sides of the border is similar, 
with a large emphasis on grassland enterprises, in particular, cattle and 
livestock. Figure 5.2 lists the proportion of gross agricultural output 
(GAO) accounted for by each sector for both economies. In general, the 
similar structure of agriculture in N orthern  Ireland and the Irish 
Republic has limited the scope for cross-border trade in agriculture. 
However, pigs, poultry and eggs have declined in significance for both 
economies, but remain more im portant to the Northern Irish economy 
than to the Irish one, accounting for 16.4 per cent of GAO in N orthern 
Ireland and 9.4 per cent in the Republic. Cereals, by contrast, are more 
significant to the Irish economy than to the N orthern Irish economy, 
accounting for 5 per cent and 7 per cent of GAO respectively. Apart from 
these sectors, the structure of agriculture is broadly similar on both sides 
of the border.
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Figure 5.2: Proportion of GAO by M ain Sectors, 1972 and 1975
N.I. ROI
1972 1985 1972 1985
Grassland Enterprises
Cattle 33.0 36.3 40.8 38.8
Milk 22.1 26.5 27.8 36.5
Sheep and Wool 2.7 5.0 4.4 4.0
57.8 67.8 73.0 79.3
Farmyard Enterprises
Pigs 19.6 11.4 11.0 5.7
Poultry and Eggs 14.4 5.0 10.2 3.7
34.0 16.4 21.2 9.4
Crops
Cereals 0.8 7.0 1.1 5.0
Other Crops 7.4 8.8 4.7 6.3
8.2 15.8 5.8 11.3
Gross Output 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: NESC and NIEC, 1988: p. 5.1.
The breakdown of the agricultural sector demonstrates that the 
reform of the CAP does indeed present a common threat not simply to 
agriculture in general, but to specific groups of farmers on both sides of 
the border. There is potential for agricultural Elites on both sides of the 
border to lobby jointly both the Commission and the British and Irish 
governm ents, so as to defend their interests. The exchange of 
information is another important possible manifestation of cross-border 
co-operation. Both these forms of co-operation necessitate constant 
contact between farmers' groups and the formulation of a co-ordinated 
plan of campaign to alter EC farm proposals. However, the similarity in 
the structure of agriculture, particularly with respect to those products
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which are most im portant to the Irish and N orthern Irish economies, 
implies that there will be less incentive for increased cross-border trade, 
regardless of EC policy.2
Therefore, both agricultural and business interests are presented 
with opportunities to co-operate because of EC initiatives, but they face 
different types of opportunities. In the agriculture sector, the m ain 
possibility of co-operation is that of joint lobbying and of information 
exchange. In the business sector, there are three main opportunities — 
joint business ventures and mergers, increased trade and joint lobbying. 
The degree to which these possibilities are being explored is the subject 
of the next section.
iii. Economic Elites and Cross-border Co-operation
There are understandable differences between interviewing members of 
the N orthern Irish economic elite and interview ing their Southern 
counterparts. In the Republic, the tradeoffs between domestic political 
issues, foreign policy issues and domestic economic issues, which
2 A second category of potential possible co-operation relates to the existence and 
extent of trade in agricultural produce between the two economies. Of note here is the 
dismantling of the Monetary Compensatory Amount (MCA) system. MCAs are border 
taxes or subsidies imposed on goods so that prices in different member states are not 
distorted by appreciating or depreciating exchange rates. Guaranteed prices and export 
funds are fixed in ECUs and are converted into national currencies using a green rate. 
This green rate is fixed by the Council of Ministers. MCAs are the difference between a 
country's green rate and its EMS or market rate. Hence, MCAs vary in line with 
currency fluctuations and green rate fluctuations. It is clear, then, that a positive MCA 
acts as an import levy and export subsidy and is applied where currencies are 
appreciating.
The existence of different MCAs in member states is an incentive for 
smuggling. Indeed, the MCA system was introduced as a temporary measure, but 
depending on the precise economic consequences of the system for some member 
states, some states objected to attempts to dismantle it. However, with the introduction 
of the European Monetary System (EMS), the ensuing currency stability lessened the 
need for MCAs and aided the system's gradual dismantling. British membership of the 
ERM (October 1990-October 1992) provided greater stability in its exchange rate with 
respect to the Irish exchange rate. Consequently, there were implications for trade 
between Northern Ireland and the Republic. However, the exact implications of MCA 
dismantlement and new agri-monetary rules depend on which rules are used instead of 
MCAs (Matthews, 1992, p. 74). At the time of writing it was not clear what the exact 
implications of new agri-monetary measures would be (ibid). Consequently, I do not 
deal with the implications of MCA dismantlement for agricultural cross-border co­
operation in this chapter.
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dominate the decision-making process of politicians and civil servants 
are not prevalent in the business sector's world view. There may be 
tradeoffs as to how economic aims should be met, bu t there is no 
balancing act required in choosing the desirability of possible outcomes 
— economic aims are pre-eminently important.
In Northern Ireland, however, the business Elites are often found 
holding influential positions in other domains (see above). There is a 
closer proximity to politics, not simply because business elites may sit on 
business boards next to members of, for example, the Departm ent of 
Economic D evelopm ent (DED) and appear to have an in tim ate 
relationship with the latter, bu t also because the conflict in N orthern 
Ireland permeates every day behaviour. This permeation implies that, in 
a society divided among those who desire union with the Republic and 
those w ho desire union with Britain, the pursuit of cross-border co­
operation to maximise profit, may be construed as a vote in favour of 
union w ith the Republic. Hence, economic activity is autom atically 
politicised.
In the attem pt to avoid such politicisation, m em bers of the 
N orthern  Irish business comm unity whom  I interview ed were, in 
general, unwilling to acknowledge the political context of the economic 
decision-making process. When asked about the possibility that the 
sectarian divide influenced the behaviour of business elites, one business 
man replied jovially: "What sectarian divide? There is none in business" 
(Interview, business representative, 7.4.92) Thus ended the interview. 
Similarly, another member of the Northern Irish business elite warned of 
the need to be sensitive in the framing of questions when interviewing 
the N orthern Irish business community in general, but particularly a 
certain organisation and commented that: 'T o  get into the political arena 
would be the kiss of death" (Interview, 7.4.92). This sensitivity is also 
demonstrated by requests from Northern Irish business elites attending 
cross-border conferences that no list of members from N orthern Ireland 
should be m ade available to the public, or to delegates attending the
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conference in question.3 Hence, at one profound level, cross-border co­
operation in Northern Ireland is constrained by the political situation.
Evidence of Business Cross-Border Co-operation
Conferences and an Atmosphere of Change
Despite the political conditions which on a practical level constrain 
Northern Irish business cross-border co-operation, it is clear that the EC 
has a potential effect on such co-operation. The EC does symbolise a 
more politically neutral agent with respect to Northern Irish politics. As 
one Co-operation N orth official from Belfast, on secondment from the 
EC, observed, communication with groups in Belfast receives a very 
different response when he emphasises that he is an EC official, than 
w hen he appears to be part of the greater N orthern  Irish fabric. 
According to the executive, the EC has an image of being non-partisan in 
Northern Ireland (Interview, Co-operation North official, 6.4.92).
The sam e executive also detected a change in the business 
atm osphere w ith respect to cross-border co-operation. He cited the 
landm ark of a conference of the Institute of Directors, held in N orthern 
Ireland in April 1990 and attended by the then Irish Taoiseach, Charles 
Haughey. It was the first time that an Irish Taoiseach had crossed the 
border in 25 years. Another example of cross-border co-operation is a 
conference held in the Templepatrick Hotel in N orthern Ireland entitled 
'Selling into the Republic'. Facilities were provided for 60 to 70 company 
representatives, bu t to the surprise of the organisers, three hundred  
company representatives attended. Similarly, a conference in Dublin was 
well attended by business communities from both sides of the border 
many of whom  engaged in 'networking' to find suitable partners for 
business. In particular, architects and engineers sought out Southern 
com panies w ith  the aim of m aking com petitive jo in t b ids for 
construction contracts abroad.
3 For example, the Business Co-operation in Ireland conference held in Jury's Hotel, 
Dublin, March 19,1992.
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Apart from conferences on business cross-border co-operation, 
Co-operation North also cite the vocal role of prominent Northern Irish 
business people. In particular, the chairman of the Ulster Bank, Dr. 
George Quigley, has advocated the desirability of an East Corridor from 
Dublin to Belfast, which w ould gain from added investm ent and 
increased cross-border co-operation. The East Corridor w ould then 
emerge in a sound economic state, ready to face the EC's economic threat 
and its opportunity. This general principle has been accepted by both the 
CBI-NI and the CII.
The CBI-NI, the CII and the Chambers of Commerce
There are two key landm arks which appear to indicate a change in 
business cross-border relations: First, joint initiatives have been 
implemented by the CII and CBI-NI and, second, proposals for increased 
cross-border co-operation have been m ade by the Irish and N orthern 
Irish Chambers of Commerce.
The Confederations of Industry on both sides of the border 
represent the most significant companies within their jurisdictions. Thus, 
they reflect and profess the views of business (theoretically, at least) and, 
as such, are in a powerful lobbying position. Each confederation has 
special committees which deal w ith such m atters as taxation, fiscal 
affairs and employment. Added to the list of CBI-NI and CII priorities is 
the need to improve cross-border co-operation.
Hence, in a new initiative, a Joint Council of both organisations 
has been established to advance the aim of co-operation. A joint steering 
group now operates, consisting of four Confederation members from 
either side of the border. The steering group consists of the Director 
General and Director of the CII, the Director and Vice-Chairman of the 
CBI-NI, business representatives from both sides of the border and two 
especially hired full-time executives with responsibility for the cross- 
border dimension. The steering group meets four times a year and the 
Joint Council, consisting of all members of the Confederations who wish 
to attend, meets bi-annually.
There is a four p art agenda: the first p a rt focuses on 
infrastructure, including transport, energy and education and training;
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the second part focuses on public sector led opportunities; the third part 
relates to private sector led opportunities and the fourth on facilitating 
activities — this category implies the removal of customs border delays. 
Under the infrastructure category, the Confederations prioritised the 
development of the Dublin-Belfast rail link. As we have seen, the Irish 
government was reluctant to invest in this line, preferring to develop the 
D ublin suburban railw ay line (chapter four). H ow ever, both  the 
governments of the United Kingdom and of the Republic have recently 
announced that the Dublin-Belfast scheme will go ahead.4
The role of the Confederations of Industry in determ ining this 
decision outcom e has been em phasised  n o t m erely  by the  
C onfederations them selves, bu t by other businesses, by the rail 
companies and by Co-operation North. The CII has commented that: 
'T he  approach could not have happened but for CII/CBI-NI pressure" 
(Interview, CII senior official, 20.3.92). Moreover, a representative of Bus 
Eireann noted that: "Lobbying was done by the C II... the logic being that 
if you have both systems competing together [that is, bus and rail 
systems], it is better" (Interview, Bus Eireann senior official, 22.3.92). 
Similarly, a Northern Irish Rail senior official observed that: "The CBI-NI 
and CII were very significant in the outcome" (Interview, NIR senior 
official, 8.4.92). On the other hand, the same executive adds that: 'I t  [the 
decision outcome] probably would have been done w ithout CBI-NI/CII 
pressure, but it came through more easily and forcibly [because of it]" 
(Interview, NIR senior official, 8.4.92). It cannot be d isputed that a 
variety of forces dictated the announcem ent of the rail scheme. The 
initiative favoured by the CBI-NI and CII, was music to the ears of the 
EC's Regional Policy Directorate. Initial meetings were held with the 
Regional Policy Commissioner, Bruce Millan, who was "positive and 
extremely receptive" to the confederations' plan (Interview, CBI-NI 
senior official, 7.4.92).
The significant factor is that the CII/CBI-NI worked in alliance 
with the Commission, thus approximating the corporatist aspiration of 
integration theorists. Both interest groups and the EC influenced the UK 
and Irish governments, in particular the latter, to embark upon the rail
4 See the Irish Times, May, 1992.
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scheme. Moreover, both confederations testify to the influence of the 
SEM on their joint council initiative. For example, a representative of the 
CBI-NI, commented that: "A big driving force is the SEM. It provides an 
opportunity and a threat" (Interview, CBI-NI senior official, 7.4.92). 
Similarly, a member of the CII observed that: "W hat has created the 
environment for this is the SEM, plus the EC putting up  large sums of 
money for Ireland to invest in infrastructure" (Interview, senior official,
20.4.92). There is, thus, a relatively clear causal relationship evident in 
the rail link example, whereby the European Community has influenced 
business confederations and these confederations have allied w ith the 
Commission to influence government policy.
Overall, the precipitation of the fashionable T h ink  Local, Act 
Global' business m anangem ent strategy is being fostered by the two 
Confederations. One member cited the statistic that there is the potential 
for 3 billion pounds extra trade between the two parts of Ireland (Kenna, 
1992, p. 2). The development of trade is a priority of the Joint Council 
initiative. Under the heading of 'Private Sector Development7, there is a 
three strand approach. The first strand entails a general group approach 
— bringing all key businesses together to see what they think is needed 
and which exact co-operative approach is favoured. The second strand is 
a sectoral approach — implying that all companies from the same sector 
are b rought together. Thirdly, the ind iv idual com pany level is 
approached — in the words of a CII representative, this third aspect 
entails saying: "This is what we do. This is the available market. We 
w ant to expand, now help us" (Interview, CII senior official, 20.3.92). 
According to the CBI-NI, the sectoral aspect of activity is now occurring 
and cross-border meetings between businesses from the same sector are 
increasing (Interview, CBI-NI senior official, 7.4.92).
The business confederations' activities are com plem ented by 
those of the Chambers of Commerce, North and South of the border. The 
Chambers' main role is to facilitate meetings and information exchange 
among its members. In July 1990, a meeting took place in Dungannon, 
N orthern Ireland, of all the Chambers of Commerce in the border 
regions. These chambers founded the Gap of the N orth Association. The 
aims of the Gap of the N orth Association are to im prove business 
contacts, to enter into discussions with state agencies and industrial
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promotion bodies and to establish a strategy of business prom otion in 
the border regions (Donovan, 1992, p. 2). Similarly, the Northern Ireland 
Chambers of Commerce invited the Republic's Chambers to participate 
in consultations with EC officials in 1991.
The Chambers of Commerce are also responsible for attem pts to 
popularise the idea that Interreg should be extended to cover not simply 
the border regions in Ireland, bu t the whole island of Ireland. The 
argum ent pu t by the Chambers is that all of Ireland suffers from the 
problems of being peripheral to the extent that the Republic as a whole 
m ay be considered to be a border region in itself. The w idening of 
Interreg would, of course, strengthen the potential to integrate the 
Northern Irish and Irish economies.
The Bus and Rail Companies
It is no t only  the C ham bers' w ork  w hich com plem ent the 
Confederations' initiatives, but also the preferences of the bus and rail 
companies in both parts of Ireland. In 1987 Iarnrdd Eireann (Irish Rail) 
and N orthern Ireland Rail commissioned a report on the m erits of an 
im proved rail system (Iarnrod E ireann/N IR, 1987). Seven different 
options for improvement were identified and one was chosen as being 
the most profitable. This option advised that an upgrading of the entire 
route from Dublin to Belfast take place. Speed w ould increase to 145 
kilometres per hour and journey time w ould fall to 1 hour and  35 
minutes (currently, the journey time is approximately two hours). The 
num ber of trains w ould increase to nine per day on week days. 
Currently, there are five per day. The upgrading w ould require an 
investm ent of 42 million Irish pounds in the Republic and 38 million 
pounds in Northern Ireland. Both the Irish and UK governments have 
chosen this option.
Iarnrod Eireann and Northern Ireland Rail cite evidence that the 
level of m ovem ent of people betw een N orthern  Ireland and the 
Republic, w ould be four to six times higher, bu t for the conflict in 
N orthern Ireland (Iarnrod E ireann/N IR , 1990, p. 6). Details of the 
number of Irish citizens who travel to the Republic gives some indication 
of the small scale of cross-border traffic. Figure 5.3 illustrates the
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numbers of visitors who travelled from the Republic to Northern Ireland 
by rail and bus for the years 1984 to 1990. The figures are also given for 
overseas visits, to place these figures in perspective. It was not possible 
to find figures for cross-border travel by car.
Figure 5.3. Visits Abroad by Irish Residents — estimated Number of 
Overseas Visits (Classified by Route or Travel).
Visits Abroad 1984 1985 1986 1987 
(Thousands)
1988 1989 1990
Total Overseas 
Visits
1,245 1,258 1,375 1,567 1,747 1,813 1,798
Cross-Border
Visits*
314 292 303 257 256 272 269**
i Figures for bus and rail travel only 
i i Provisional figure.
Source:: CSO Statistical Release, Tourism and Travel 1990, (source adapted).
Clearly, there is scope to increase the level of cross-border travel. 
The decision to improve the rail link, implies that despite the conflict 
efforts will still be made to increase passenger numbers. This approach is 
reflected in the opinion of one analyst, who commented that:
The political situation is a constraint on growth, bu t for the fast 
growers the political difficulties are far less of a constraint. Therefore, 
appropriate policies should be devised for a post-settlement scenario 
(Kinsella, 1992, p. 3).
In other words, policies should be im plem ented as if there was no 
conflict in Northern Ireland, because some firms would benefit, despite 
the political constraint.
The rail companies enjoy good and close relations. According to a 
representative of N orthern Ireland Rail, the relationship "has always 
been excellent" (Interview, NIR senior official, 8.4.92). The railway line 
betw een D ublin and Belfast is shared, which im plies that both 
companies serve the same customers. The sharing of the line also 
necessitates that safety standards are harm onised and that a joint
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m arketing approach exists. The revival and strengthening of the 
relationship dates back to 1987 when the rail improvement study was 
commissioned. It is noteworthy, that in attempting to win money from 
the EC for the railway proposal both companies offered to send a joint 
delegation to Brussels, but the UK and Irish governments refused the 
offer (Interview, NIR senior official, 8.4.92).
Similarly, the bus companies' situation has led a representative of 
Bus Eireann to state that: 'T he Ulster Bus and Bus Eireann relationship 
has been a model relationship" (Interview, Bus Eireann senior official,
22.3.92). There are regular meetings between the com panies' chief 
executives. Senior officials meet roughly ten times per year. Both 
companies exchange drivers - N orthern Irish drivers drive Bus Eireann 
buses and Irish drivers drive Ulster buses. Co-operation and goodwill is 
recorded among drivers. The Republic also buys up N orthern Irish 
surplus buses for its school transport system.
From 1987, the Irish bus company has operated w ith a strong 
commercial bias and was given a new brief by the government from that 
date. The behaviour of Bus Eireann, less as a state sponsored body and 
more as a private company, led to an increased awareness that both 
Northern Ireland Rail and Iarnrod Eireann were serious competitors to 
Bus Eireann and Ulster Bus. As a senior official observed: "Bus versus 
rail is the m ain difficulty" (Interview, Bus Eireann senior official,
22.3.92). The policy response to rail competition has meant that, since 
1987, both Bus Eireann and Ulster Bus have co-operated to improve ease 
of transport between North and South. There are now links between all 
areas of the South and Northern Ireland.
Thus, there is evidence of increased cross-border co-operation in 
the transport and business sector. Joint lobbying at EC and national level 
has developed between the CBI and CII. Moreover, the rail companies 
offered to make a joint lobby in Brussels, but were refused. The rail 
companies have co-operated in lobbying at national level and a 
representative of NIR stated that: "In terms of transport infrastructure, 
the whole of Ireland is one unit" (Interview, NIR senior official, 8.4.92). 
Meetings between executives from both sides of the border are frequent. 
Overall, in the business sector there has been an upsurge of interest in 
the cross-border dimension, largely in response to CII and CBI-NI efforts
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and to the efforts of the Chambers of Commerce and prom inent business 
executives both North and South of the border.
Moreover, the threat of the SEM, and the provision of money for 
cross-border schemes by the EC, has stim ulated business um brella 
groups, such as the CBI-NI, to develop cross-border links. All these 
factors bode well for functionalist theory, where interest groups in co­
operation with the EC have influenced national policy. However, there is 
also evidence of an absence of cross-border co-operation in the business 
sector.
The Absence of Cross-Border Co-operation
There are two main areas where my findings suggest limitations on the 
scope for cross-border co-operation. These are, the case of large firms 
and the more grass root level of business activity, and the case of the 
tourism sector.
Grass-root business behaviour I large firms
D uring the course of the interview s which w ere conducted w ith 
economic elites, the obvious question arose as to how business groups 
such as the CBI-NI and the CII actually reflected the opinions and 
activities of grass-root business communities. Representatives of these 
bodies responded that they reflected industry, because it was individual 
firms which formed the backbone of the umbrella organisations. Yet, two 
prom inent N orthern Irish businessm en observed that there was a 
significant difference between the behaviour of the large firm and that of 
the small firm. One executive stated that: "The Republic is a small 
market. Its importance depends on the product range. Small companies 
would see it as a target area, but large companies look to Britain and 
elsewhere" (Interview, NITB. senior official 7.4.92). This observation 
implies that a proportion of the business community in Northern Ireland 
and possibly in the Republic would not feel obliged to increase cross- 
border links and, therefore, that trade and joint lobbying activities would 
be minimal.
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To date, the evidence of studies and of trade statistics supports 
this proposition. Figure 5.3 details the level of cross-border trade 
between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic for the period 1986 to 
1991.
Figure 5.4: Cross-Border Trade Between Northern Ireland and the Irish 
Republic1
1987 1988 1989 1990 199111
Exports from N1
to the ROI 377,367 391,616 488,989 500,122 414,180
Exports from
ROI to NI 618,811 757,006 776,126 816,497 648,214
Source:: Ireland in Europe: A Shared Challenge, 1992: 40. 
Note i: Figures calculated in Irish pounds millions 
Note ii:: Figure for the period January to October only.
For those who believe that the EC is having little effect on trade between 
N orthern Ireland and the Irish Republic, these statistics indicate the 
marginal increase in cross-border trade and the very low level of that 
trade. Moreover, a recent report on cross-border trade w ritten by 
Coopers and Lybrand, found that only 67 per cent of all firms 
interviewed in N orthern Ireland carried out m arket research on the 
Republic. Only 20 per cent of those interviewed indicated that they 
w ould trade with the Republic in the next five years (Coopers and 
Lybrand, 1991, p. 10). Only 50 percent of firms listed in the IDB trade 
directory trade with the Republic (Bailie, 1992).
In 1990, the South exported 816 million pounds worth of goods to 
N orthern Ireland and the N orth exported approxim ately 500 million 
pounds w orth to the Republic. Trade com prised m ainly of food 
products, drink, cereals, furniture, clothing and textiles. (Smyth, 1992, p. 
4). From Figure 5.4, there is no doubt that trade has increased, but as the 
director for the CBI-NI remarked, in only four of the above categories 
does Northern exports constitute more than 15 per cent of total Southern 
imports (ibid). For example Northern Ireland's exports to the Republic
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"have remained a very small proportion of the total sales of N orthern 
Irish manufacturing industry" (Department of Finance and Personnel, 
1991, p. 2).
Figure 5.5: Cross Border Trade as a Proportion of Northern Ireland's 
Manufacturing Total Sales
Ouarter Ending
30.4.90 31.7.90 31.10.90 31.01.91 31.04.91
N. Irl. Exports to
ROI (% of total
M. exports)1 6 6 9 7 6
Source: Department of Finance and Personnel, (1991), Northern Ireland's Trade With the 
Republic: 2
Note i: M  = Manufacturing sector;.Figures represent Northern Irish exports to the Republic 
expressed as a percentage of total Northern Irish manufacturing exports.
How ever, the Confederations of Industry  are optim istic tha t this 
situation is changing. In a CBI-NI survey, the main obstacles to trade 
were identified as being: customs delays; a varying exchange rate; an 
inadequate infrastructure; the existence of prejudice against a product's 
origin; a lack of awareness of opportunities; and, finally, a lack of will. A 
perception of bad debt collection from the Republic was also found to be 
an obstacle to cross-border trade (Smyth, 1992, pp. 4-5).
Custom s delays, exchange rate  variations and  inadequate  
infrastructure can all be overcome by the EC's influence and that of 
in terest groups. Awareness of opportunities can be increased by 
information campaigns. Hence the business groups interest groups are 
focusing on transport improvements and on information campaigns. 
However, prejudice, negative perception of debt collection and lack of 
will are different matters. Lack of will can apply to the larger firm and 
need not be based on any political perceptions. Prejudice is related to 
political factors and hinges on the point m ade at the beginning of this 
section that at a basic level politics perm eates the decisions of the
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business community in Northern Ireland. In trade, then, there is an 
impeding political constraint.
The Confederations and Chambers, as well as such bodies as Co­
operation North, would argue that prejudice and lack of will are not 
static factors and that they can be altered. The active effort to provide 
information and to facilitate ease of communication lowers the cost of 
trade, psychologically and economically. In this way, trade increases. 
Thus, the director of the CII commented, with reference to the Coopers 
and Lybrand study, that he can nearly guarantee different and more 
encouraging results in two years time, should the study occur again 
(Interview, CII senior official, 20.3.92). He argues also that the perception 
of bad debts is already changing in Northern Ireland. Thus, although the 
statistics on cross-border trade indicate a relatively low level of such 
trade, the fact that trade levels have increased over the 1987-1990 period 
indicates that the situation is changing.
The fly in the ointment is that such logic rests on the assumption 
of common economic interests existing between N orthern Ireland and 
the Irish Republic. In fact, large firms may not perceive there to be a 
common interest, no matter how fast trains move and how smooth roads 
appear. Similarly, the tourist boards behave as competitors, not co- 
operators.
Tourism
Tourism is an example of business activity which is marked by conflicts 
of interest. Bord Failte has exhibited a reluctance to co-operate in the 
tourism sector. Bord Failte's logic is understandable from an economic 
perspective (chapter four). The Republic loses visitors if its image is 
associated with that of Northern Ireland.
The num ber of tourists visiting N orthern Ireland fell from 1.1 
million to 400,000 in the period 1967 to 1972 (Davy, Kelleher, McCarthy, 
1990, p. 23). In 1988, tourism was only 1.5 per cent of Northern Irish GDP 
(ibid). Whilst the NITB gains from selling N orthern Ireland and the 
Republic as one unit to tourists because it lessens the image of violence, 
Bord Failte clearly does not, because it fears that its own 'green and
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pleasan t p astu re ' im age will be tarn ished  by violence. As a 
representative of Bord Failte stated:
In this country [the Republic], the IDA and Tourism spent a lot of time 
separating itself from a negative image. We need a clean and stable 
image (Interview, Bord Failte senior official, 31.3.92).
Moreover, the more tourists who visit Northern Ireland, the smaller the 
num ber who visit the Republic. Tourists who visit the Republic are 
mainly from the United States and continental Europe. They book a fixed 
time in Ireland and, if they decide to stay in N orthern  Ireland, it 
generally means that they shorten their stay in the Republic, rather than 
stay for a longer period on the island as a whole. As a representative of 
Bord Failte stated:
You have to be a pragm atist in business. People aren 't in it for the 
good of their health. Hotel owners work for shareholders who w ant 
their dividends (Interview, Bord Failte senior official, 31.3.92).
According to a Northern Irish business person:
The biggest obstacle [to cross-border co-operation in tourism] is Bord 
Failte, not the sectarian divide (Interview, 8.4.92).
For Bord Failte cross-border co-operation will occur w here there are 
sound economic interests to engage in such co-operation:
Sustainable co-operation will take place when you leave it to the 
experts to do it, not to do-gooders who have no commercial risk by 
making claims (non-attributable interview).
Thus, if there are economic reasons for cross-border co-operation, then, 
"the experts" (presumably, the speaker m eant Bord Failte) will co­
operate. Bord Failte cites the recently launched Gulliver program m e as 
an example of an incremental, or new policy area where there is an 
economic rationale for cross-border co-operation (unattributable  
interview). This project is a joint project between the two tourist boards 
and it entails a data-base for the island of Ireland. Essentially, this data 
base contains inform ation about am enities and booking facilities 
throughout Ireland. The Gulliver project necessitated weekly meetings
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between officials from both parts of Ireland. Interreg is another new 
policy area where an economic incentive exists for cross-border co­
operation. Interreg dem ands that members from both tourist boards 
meet regularly and there are, according to Bord Failte, daily telephone 
calls at times related to Interreg schemes.
The problem with these schemes is that they are relatively small. 
Interreg constitutes a small proportion of total national expenditure 
(chapter four). One million four hundred  thousand Irish pounds is 
allotted to Bord Failte out of a total Irish Structural Fund allotment of 80 
million pounds (Interview, Bord failte official, 1.4.92). In 1992, four 
projects had been approved under the Interreg scheme (ibid) Of these 
projects, one is large and the remaining three projects are small (ibid). Of 
the 1.4 million pounds, 0.6 million is spent on joint marketing projects 
and 800,000 pounds is spent on capital projects (ibid).
Interreg constitutes 6 to 7 per cent of the total NITB budget, or 2.9 
million pounds sterling (ibid). While this figure is not insubstantial, both 
tourist boards agree that the International Fund constitutes a bigger 
source of income. In the words of a Bord Failte official: "The EC's 
influence on cross-border developm ents is lim ited at this point" 
(Interview, Bord Failte official, 31.3.92). Similarly, a NITB executive 
commented that "Progress made is to do with the International Fund, 
not with the EC" (Interview, NITB senior official, 7.4.92). U nder the 
International Fund, 14.5 million Irish pounds has been allocated to Bord 
Failte (Interview, Bord Failte official, 1.4.92). In this respect the tourism 
sector and its respective civil service departm ent are at one. The Anglo 
Irish Agreement and the International Fund, established under the aegis 
of the AIA, appear to have influenced levels of cross-border co-operation 
in the tourism  sector more than the EC. Thus political factors, not 
economic determinants, appear to have caused the limited co-operation 
that exists.
There is some evidence, therfore, of increased cross-border co­
operation in some sectors of business activity, but such co-operation is 
absent in the tourism sector.
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Agricultural Cross-Border Co-operation
The threshold of agricultural cross-border co-operation begins at a lower 
level than in that of the business sector. For example, until 1991, neither 
of the current presidents of the two unions had met, despite membership 
in the EC agricultural union, COPA (Interview, Co-operation N orth 
senior official, 6.4.92). A form er president of the IFA recalls his 
impression of the UFU as an essentially bigoted organisation. In 1984, for 
example when the aforementioned Irish president wrote a speech to be 
delivered in Belfast on the need for economic co-operation, the UFU took 
offence and, according to the former president, allowed him only one 
m inute to speak (Interview, IFA former president, 15.4.92). This event 
serves to illustrate the sensitivity of unionist citizens to the idea of 
economic cross-border co-operation. However, this sensitivity has been 
m ost m arked in the agriculture sector, as opposed to the industrial 
sector.
Similarly, a current senior official in the IFA recalls that, in the 
early 1980s, a proposal was made that, as a favour to the N orth, the 
green pounds in the two jurisdictions w ould be harm onised. This 
harmonisation would have meant that rather than suffering from a UK 
policy which protected the consum er bu t low ered farm  incomes, 
N orthern Irish agriculture would benefit from the Republic's policy 
which favoured agricultural producers. The proposal was opposed by 
the UFU, because its members claimed that such policy harmonisation 
weakened the Irish border, whilst it imposed a new border between 
Northern Ireland and Great Britain (Interview, IFA senior official, 1.4.92).
The UFU's response bears a strong relationship to its historical 
background. At many times in the Stormount regime's history, leaders of 
the UFU were often members of the UU:
The UFU gained access and legitimacy through its attachment to
the Ulster Unionist Party rather than its ability to represent
farmers (Greer, 1992, p. 17).
Thus, political constraints have traditionally impeded agricultural cross- 
border co-operation to a marked degree. Moreover, the opportunities for 
agricultural co-operation are more lim ited in range, than those for 
business co-operation. Given the similarity in agricultural structure in
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both parts of Ireland, the scope for increased cross-border trade is 
limited. Thus, the need to improve infrastructural facilities to encourage 
such trade may be less emphasised by farmers on both sides of the 
border. Despite these possible limitations to cross-border agricultural co­
operation, some interviewees did believe that there was evidence that 
cross-border co-operation in agriculture had increased because of the EC.
Evidence of Agricultural Cross-Border Co-operation
Co-operation North is a main advocate of the view that the agricultural 
relationship is changing in the aftermath of EC policy change (Interview, 
Co-operation North senior official, 6.4.92). The launch of a Co-operation 
N orth report on farm incomes in Northern Ireland is widely cited as an 
example of increased co-operation. This report examined farm incomes 
on both sides of the border and was done in collaboration with the IFA 
and the UFU. Moreover, co-operation has always been close between 
N orthern Ireland and the Irish Republic in m atters of animal health. 
However, this co-operation dates back to pre-EC m em bership days. 
Thus, it cannot be taken as evidence of novel EC influence in the 1989- 
1993 period. Similarly, before the 1989-1993 period, there was evidence 
of limited co-operation within the EC. In the pre-1988 period, under EC 
rules, special agricultural m easures applied to the Republic to take 
account of its high dependence on agriculture. Some of these measures 
were extended to N orthern Ireland at the request of N orthern Irish 
agricultural interests. For example, in the Republic premiums were paid 
on ewes by the EC, whereas, in the UK premiums were paid on lambs. 
The UFU supported successfully the application of the Irish system to 
N orthern Ireland (Interview, Irish Livestock and Meat Board senior 
official 6.4.92). However, the above example of green rate harmonisation 
demonstrates the limits of this approach. Such cases of policy extension 
are rare.
Cross-border trade does occur along the border areas. A major 
incentive for trade is that, under EC rules, milk cannot be sold from 
Northern Ireland to Great Britain. However, it can be exported from the 
Republic to the UK, because such exports would constitute inter-state 
trade encouraged by the EC adm inistration (Interview, Bord Bainne
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senior official, 27.3.92). Hence, there is a degree of exporting from one 
side of the border to the other and this trade terminates in Britain.
Another example of co-operation is that of factory owners in the 
food processing sector buying factories across the border (Interview, 
Irish Livestock and Meat Board senior official, 6.4.92). In particular, meat 
processing firms from the Republic have bought plants in N orthern 
Ireland. For example, the Goodman Group owned factories on both sides 
of the border, as do approximately four other large firms — Kerry Foods, 
Tara Meats, Avonmore Foods and Master Pork. Moreover, the recent 
sale of United Meat Packers (UMP) resulted in a joint venture, whereby 
two companies North and South of the border bought the plant.
Technically, however, this type of cross-border co-operation, 
involving the food processing industries, actually falls into the business 
sector category. The farm ers' unions are more concerned w ith the 
livelihood of the farming community than with that of food processing 
factory workers. Moreover, factory owners fall into the 'em ployers' 
category of the ESC structure, not the ’miscellaneous' category which 
covers agriculture (Kirchner and Schwaiger, 1981, pp. 63-66). Thus, much 
of the evidence used to argue that agricultural cross-border co-operation 
has increased can be refuted or m ust be qualified. No interviewee from 
the farm ing sector perceived that the agricu ltural cross-border 
relationship was changing, either because of EC influence or for any 
other reason.
The Absence of Agricultural Cross-Border Co-operation
The tone is set by the comment from a Teagasc senior official, that: 'T he 
EC hasn't helped to a large degree in collaboration" (Interview, Teagasc 
senior official, 15.4.92). Similarly, a representative from Bord Bainne 
commented that "Basically w e're [Northern Irish and Irish dairying] 
competitors" (Interview, Bord Bainne senior official, 27.3.92). The main 
source of competition in milk and milk products is the German market. 
In a case cited by a Bord Bainne official, the N orthern Irish Milk 
Marketing Board (MMB) promoted its butter in Germany by calling it 
Irish Gold. The potential damage to the Republic's export revenue led 
Bord Bainne successfully to sue the MMB. The basis for the legal action
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was that the Northern Irish butter was British not Irish (Interview, Bord 
bainne senior official, 27.3.92). Another example of an absence of co­
operation in the dairying industry is the low level of trade between the 
two areas. For example, one of the Republic's largest dairy exports, 
Kerrygold butter, is not sold at all in Northern Ireland.
Similarly, in the livestock and m eat market, N orthern Irish and 
Irish agricultural actors are rivals
Both parts are competing for a large m arke t... We have to plough our 
ow n furrow, just as they have to plough theirs (Interview, Irish 
Livestock and Meat Board senior official, 6.4.92).
The trade statistics in general do not bode well for advocates of 
co-operation. Figure 5.6 presents the trade statistics for N orthern Ireland 
and the Irish Republic.
Figure 5.6: Irish Im ports from and Exports to N orthern Ireland, 1987- 
1990
1987 1988 1989 1990
Imports 105,461 114,183 158,189 134,269
Exports 242,884 257,343 228,312 257,924
Source:; Gray, 1992, p. 40 and CSO.
The figures in this stable can be in terpreted  either positively or 
negatively. There is an overall increase in trade, comparing the 1987 to 
the 1990 figures, of 43,848 thousand pounds. However, more negatively, 
across the period 1987 to 1990, there is not a consistent trend  of 
increasing cross-border trade. Thus, imports rose in 1988 and in 1989, but 
fell in 1990 below their 1989 level. Similarly, exports rose in 1987 and in 
1988, but fell in 1989, before rising again in 1990. Moreover, the actual 
level of trade is low, regardless of whether there has been an increase. 
Thus, statistics on cross-border trade in agriculture do not offer evidence 
of substantial cross-border co-operation existing in agricultural trade.
Similarly, there is no evidence of any attem pt at joint lobbying, 
either at the level of the national government, or the EC. As regards the
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CAP reform , a representative of the UFU observed that "Both 
governments regard [the proposals] as discriminatory" (Interview, UFU 
senior official, 8.4.92). Hence, according to this UFU representative, there 
is no need to devise a joint lobbying strategy with the IFA, because the 
traditional channel of lobbying N orthern Irish Ministers, who in turn 
lobby in London, is adequate. The UFU argument is that, because the UK 
is not happy with the MacSharry proposals, N orthern Ireland has no 
difficulty in making its voice heard in London. Similarly, the National 
Farmer's Union (NFU), which represents the farming interests of the UK 
as a whole including N orthern Ireland, is opposed to the MacSharry 
proposals. Thus, the rhetorical question posed by the UFU w ould be 
"why should the UFU turn to the Republic for support when it already 
has well established and satisfactory British channels of influence?" This 
argum ent will be discussed in the concluding section below.
Finally, the farm ers' unions do not perceive that the EC, or 
International Fund for Ireland (IFI) rural development programmes are 
significant. Again, it is clear that the am ount of money provided for 
these programmes is perceived to be very small and not large enough to 
make a difference to the agricultural cross-border relationship. Thus, 
while a representative of the IFA observed that the UFU was very 
positive towards cross-border developments, he himself considered that 
"it was a bit early on" to be able to judge their influence (Interview, IFA 
senior official, 3.4.92). Similarly, a UFU senior official stated more 
decisively:
I don 't think that any of [the program m es] are very im portant
(Interview, UFU senior official, 8.4.92).
According to this view there are four main difficulties in the operation 
of both the EC and the IFI schemes.(Interview, UFU senior official, 
8.4.92). First, there is not enough money for the cross-border schemes. 
Second, very little progress has been m ade because, w hilst all of 
N orthern Ireland apart from Belfast can avail of money under the 
schemes, only the border counties in the Republic are included. 
According to the UFU representative, it is difficult to draw  up a broad 
and effective list of projects within such a narrow geographical space. 
Third, farmers are mainly interested in maintaining or increasing farm
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incomes, rural development is a peripheral concern to them. The fourth 
problem  identified by this UFU representative is that, under the 
International Fund decision m aking process, there is no access for 
interest groups to lobby the actors. The discussions held by the IFI 
involve a very small number of civil servants and ministers. The unions 
are not represented. Hence, it would be pointless for interest groups to 
co-operate to influence the process.
Overall, then, there is little evidence that the EC has affected the 
cross-border relationship in agriculture. Yet, in contrast, there is 
evidence of change in their business cross-border relationship.
iv. Conclusion: Economic Elites and Cross-Border Co-operation
The results of these case studies are confusing at one level, because there 
are differences in levels of co-operation, not just between sectors, but 
within sectors. Hence, there is little evidence of co-operation increasing 
in agriculture as a whole, but, within industry, co-operation levels do 
seem to be increasing, but in certain sections. Notably, in tourism there 
is less evidence of co-operation.
On another level, the findings are not confusing. Where common 
interests exist there is co-operation, but where competition dominates to 
the exclusion of common interests, rivalry w ithout co-operation occurs. 
The problem with this analysis is that it assumes that there is less need 
for agricultural interest groups to co-operate than there is for the 
business unions. While it cannot be denied that there is a greater range of 
opportunities to co-operate in the business sector, there is the obvious 
question as to why, for example, farmers' unions have not availed of the 
opportunities that do exist. In short, why has more joint lobbying not 
occurred at European level?
There are two possible answers. The first is that there is still no 
need to avail of existing opportunities. Given the existence of COPA and 
of the UK National Farmers' Union, it may well be the case that there is 
no need to lobby in alliance with the IFA. The IFA and the UFU can form 
a stronger voice by co-operating with all farmers' groups in COPA and 
the UFU has the voice of the NFA. However, why then should the two 
business confederations co-operate together by lobbying jointly? The
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CBI-NI too has the CBI and the EC European employers' union (UNICE) 
to rely upon.
The important fact in all of this is that the areas of co-operation in 
the business sector all spillover to each other. For example, because the 
development of trade between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic is 
a priority for the CII and the CBI-NI, then not only trade co-operation, 
b u t also tran sp o rt co-operation  occurs. Im proved  tra n sp o rt 
infrastructure is needed to lower the costs of cross-border trade for 
producers. Because transport co-operation is needed to develop trade, 
then joint lobbying for transport co-operation is perceived to be 
necessary by the confederations.
In contrast, in the agricultural sphere, m aintaining farm income, 
(hence, opposing the MacSharry reform proposals), is the desired end, 
not developing trade within Ireland. The absence of trade emphasis can 
be partly explained by the similarity in agricultural structure on both 
sides of the border. Thus, agricultural and business aims are very 
different in that business aims are more dynamic, whereas agricultural 
aims are more reactive. The latter do not spillover to other activities, but 
are geared towards a specific and narrow ly defined target. In this 
context, the awareness of the benefits of developing agricultural cross- 
border co-operation is curtailed.
However, given the peripherality of N orthern Irish agricultural 
interests within the larger UK framework, it is still difficult to explain 
why the Republic is not engaged as an ally in the attempt to maintain the 
CAP price support system. For example, civil servants who were 
interviewed in Whitehall betrayed a distance between themselves and 
Northern Ireland. One civil servant, when asked about the role of the 
N orthern Irish civil servants, commented that they "Sat, watched and 
generally got in the way" (unattributable interview). Similarly, a former 
head of the IFA recalled that at the meetings of COPA the Scottish, 
Welsh and English unions would share jokes among themselves, often 
ignoring the UFU completely (Interview, ex- IFA official, 15.4.92). This 
peripherality from the decision-making process in Whitehall implies that 
there is a theoretical incentive for the UFU to avail of opportunities to co­
operate with the Republic.
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The second possible reason for an absence of agricultural co­
operation is that the agricultural sector has a short sighted attitude 
towards policy-making. In other words, the agricultural sector does not 
plan ahead, but the business sector, in contrast, emphasises strategic and 
long-term planning. Recall the observation that a farmer has a horizon of 
15 metres (chapter three). The reason for these different perspectives 
may lie in the specific nature of business versus agricultural activity. 
Agriculture in Ireland has traditionally been conservative. For example, 
text books describe the difficulty in encouraging the farming community 
in the Republic to adopt m odem  farming methods. Similarly, it has been 
observed that:
Ulster farmers were sceptical about the benefits of expenditure on 
education, research and marketing. It was largely because farmers 
were reluctant to adopt new  m ethods voluntarily  that the 
Ministry became convinced of the need for state direction and 
regulation (Greer, 1992, p. 7).
This conservatism implies myopia and an aversion to change. The high 
dependence of farming on external conditions, that is, on particular 
weather conditions and the plight of small farmers in making a living, 
makes such conservatism understandable.
Moreover, even when farmers have altered their behaviour and 
have m ade greater use of m odern methods, the resultant increase in 
output has been bought up at a guaranteed price by the EC. It is arguable 
that the subsidisation of agriculture does not encourage long-term, or 
dynamic thinking, because, as long as aid existed, farming interests had 
less need to devise plans for survival in a harsh economic climate.
The question of whether or not the UFU's political stance may 
im pede cross-border agricultural co-operation has not yet been 
addressed. There is clearly a variety of factors which explain the 
difference between the business and agricultural sectors. It is difficult to 
state definitively that the UFU's historical unionist tradition continues to 
influence its present behaviour. This difficulty arises from the fact that 
IFA has not approached the UFU to co-operate recently and each union's 
representatives have spoken purely in economic terms. To derive 
political preferences from these economic comments w ould open the
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interviewer to accusations of a biased interpretation. M oreover, no 
current member of the IFA observed sectarianism within the UFU. 
Therefore, speculation that the political stance of the UFU affects its 
relationship with the IFA can only rem ain speculation. However, the 
cases cited where political preference did dictate UFU decision outcomes 
are quite recent — for example, the 1984 case described above. So it is 
possible that politics is a factor in influencing the UFU's approach to co­
operation with the IFA.
Either way, the findings of agriculture do not bode well for neo­
functionalist theory. Despite the existence of opportunities for co­
operation, such co-operation is not occurring. In contrast, the results of 
this chapter are more encouraging in the business sector. The rail link 
case study is an example of an area where business co-operation has 
influenced governmental cross-border co-operation. However, there is a 
need for m ore co-operative ventures in the tourism  sector. The 
Confederations of Industry would argue that, even in two years, there 
will be more co-operative activities and, indeed, there is a general 
impression among many business people who were interviewed that a 
momentum is building in favour of increased cross-border co-operation. 
Thus, this examination of economic elites provides a mixture of evidence 
about the EC's effect on the Ir ish /N o rth e rn  Irish cross-border 
relationship.
Chapter Six
Political Parties and Cross-border Co-operation 
i: The European Parliament
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In tro d u c tio n
Interviews w ith economic elites in N orthern Ireland and the Irish 
Republic revealed that m any of these groups perceived there to be 
common interests betw een N orthern Ireland and the Republic and 
that these interests have been caused by EC policy. They also revealed 
the desire of these groups to act on the basis of economic logic and to 
engage in cross-border co-operation.
The question addressed in this chapter and the next is how have 
the political parties in Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic reacted 
to EC policies which have upgraded their common economic interests? 
W hereas previous chapters have been concerned w ith cross-border 
co-operation betw een economic and adm inistrative elites, in this 
chapter and in the next chapter, I examine the EC's effect on co­
operation between political actors.
The focus of my examination of Irish and N orthern Irish MEP 
behaviour is on w hether partisan linkage politics characterises the 
parties' approach to the EC. 'Partisan linkage' refers to the argum ent 
that "European issues can be manipulated to serve partisan ends, even 
w here the origins of domestic conflict have nothing to do with the 
Com m unity" (Hainsworth, 1979, p. 470). According to the partisan 
linkage argum ent, reactions to the EC and to cross-border co­
operation should conform closely to unionist and nationalist party  
ideologies. This argument begs the question of whether MEPs convey a 
different attitude to the EC than that traditionally adopted by their 
parties. This possibility is the core concern of this chapter.
The aim of this exam ination of cross-border co-operation 
between MEPs in the EP is not to determine the EP's effect on cross- 
border co-operation. Rather, the focus of this chapter, as previous 
chapters, is the effect of EC policy change on Irish /N orthern  Irish 
cross-border co-operation. The actors examined in this case are MEPs, 
bu t the EP's significance is that it may facilitate  cross-border co­
operation between different party representatives. The theme remains 
that it is EC policy which may cause such co-operation.
Thus, I am interested in how MEPs are reacting to the reform of 
the CAP, to EC regional policy reform and to the creation of the SEM 
within the EP. In order to determine MEP behaviour, interviews were 
conducted w ith Irish and Northern Irish MEPs a n d /o r  with their EC
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adv iso rs.1 Apart from interview material, I have relied heavily upon 
MEP speeches and interventions during EP plenary debates.
Co-operation betw een political actors on economic m atters 
w ithin political institutions is assum ed to be a form of economic co­
operation, as opposed to constituting political co-operation. For neo­
functionalists, the existence of common economic interests between 
N orthern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland should eventually spill 
over to economic co-operation and, indeed, should  cause deeper 
agreem ent on the need for shared institutions to adm inister cross- 
border schemes, that is on the need for political co-operation. In this 
chapter, I examine the effect of the EC on economic and political co­
operation between Irish and Northern Irish Members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs).
The EP is studied in this thesis because leaders of the DUP, the 
UUP, the SDLP and the Irish parties are all members of that institution. 
Given the importance of the SEM, the CAP reform and EC regional 
policy to Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, the EP should 
be an ideal forum for cross-border co-operation. At the national level, 
in W estm inster or the Dail, m em bers of parliam en t concern 
themselves with a wide array of domestic and foreign policy concerns, 
whereas, in the EP, attention is concentrated upon the very policies 
which upgrade interests between N orthern Ireland and the Republic: 
for example, the creation of the SEM.
Moreover, as I show in the next section, the EP's role in the EC's 
decision-making process is not insignificant. Thus, it is a worthwhile 
forum of activity. MEPs from Northern Ireland and the Republic can 
move away from discussing the political conflict in N orthern Ireland to 
discussing EC policy. They can make their fears and hopes known to 
other European politicians in the EP, to the Commission and to the 
Council. The possibility is that the EP lifts Northern Irish/Irish political 
parties out of their conflictual setting and increases cross-border co­
operation.
The behaviour of MPs and TDs in W estm inster and in Dail 
Eireann is not examined in this chapter. The reason for this omission is 
that MPs and TDs do not have the same scope to co-operate with each 
other within their national parliaments as in the EP and local councils.
1 Sinn Fein politicians are not examined in this chapter, because Sinn Fein is not 
represented in the EP.
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A part from the qualitative difference betw een the w ork done in 
national parliam ents and  that undertaken in the EP and  local 
government, Whitehall and the Dail are obviously separate from each 
other politically and geographically. The assum ption is that the EC's 
effect on the behaviour of MPs and TDs in Westminster and the D&il is 
unlikely to be great and thus will not be examined here. Similarly, the 
Anglo-Irish Parliam entary body, established in 1989 is not examined 
here.
The chapter begins with a description of the EP's role in the EC's 
decision-m aking process. This descrip tion  is fo llow ed by  an 
examination of the m ain parties in N orthern Ireland and the Republic 
of Ireland and of their attitudes to the EC. Section three examines the 
effect of the European Com m unity on the behaviour of Irish and 
N orthern Irish MEPs in the EP and the extent to which this behaviour 
conforms with the traditional approach of each party to the EC and to 
co-operation.
In conclusion, I argue that there is evidence of lim ited MEP 
cross-border co-operation. However, there is little tangible evidence of 
any substantial political cross-border co-operation am ong Irish and 
Northern Irish MEPs. Despite the apparently limited effect of the EC on 
political cross-border co-operation, on a different practical level there 
is a cross-cutting consensus among all political parties which offers 
practical support to EC regional policy. The EC's policy initiatives of 
the 1980s have provided incentives for this practical support.
i. The Role of the EP in the EC's Decision-Making Process
It is essential to place the discussion of the EP in context by examining 
the role of the EP in the EC's decision-making process. The fact that the 
EP is a vibrant institution, although weaker than the Commission and 
the Council, increases the possibility that Irish and MEPs will be active 
participants in the EP and that they will face m any opportunities for 
cross-border co-operation.
MEPs are members of the EP's different political groups and also 
of EP committees. M any MEPs also hold seats in their national 
parliaments. The theoretical role of the EP is not very different from 
that of a national assembly. The EP should legitimate the EC and, as 
such, it should provide support for the work of the Commission. The
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EP should represent the citizens of Europe. The EP groups are m eant to 
resemble national political parties. These groups are detailed in Figure 
6.1
Each EP group aims to vote en bloc for or against a given 
proposal at the EP's plenary sessions. The EP arena is significantly 
different from that of the Dail or Westminster. It follows a continental 
European system, in contrast to the W estminster model. As such, the 
EP is less adversarial than the Irish and UK parliaments. An obvious 
difference between the EP and national parliam ents is that, given the 
different national interests represented by individual MEPs, it is often 
difficult to obtain group discipline when casting votes (Nugent, 1989, p. 
129). Moreover, given that EP activity is not preoccupied with driving 
out an opposition governm ent or protecting an existing governm ent, 
EP group discipline is more difficult to sustain than that of party  
discipline within a national parliament. Attendance at plenaries is poor, 
leading one commentator to observe that: "The EP in plenary does not, 
it should be said give the impression of being the most dynam ic of 
places" (Nugent, 1989, p. 140).
Figure 6.1: G roups of the EP (num ber of Irish  and N orthern  Irish  
m em bers in brackets)
EP group Irish and Northern Irish m em bers
S ocia lists Irish Labour Party (1), SDLP (1)
European Peoples Party Fine Gael (4), U U P (1)
Liberal Democratic and Reformist Group Progressive Dem ocrats (1),
Independent (Irl.) (1)
Group of the European Left Dem ocratic Left2 (Irl.) (1)
Greens 0
Group of the European Democratic Alliance Fianna Fail (6)
Rainbow Group Independent (Irl.) (1)
Technical Group of the European Right 0
Left Unity Group 0
Non-attached M embers D U P (l)
Source : Jacobs , Corbett and Shackleton, 1992, pp. 60-77, (adapted).
The detailed w ork of the EP is carried ou t in the 18 EP 
committees which cover various areas of EC activity (See Figure 6.2).
2 Democratic Left is the rump of the IrishWorkers Party which divided in the 
aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall.
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Each committee has a chairperson who presides over committee work 
and represents the committee at plenary. Committee co-ordinators act 
as spokespeople for their political groups. Each co-ordinator makes 
sure that all m em ber of h is /h e r  political group attend comm ittee 
m eetings and  act in accordance w ith  their g ro u p 's  w ishes at 
committees.
The practical role of the EP differs from its theoretical role. In 
practice, the Treaty of Rome conferred very limited powers on the EP 
(Coombes, 1979). Like the ESC the EP could lobby the Commission and 
could advise it, but it could not enforce its will upon the Commission. 
Unlike the Commission, the EP had no formal initiating powers. Until 
1979, the EP was not even directly elected by the citizens of Europe. 
Even after the introduction of direct elections in 1979, its powers were 
so lim ited  as to m ake its rep resen ta tive  role appear puerile. 
Consequently, the transfer of legitim acy by national actors to a 
supranational institu tion forecast by neo-functionalists, w as not 
apparent.
Figure 6.2: Perm anent Com m ittees of the EP
Agriculture, Fisheries and Rural D evelopm ent Budgets
Budgetary Control
Civil Liberties and Internal affairs
Culture, Youth, Education and the M edia
D evelopm ent and Co-operation
Econom ic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy
Energy, Research and Technology
Environment, Public Health and Consum er Protection
External Economic Relations
Foreign Affairs and Security
Institutional affairs
Legal Affairs and C itizens Rights
P etitions
Regional Policy, Regional Planning and Relations w ith Regional and Legal 
A u thorities
Rules of Procedure, Verification of Credentials and Im m unities 
Social Affairs, Em ployment and the W orking Environm ent 
Transport and Tourism  
W om ens Rights
Source: Jacobs, Corbett and Shackleton, 1992, pp. 101-102
The Commission and the Council of Ministers form the nexus of 
pow er in the EC's decision-m aking process (chapter three). The
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Council's power vis-^-vis the Commission is not matched by any other 
EC institution. However, there are sources of lim ited EP power. The 
1970 and 1975 Budget Treaties gave the EP power to reject the budget 
of the EC for w hat w as called non-com pulsory  expend itu re . 
Compulsory expenditure refers to expenditure which the Com munity 
is legally obliged to undertake, for example, the price support system of 
the CAP. N on-com pulsory expenditure  refers to tha t w hich is 
dependen t on the C om m ission 's discretion. The EP g radua lly  
expanded the definition of non-com pulsory expenditure, so that, in 
1992, 40 per cent of all expenditure fell into the non-com pulsory 
category (Jacobs, Corbett and Shackleton, 1992, p. 214).
Another source of EP power is that the Commission is obliged 
to consult with the EP before it makes a formal policy proposal. Under 
Article 49 of the Rome Treaty, the Commission is allowed to am end 
proposals after it has submitted them for Council discussion, as long as 
the Council has not yet taken an opinion on them. The EP has made 
the most of this power, so as to extend its implications. For example, in 
1981, the EP took advantage of Article 149 of the Rome Treaty, to 
persuade the Commission to amend certain proposals on isoglucose 
before the Council had reached a final decision (Lodge, 1983, p. 31).
M oreover, under the term s of the SEA, the consultation 
procedure was strengthened in certain policy areas to become w hat is 
know n as the 'co-operation procedure '. This new  'co-operation 
procedure' laid down that, in all matters relating to the establishment of 
the SEM, the EP would be given a second reading of a bill after the 
Council of M inisters had given its opinion. It was argued that in 
practice the Council would be reluctant to reject EP am endm ents at 
this stage, because the Council w ould w ish to ensure the speedy 
passage of the bill. Consequently "by providing for EP and Council 
second readings, and by making it difficult — though by no means 
impossible — for the Council to ignore a majority Parliamentary view, 
the co-operation procedure increases the potential influence of the EP" 
(Nugent, 1989, p. 248).
The co-operation procedure was widened under the M aastricht 
Treaty. The co-decision procedure  w hich is in troduced  in  the 
M aastricht Treaty provides for a conciliation committee m ade up of 
representatives of the EP and the Council. If the Council does not 
accept EP amendments, the relevant proposed text is referred to the
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conciliation committee. The EP has the right to reject a text after three 
months of attem pted compromise, if a simple majority of its members 
are in favour of rejection.
Thus, the EP, although a weak actor in the EC institutional 
framework, is not entirely impotent. Its role in the EC's decision making 
process:
has increased from having initially no role whatsoever to play to 
having a consultative role ... to pow ers that are m ore than 
consultative in certain areas, even reaching to the level of co­
decision with Council (Corbett and Shackleton, 1992, pp. 202-203).
The EP, although it is weaker than the Commission and the Council, is a 
significant institution. Theoretically at least, it should be an ideal forum 
for cross-border co-operation betw een Irish  and N orthern  Irish 
political parties. The ideologies of these parties will now be described.
ii. The Irish and Northern Irish Political Parties
Northern Irish Parties
The Unionist Parties: The DUP and the UUP
The Northern Irish political environment is distinguished by a num ber 
of obvious factors "There can be little question that its party  system 
and its relationship to param ilitarism  reflects the harsh and unstable 
political environment in which it operates" (Arthur and Jeffrey, 1988, p. 
61). The question of Northern Ireland's constitutional status, of its right 
to remain within the United Kingdom, or its right to become part of the 
Republic of Ireland dom inates the behaviour and rhetoric of the 
different parties.
Thus, traditional unionism seeks to ensure that Northern Ireland 
remains within the United Kingdom and asserts that the Irish state is 
responsible for the existence of conflict in N orthern Ireland (O'Leary 
and McGarry, 1994, forthcoming). The Irish constitutional claim that 
Ireland consists of the island of Ireland, that is of the 32 counties, is 
repugnant to unionists and fuels their argum ent that the behaviour of 
the Irish state encourages nationalist param ilitaries to continue their 
campaign of violence. The alleged reason for such Irish behaviour is
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that bearing a nationalist banner serves party leaders well in gaining 
electoral success in the Republic.
There are divisions w ithin the unionist camp. T raditional 
unionism is but one form of unionism. O'Leary and McGarry describe 
revisionist unionism  as those unionists who hold that the British 
governm ent is responsible for the conflict, because of its lacklustre 
approach to N orthern Ireland and lack of comm itm ent to N orthern  
Ireland's British status (O'Leary and McGarry, 1994, forthcoming). There 
is also a division betw een unionists devolutionists w ho favour 
devolved self government in Northern Ireland and integrationists who 
wish to ensure that N orthern Ireland be integrated into the U nited 
Kingdom and be treated like any region of the United Kingdom. In the 
former camp, there is a variety of preferred forms of devolution ranging 
from majority rule to power sharing with nationalists.
The divisions within unionism became increasingly apparent in 
the afterm ath of the outbreak of conflict, that is from 1969 onwards. 
Faced w ith British attem pts to reform  the system , the un ion ist 
m ovement was divided in opinion as to w hat its appropriate response 
should be. In broad terms, the division was between the more hardline 
and extreme strand within the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and the 
more moderate strand. Broadly speaking, the Alliance Party, formed in 
1970, represents the more m oderate strand of unionism ; the DUP 
represents the most extreme strand; and the UUP rests in betw een 
both parties, but tends towards the DUP and battles w ith the DUP to 
win unionist votes.
The extremism of the DUP threatens UUP support and has 
contributed to attempts by each party to out-do each other in a policy 
of 'no surrender' to Anglo-Irish initiatives. Despite this competition, the 
tw o parties joined forces against the A nglo-Irish A greem ent and 
produced a joint policy document "An End To The Drift" in 1987. The 
coalescence of policy is also evident in both parties' approach to the 
European Community (see below). As the next section shows, although 
unionism  is factionalised, Sinn Fein and the SDLP have been even 
more divided in their approach to the conflict in Northern Ireland.
The Nationalist Parties: The SDLP and Sinn Fein
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The obvious and encom passing feature of nationalism  in N orthern  
Ireland is that nationalists w ant a united Ireland. Beyond that feature, 
there is deep division over w hat constitutes the cause of the conflict in 
N orthern Ireland. An additional question is that of participation in a 
united Ireland — who w ould be a part of a united  Ireland? W ould 
Ulster Protestants be included? The means to achieve the aim of a 32 
county Irish state and the length of time needed to do so are also 
causes of dissension within nationalist ranks. Thus, there is a distinction 
between so-called traditional nationalism and revisionist nationalism  
(O'Leary and McGarry, 1994, forthcoming). Each school differs in its 
approach to the above themes.
The traditional nationalist argum ent is th a t the conflict in 
N orthern  Ireland  is sym ptom atic of a deep-rooted  problem  in 
Northern Ireland and is caused by the behaviour of the British state. 
The British presence and partition are the cause of the conflict and only 
w hen the British presence w ithdraw s from N orthern  Ireland and 
Ireland is unified will there be peace. Step by step actions by the British 
governm ent are sim ply a British response to IRA violence. Such 
actions do not signify any real commitment to resolving the problem in 
N orthern  Ireland , as defined by traditional nationalists. A key 
distinguishing mark in the rhetoric of traditional nationalists is that any 
step by step approach, regardless of its motivation, is perceived to be 
too slow and that a united Ireland is attainable in the very near future, if 
the British governm ent is willing to deliver it (O'Leary and McGarry, 
1994, forthcom ing). C onsent is not a necessary condition for the 
achievement of a united Ireland in the traditional school of thought. 
P ro testan t perm ission  to a tta in  un ification  is not necessary . 
Consequently, traditional nationalism in N orthern Ireland legitimates 
the right to use force to achieve the aim of Irish unity.
The Sinn Fein party is best described as a hybrid of traditional 
nationalism and socialism. It is commonly perceived to be the political 
w ing of the IRA, although recently the party has detached itself more 
from the IRA's activities.3 Sinn Fein was banned until 1974. In that year, 
it w as legalised. The British aim ed to encourage param ilita ry
3 In the 1992 general election campaign, the Sinn Fein leader, Gerry Adams, appeared 
to separate his party from IRA atrocities, although he maintained that every citizen 
had the right to take up arms.
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supporters to relinquish arms in favour of constitutional politics.4 As it 
tu rned  out, Sinn Fein leaders d id  not believe that v iolent and  
constitutional politics hade to be m utually exclusive activities. In their 
heady days of the early 1980s, w hen the H-Block hunger strikers 
increased Sinn Fein's support, the policy of the ballot box and the 
arm alite was announced by Danny M orrison at the Sinn F6in Ard- 
Fheis (annual conference) with the chilling explanation that "while not 
everyone can plant a bomb, everyone can plant a vote" (A rthur and 
Jeffrey, 1988, p. 40).
In the 1993 local elections, Sinn F£in increased its vote share. 
However, support for Sinn Fein has generally waned since 1983, despite 
its self-confident entrance into the constitutional arena. It is this factor, 
combined, perhaps, with the party 's exclusion from the Anglo-Irish all 
party  talks, which has produced an alteration in Sinn Fein's policy 
towards the use of violence in the early 1990s
Revisionist nationalists, in contrast, foresee a long journey to 
unity, marked by the attempt to reconcile the different traditions on the 
island of Ireland. Revisionist nationalism  em phasises that a united  
Ireland can emerge only with the consent of the majority in N orthern 
Ireland and, thus, Ulster Protestants can be part of the united Ireland if 
they so wish.
Revisionism takes account of the in ternal dynam ics of the 
conflict in N orthern Ireland and the relationship betw een the two 
communities within Northern Ireland, as opposed to paying exclusive 
attention to the role of the British state. This em phasis on consent 
necessitates the longer time frame envisaged for attaining a united 
Ireland, because the alteration of P rotestant perception and  the 
development of trust is a gradual process.
Time is also a factor in explaining the different attitude to the use 
of violence between Northern Irish nationalist groups. The emphasis 
upon the immediacy of attaining a united Ireland favours the use of 
violence to achieve that aim. Violence pressurises governm ent, it is 
speedy in its immediate effect and, as stated above, traditionalists in 
Northern Ireland argue that Britain responds only to the threat and
4 It must be noted that, although Sinn Fein is treated here as a Northern Irish party, 
it has its headquarters in Dublin and has representatives in both Donegal and 
Dundalk in the Republic. However, its main support base is in Northern Ireland and, 
consequently, it is best treated as a Northern Irish party in this chapter.
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incidence of the "armed struggle'. In contrast, revisionists reject the use 
of violence.
These arguments, which emphasise the consent of the unionist 
majority, form the plank of SDLP policy and distinguish the SDLP from 
Sinn Fein. The SDLP, like the DUP, was formed in the aftermath of the 
civil rights protests by Ivan Cooper, Austin Currie, Gerry Fitt, Paddy 
Devlin and John Hume. From its inception, it was a nationalist party 
w ith a difference, for it agreed to participate in the institutions of the 
state. The SDLP recognised the existence of a separate N orthern Irish 
and UK state and agreed to work within it.
In 1981, the H-Block hunger strikes led to a partial ground swell 
of opinion in support of Sinn Fein. By 1983, support for the SDLP had 
not changed drastically from its 1981 trough, a fact which implied that 
the SDLP's weakness was a function of more than simply the H-Block 
hunger strikes. There were two main explanations for SDLP weakness 
(Rolston, 1987, pp. 60-61). The first was the domination by unionists of 
local councils. The second explanation was that it was associated more 
w ith the m iddle class Catholic community, whereas Sinn Fein drew  
support from working class Catholics.
Under John Hum e's leadership, the SDLP turned to the parties 
in the Republic for support in the attem pt to fight off the Sinn Fein 
threat. It was a strategy that succeeded and the 1980s saw  the 
development of the SDLP-Irish axis which has placed the SDLP at the 
forefront of the Anglo-Irish process (see p. 56). The divisions which rack 
the Northern Irish parties are not as evident in Fianna Fail's and Fine 
Gael's Northern Irish policy as the next section will show.
The Irish political parties
The roots of the Irish party system lie in the rift which emerged over 
the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty which partitioned the island in 
1921. The pro-and anti-Treaty factions are the ancestors of Fine Gael 
and Fianna Fail respectively and are infam ous in their effect of 
dam pening the developm ent of a left-right cleavage in the party  
system, until the 1980s.
Fianna Fail traditionally has been more Republican in its rhetoric 
and has been conscious of its more republican supporters. Thus, in
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1985, the then (opposition) Fianna Fail leader, C. J. H aughey, 
condemned the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA), ostensibly 
because the party  claimed that the Agreem ent accepted the current 
constitutional status of N orthern Ireland and, therefore, underm ined 
the Irish constitutional claim to Northern Ireland.
However, since 1985, the differences which separate the two 
parties w ith respect to N orthern Ireland are much less visible. Fianna 
F&il perform ed a U -turn  w ith respect to the A greem ent and  the 
governm ent has been a supporter of the Agreem ent's operation. Both 
parties' leadership uphold the principle of unity by majority consent 
and both are committed to the Agreement's devolutionist aim.
The m ain difference that does exist between the two parties 
relates to the desirability  of constitutional change, to encourage 
Protestants into what they perceive to be an essentially Catholic state. 
Fianna Fail traditionally has been less in favour of such change, whilst 
Fine Gael has supported it, particularly under the leadership of Dr. 
Garret Fitzgerald.
Differences betw een the two parties in the economic policy 
dom ain are not as m arked as in o ther European dem ocracies. 
T rad itiona lly , Fine Gael su p p o rt cam e from  u rb an  business 
communities and large-scale farmers. Fianna Fail was associated more 
with poorer sections of the community, in particular w ith small-scale 
farmers. Thus, Fianna Fail's 1948 manifesto "was welfarist rather than 
Republican" (Mair, 1987, p. 28). However, both parties emphasised that 
they represented the interests of the whole population (Mair, 1987, p. 
26) and became catch-all in their policy.
The current party system is changing in that the social support 
bases of the m ain parties is altering. Two developm ents are of 
particular importance: the founding of the Progressive Dem ocrats 
(PDs) (1987) and the increased strength of the Irish Labour Party. The 
PDs were founded in 1987 w ith the aim of breaking a m ould in Irish 
politics and attracting the growing num ber of young disenchanted 
voters. It quickly became associated w ith the m ore affluent m iddle 
class and after a "glorious" birth, its electoral success w aned. For 
example, in the 1989 election it won only 5.5 per cent of first preference 
votes, that is 6.4 per cent less than in the 1987 election. In the 1992 
election, although increasing its num ber of seats by 4, its share of first 
preference votes fell by 0.8 per cent on the 1989 election result.
The Irish Labour Party m ade great gains in the 1992 general 
election, winning 33 seats in the Dail (a gain of 18 seats) and entering 
into coalition government with Fianna Fail. This increased strength was 
no flash in the pan. In the 1989 election, for example, it was noted that 
the Labour Party had increased its vote share in the urban areas of the 
Republic, particularly Dublin. (O'Leary and McGarry, 1990, p. 133).
Despite Labour's strength and the establishment of the PDs, I do 
not examine representatives of these parties in this thesis. The reason 
for this omission is that Labour is still relatively weak in the rural border 
areas of the Republic. These are the constituencies which I focus upon 
in this chapter and the next. Similarly, the PDs are not strong in these 
areas.
In general, there is far m ore of a consensus of opinion on 
N orthern Irish policy between all the main Irish parties than between 
the Northern Irish parties. The divisions which rack the N orthern Irish 
parties are much less dom inant in Fianna Fail and Fine Gael politics. 
For this reason, the discussion of Fianna Fail and Fine Gael is shorter 
than the above discussion of the Northern Irish parties. Similarly, the 
significance of EC cross-border initiatives is not subsum ed under part 
of a wider nationalist/unionist debate. The EC's place in party ideology 
will now be examined.
The Parties and the EC
N ot surprisingly, Irish and Northern Irish parties differ in their attitudes 
to the EC. On the one hand, the SDLP, Fianna Fail and Fine Gael have 
professed support for the EC, but, on the other hand, the DUP, the 
UUP and Sinn Fein are either deeply opposed to the Community, or 
are equivocal in their attitude to the Community.
For the SDLP, the European Community presents an ideal avenue 
to reconcile the two communities in N orthern Ireland. The model of 
Franco-German rapprochement after W orld W ar two, facilitated by the 
establishm ent of the European Community, has an obvious appeal to 
constitutionalists aiming to end the historical anim osity in N orthern 
Ireland. That the Rome Treaty is inspired by the aim of integrating the 
nations of Europe, so that borders are made obsolete, clinches the EC's 
appeal to the SDLP.
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From the 1970s onwards, the SDLP emphasised the EC's role as a 
healing force in Northern Ireland (Hainsworth, 1989, p. 56). Thus, as the 
EC's dynamism accelerated in 1988 with the Single European Act and a 
strengthened EC regional policy, the SDLP increasingly emphasised the 
potential of a European Community regional policy to advance cross- 
border co-operation. In 1991, for example, Hum e stated that:
Economic necessity underlines and underp ins the idealistic 
reality of a united Europe ... the nation state has outlived its 
usefulness (Hume, 1991).
The SDLP's emphasis is on a Europe of the regions, where the concept 
of nationalism is overrun by a supranational European state of regions. 
The SDLP presses for the island of Ireland to be one region within this 
new Europe:
The European Community also recognises the economic reality 
which is that our situation and needs are similar to those of the 
South of Ireland ... What we call for now is a joint approach and 
application based on a comprehensive economic plan covering 
the whole island (ibid).
The SDLP's enthusiasm  for EC regional policy gives rise to its 
com plaints that the Republic's governm ent receives m ore aid than 
does the British governm ent for N orthern Ireland. The SDLP argues 
that if N orthern  Ireland could be represented by the Republic's 
governm ent in negotiations for EC aid, then N orthern Ireland w ould 
benefit more from EC regional policy. Consequently, there is a strong 
economic justification for the island of Ireland to speak with one voice 
in a supranational Europe of regions.
Similarly, Fianna Fail and Fine Gael have no difficulty w ith EC 
regional policy. The Republic stands to gain from the EC Structural 
Funds and Fianna Fail and Fine Gael have no ideological difficulty with 
the concept of the erosion of the Irish border. Thus, the SDLP, Fianna 
Fail and Fine Gael parties do not have any ideological difficulty with 
cross-border co-operation.
It m ust be rem em bered that the support of constitutional 
nationalist parties for EC-induced cross-border co-operation cannot 
serve as evidence of co-operation, as I have defined it. (See chapter 
one). Rather, such support is an example of underlying harmony. For 
true cross-border co-operation to exist, there m ust be evidence that
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unionist parties and traditional nationalist parties (Sinn Fein) support 
EC-induced cross-border co-operation. In fact, the DUP and UUP have 
not supported such co-operation and Sinn Fein's attitude to the EC has 
been ambivalent.
The response of both the UUP and the DUP to the EC has been 
broadly similar. Thus, in the 1975 referendum , both the DUP and the 
UUP emphasised the threat to British parliam entary sovereignty posed 
by the use of the referendum and of the EC itself (Hainsworth, 1989, p. 
55). In the 1979 EP elections, both parties opposed the introduction of 
the Single Transferable Vote (STV) m echanism  of P roportional 
Representation, claiming that it placed Northern Ireland further dow n 
the road to union with the Republic given the use of the STV system in 
the Republic (Hainsworth, 1989, pp. 58-59).
For unionists, the distinction between the absence of an Irish 
border, because Ireland is one region in a Europe of regions, and the 
absence of a border, because Ireland is recognised to be one nation in 
a Europe of nations, is hard ly  compelling. The aforem entioned 
DUP /U U P opposition to the concept of supranationalism  means that 
a Europe of the regions is not acceptable and lends itself to the 
argum ent that the SDLP's response to the European Com m unity is a 
political ploy to unite N orthern  Ireland w ith the Republic. The 
argum ent, then, is that the European Com munity accommodates the 
SDLP ideology very well and, thus, the EC is a back door to Irish 
unification.
In both election manifestoes for the 1989 EP elections, the 
emphasis was on the defence of national sovereignty (Elliott, 1990, p. 
96). As Hainsworth notes, the unionist parties reject what they perceive 
to be "an abuse of European institutions" and depict the European 
Community as a "sinister backcloth to Anglo-Irish discussions" (1981, p. 
10). Thus Paisley stated in 1981 that:
It is already noticeable how much of the EC's aid is channelled 
to cross-border schemes ... The evil genius of political and 
economic integration that m otivates the Common M arket can 
be seen at work in the Dublin talks (Hainsworth, 1981, p. 10).
In the 1975 referendum , Paisley "dubbed the Virgin M ary" as the 
'M adonna of the Common Market'" (Hainsworth, 1989, p. 56). Similarly, 
in the 1979 direct elections to the EP, the DUP's campaign centred on 
the use of anti-Catholic rhetoric and an anti-EC stance. Yet Paisley, the
wDUP candidate, pledged to gain as much material benefit from the EC 
as possible and to use the European Parliament to defend the Unionist 
position whenever necessary. As regards cross-border co-operation, 
Paisley was opposed to any contacts with the Republic of Ireland.
In their approach to cross-border initiatives, the DUP and UUP 
exhibit slightly different approaches. The DUP is and has been more 
suspicious of EC sponsored schemes and their possible implications 
for a unified Ireland (Hainsworth, 1981, p. 9). Hence, in 1979, the UUP 
was in favour of cross-border drainage schemes, bu t the DUP was 
deeply opposed to such schemes (Hainsworth, 1979, p. 475). However, 
both parties fear that the other will out-do it in the battle for unionist 
support (Hainsworth, 1989, p. 59). Thus, the UUP's approach to cross- 
border co-operation has not been as enthusiastic as that of the SDLP. 
N or has Sinn Fein 's approach to EC-induced cross-border co­
operation been overwhelming.
Sinn Fein believes the EC underm ines Irish sovereignty  
(Hainsworth, 1990, p. 91). Thus, in its 1992 election manifesto, the 
promising section titled "The European Dimension" is little more than a 
repetition of an oft-repeated Sinn Fein theme, namely that international 
organisations should be used to whip up international support for the 
Sinn Fein cause. In deference to the climate of European integration, 
Sinn Fein refers to the "the economic restructuring contained within EC 
integration after 1992" (Sinn Fein, 1992, p. 15). However, it continues:
The stated aim of both processes is to remove artificial barriers 
and restrictions on the movement of people and goods. German 
unification is underway. The partition of Ireland ... needs to be 
addressed in the same way (ibid).
Thus, Sinn Fein concludes that "the po litical and  econom ic 
transformation of Europe" is a chance for Ireland to resolve "its British 
problem  and em bark on a process of econom ic and political 
reunification..." (ibid).
This novel approach to European integration entails approving 
of the removal of artificial borders, bu t only so that the cause of 
nationalism  can be advanced. Hence, Sinn Fein suppo rts  the 
streng then ing  of in ternational co-operation, b u t only  betw een 
sovereign states (Arthur and Jeffrey, 1988). It emphasises the need to 
preserve Ireland 's neutrality policy and to protect Irish economic 
interests. Unlike the SDLP, Sinn Fein is opposed to supranationalism.
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Thus, only the SDLP, Fianna Fail and Fine Gael are unequivocal 
supporters of an integrated Europe. The question is w hether DUP, 
UUP and Sinn Fein attitudes to the EC have altered in the aftermath of 
the SEA and as a result of the EC upgrad ing  common interests 
between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland? The reaction of 
MEPs and local councillors to the 1992 initiative will now be examined.
iii. Irish/Northern Irish MEPs and the European Parliament
There are m ultiple indicators of MEP cross-border co-operation:
• MEPs from Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland defend 
each other's economic interests at EP plenary sessions and at 
committee meetings.
• Irish and Northern Irish MEPs co-operate in draw ing up  joint 
resolutions.
• Irish /N orthern  Irish MEPs co-operate by m eeting together to 
establish a joint position on certain policy matters.
• Irish /N o rth ern  Irish MEPs co-operation is reflected by the 
rhetoric of MEPs at EP plenaries and, of course, by their rhetoric 
and that of their officials when interviewed. Do they support 
endeavours to deepen regional cross-border co-operation?
As has been the case in previous chapters, the evidence cuts 
both ways. I begin by examining the case that the EC has not affected 
MEP cross-border co-operation.
The Absence of MEP Co-operation
There are num erous reasons why the EP's effect on Irish /N orthern  
Irish party political co-operation appears to be limited. First, the dual 
m andate, whereby MEPs are also national MPs, m eans that m any 
MEPs have little time to spend in the EP, w hether they w ould co­
operate there or not. Second, even when Irish and Northern Irish MEPs 
do attend the EP plenaries, there is little evidence of cross-border 
Irish/N orthern  Irish co-operation.
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Attendance at the European Parliament
Because MEPs are often members of their national parliam ents, they 
do not have time to concentrate on EP activities. This problem  is 
accentuated for the DUP and SDLP MEPs. Both Hum e and Paisley are 
leaders of their political parties. Their burden of work is larger than that 
of the average MEP who is a m ember of national parliam ent. This 
burden is reflected by one's first impression upon reading EP debates, 
namely that Irish MEPs and also Jim Nicholson appear to make more 
interventions than either Hume or Paisley.
Nicholson's burden of constituency work is lighter, because he is 
not an MP. Thus, he has more time to spend at EP comm ittee and 
plenary sessions. It is estimated that he attends about 90 per cent of all 
committee meetings, whereas Paisley attends far less:
Paisley is an infrequent attender at anything. He records his 
opinion, although not there (Interview, European Parliam ent, 
June, 1993).
Obviously, scope for cross-border co-operation at EP level is 
limited if attendance is poor at EP meetings. At committee meetings, 
for example, "MEPs just make their views known to the co-ordinator" 
(Interview, European Parliament, June 1993). Thus, work is channelled 
th rough  the EP political groups. Indeed , one M EP's officer 
concentrated m uch m ore upon the contacts established betw een 
Hum e and the EP's Socialist group, than those between Hum e and his 
fellow N orthern Irish MEPs (Interview, European Parliam ent, June 
1993). It appears, then, that co-operation betw een MEPs, even when 
they are present at EP meetings, is limited.
Unlike other actors in previous chapters, MEP representatives 
d id  not cite actual examples of formal or inform al co-operation. 
D iscussions of the EP and cross-border co-operation assum ed a 
general air. One in terview ee talked about the Socialist G roup 
(Interview, European Parliament, 31.3.93). Another talked about the 
general atmosphere in the EC and how that required a different m ind 
set from Northern Irish politics (Interview, European Parliament, July 
1992), but he did not expand his point. N o one provided concrete 
examples of cross-border co-operation betw een N orthern  Irish and
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Irish MEPs. Moreover, there is evidence that suggests that the co­
operation between those MEPs who do attend EP meetings, is limited.
Co-operation at plenary and committee meetings
There are four types of evidence w hich appear to im ply that 
Irish /N o rth ern  Irish cross-border co-operation at EP plenaries is 
lim ited, even w hen MEPs attend. First, MEPs from the Republic of 
Ireland rarely support or advance N orthern  Irish interests at EP 
plenaries and vice versa. Second, whereas Irish, SDLP and UUP MEPs 
show concern for Northern Irish and Irish Structural Funds receipts, 
Paisley's concern is not as consistently exhibited at EP plenary sessions. 
Third, Ian Paisley has chosen to use the EP to prom ote DUP opinion. 
He has brought sectarian rhetoric into EP discussions. Fourth, unionists 
have traditionally refused to discuss Northern Irish political m atters in 
the EP. I will now examine each of these factors.
At EP plenaries, it is rare that an Irish MEP refers to shared 
interests between N orthern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Yes, 
Irish MEPs are aware of the significance of the Structural Funds, the 
CAP reform and the creation of the SEM. However, the logic of cross- 
border co-operation is not acknowledged in EP plenaries. Irish MEPs 
frequently make the case for increased regional aid, for the protection 
of Irish farmers and for an improved EC tourism policy. However, they 
do not refer to their common interest with N orthern Ireland in this 
regard.
Most strikingly, in the afterm ath of the M aastricht Treaty 
discussions, Nicholson pleaded for inclusion of Northern Ireland in the 
new  Cohesion Fund:"O bjective One areas not included  in the 
Structural Funds will now be placed at a trem endous disadvantage to 
other parts of the comm unity".5 Irish MEPs did not comm ent upon 
N o rth ern  Ire lan d 's  exclusion. As in p rev ious chap ters, Irish  
representatives actors appear to have a set of priorities which does not 
include Northern Ireland.
Similarly, Northern Irish MEPs do not advance the interest of the 
Republic of Ireland in p lenary  m eetings. An exception to this 
contention is H um e's report of 1987. In this report, Hum e set out a 
regional framework for Irish administration of EC regional policy aid.
5 Nicholson, J., Debate of the European Parliament, No. 3-426/99, 19.1.93.
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The report was greeted warmly by the Irish MEPs. Paisley and Taylor, 
in contrast, did not take part in the debate. Nor for that matter does Ian 
Paisley always prom ote the economic interest of N orthern Ireland at 
plenaries.
Unionist MEPs and the EP: Paisley and Taylor
Although Paisley does sometimes speak on behalf of N orthern Irish 
economic interests, he is by no means consistent in defending those 
interests. He mixes economic pragm atism  with political rhetoric. It is 
his political rhetoric which indicates that the EC is having a lim ited 
effect upon his attitude to cross-border co-operation and to the EC.
For example, in the EP's debate on European Union, in the m idst 
of Irish demands for increased regional aid, Paisley took a loftier angle:
The true future of the nations in Europe lies in co-operation and 
not in incorporation. In unity, but not in uniformity. In national 
sovereignty, not in international submergence and in a family of 
nations, not in a federation of nations.6
Thus, the importance of EC regional aid em phasised at this time by 
Irish MEPs was not mentioned by Paisley. Similarly, in the M aastricht 
debate, Paisley expressed his opposition to federal union, but he did 
not m ention the importance of EC regional aid to the N orthern Irish 
economy.7
This approach to the EC is, of course, evident in the DUP's 
election manifestoes and in the DUP's rhetorical opposition to the EC. 
Paisley displays an ambivalent response to EC policy. He participates 
in the EP, but he does not always acknowledge the EC's importance for 
the N orthern Irish economy. Moreover, he has given EP m embers a 
taste of sectarian rhetoric. Such rhetoric on a European forum  
illustrates the absence of Paisley's "Europeanisation".
There are some fine examples of divisive political rhetoric at EP 
sessions These examples indicate that the EC has not altered the 
behaviour of MEPs significantly. There are three m ain examples of such 
political rhetoric: the reaction of unionist MEPs to the Haagerup Report
6 Paisley, I., Debate of the European Parliament, No. 3 411/140, 20.11.91.
7 Paisley, I., Debate of the European Parliament, No. 3, 422/32, 14.10.92.
in 1988; unionist reaction to discussion of the Stalker Affair in 1988; and, 
finally, Paisley's reaction to the Pope's visit to the EP in 1988.
Both Paisley and John Taylor, the former UUP MEP, have been 
opposed to the inclusion of N orthern  Irish political issues in EP 
debates. In 1988, the Haagerup Report, draw n up  on behalf of the EP's 
Political Affairs Committee, addressed the conflict in Northern Ireland. 
The report stated that "it is not up to an outside body like the 
European Parliament to dictate anything resembling political proposals 
regarding the Northern Ireland situation".8
The report itself did of course make political recommendations. 
The rapporteur argued that Irish unity could not take place for the 
foreseeable future, because of the violence that would occur should the 
UK w ithdraw  from N orthern Ireland and because of the financial cost 
of unification to the Republic. A joint UK, Irish, EC financial funding 
scheme w ould be insufficient to cover this cost. N or w ould an EC 
peace-keeping force "be realistic" (Haagerup, 1988, p. 72).
The rapporteur recommended the developm ent of a British and 
Irish consensus to encourage a basis for co-operation in N orthern  
Ireland. In particular, he recom m ended the establishm ent of joint 
British-Irish responsibilities in specific political, legal and 'other" fields 
(Haagerup, 1988, p. 73). Devolution should be the aim of internal reform 
within Northern Ireland (Haagerup, 1988, p. 74). The EC's role would be 
an economic and social one (ibid).
The Haagerup Report also emphasised the importance of cross- 
border co-operation. The Commission and the Council of Ministers is 
requested to present an integrated developm ent for N orthern Ireland 
and the border regions (Haagerup, 1988, p. 7). The hope was expressed 
that the additionality  problem  will be resolved and the need to 
improve cross-border trade was emphasised (Haagerup, 1988, p. 9).
The report was deeply opposed by Paisley and Taylor. Both 
MEPs rejected its recommendations and objected to discussion of the 
political conflict in Northern Ireland at an EP session. In contrast, the 
report was welcomed by Irish and SDLP MEPs. Its recommendations 
fit neatly with the SDLP's approach to the conflict in Northern Ireland. 
Similarly, the H aagerup Report was welcom ed by the Irish MEPs. 
N ationalist and unionist reaction was predictable once m ore and 
m atched each party 's  ideology w ith respect to the conflict. The
8 Haagerup Report, PE 88.265/fin, March 12 1988.
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em phasis on joint adm inistration and  eventually  devolu tion  for 
N orthern  Ireland appeared  to threaten unionist ideology which 
desired an absolute union with the UK. On the other hand, the report's 
gradualist approach and its aim of devolution fit neatly the revisionist 
nationalist aims. Thus, the MEPs' reaction to the Haagerup Report was 
indeed predictable. The EP did  not appear to facilitate any greater 
political co-operation than  d id  W estm inster, Storm ount, or Dail 
Eireann.
In characteristic fashion, Paisley objected dram atically to the 
Pope's visit to the EP in 1988. The degree of political tension between 
Paisley and MEPs from the Republic of Ireland was also m ade clear. 
The day before the Pope's visit, for example, one Irish MEP asked if 
there was "any way we can ensure that Mr Paisley who is considered 
by m any to be an institu tional terrorist does not get the floor 
tomorrow?"9 Paisley retorted that:
Perhaps he [Andrews] would like to open an inquisition torture 
chamber in this parliam ent so that he could p u t on the rack 
those who do not agree with him or with the Roman Pontiff ... As 
a Protestant, Mr President, I have no apology to make for the 
attitude of Reformation Protestants to the claims of the Pope of 
Rome.10
On the day of the visit, Paisley did indeed make no apology, nor remain 
silent. Referring to the Pope he stated that: "His Church has been 
responsible for the torture and m urder of millions in the Spanish 
inquisition and well he knows it" .11 Paisley was eventually rem oved 
from the chamber.
All these examples serve to illustrate the constancy of the 
political divide in Northern Ireland. The reactions of the Northern Irish 
and Irish MEPs appear to be entirely predictable. Unionists have been 
opposed to joint power sharing and to joint regional arrangem ents. 
Paisley and Taylor have objected to the inclusion of political matters in 
EP debates, w hile H um e and Irish MEPs have w elcom ed such 
initiatives.
These reactions are entirely in keeping with the political views of 
each party and with each party 's approach to the EC. In this way, it
9 Andrews, N., Debate of the European Parliament, No 2-369/2, 10.10 88.
10 Paisley, I., Debate of the European Parliament, No. 2-369/2, 10.10.88.
11 Paisley, I., Debate of the European Parliament, No. 2 369/4, 11.10.88.
1®
does indeed appear to be the case that partisan  linkage politics 
characterises the MEPs' behaviour at EP meetings. Indeed, one officer 
noted that:
Economic co-operation tends to get bogged dow n in partisan 
politics in N orthern Ireland. Each of the MEPs co-operate, but 
something happens to their political metabolism when they land 
at Aldergrove (Interview, European Parliament, June, 1993).
However, despite these examples of continuing political division, there 
are qualifications to be made; the EC has shaped MEP behaviour in a 
m anner more consistent with the hopes of integrationists.
Evidence of MEP Co-operation
Co-operation between Irish and N orthern Irish political actors is a 
subtle act. We have already seen how DUP and UUP politicians regard 
each other as rivals for unionist support. Thus, each party  m ust be 
careful not to alienate its supporters by dram atic acts of co-operation 
with nationalists. Nor can party leaders be seen to deviate from their 
party ideology with respect to Northern Ireland. It is possible that the 
blunt measures of public rhetoric, of formal negotiations and even of 
private interviews conceal informal, small, but nonetheless significant 
contacts between Irish and Northern Irish MEPs.
Corridor conversations are infamously difficult to detail. They 
are not as tangible as formal meetings between politicians. There are 
no m inutes, or diary entries of their contents. Interviewees m ay be 
reluctant to disclose their contents. However, their occurrence implies 
that unionist opposition to the idea of European integration and to 
cro ss-bo rder co-operation  m ay be m ing led  w ith  econom ic 
pragmatism, either overt or quiet. In this section, I provide evidence of 
MEPs' pragm atism  in their approach towards the EC. This evidence 
falls into four categories: rhetoric at EP debates, informal discussions 
on economic matters, joint meetings between SDLP and unionist MEPs 
and, finally, Irish, SDLP and unionist m em bership of the same EP 
committees.
Rhetoric at EP Plenary Meetings
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Although Paisley has not always made the case for increased EC aid 
for Northern Ireland at apparently appropriate times, all Northern Irish 
and Irish MEPs are aware of the importance of the Structural Funds for 
the N orthern  Irish econom ies and are sim ilarly  aw are of the 
significance of CAP reform and the creation of the SEM. The Irish and 
N orthern Irish MEPs show their concern that their regions receive 
regional aid. They are conscious of the changes posed by EC policy 
initiatives.
Nicholson, for example, frequently pleads for greater protection 
of the family farm when discussing the CAP reform proposals.12 He 
believes that it is his job to protect the economic interest of N orthern 
Ireland in the EP (Interview, European Parliament, July, 1992). Similarly, 
Paisley has expressed his opposition to any weakening of the CAP 
price support system.
The problem of additionality (chapter three) is also recognised 
by unionist and SDLP MEPs alike:
The question of additionality is a running sore as far as N orthern 
Ireland is concerned ... It is not honest for the British governm ent 
to apply for monies and to refuse to pu t those monies into the 
particular projects for which they have been requested. That is 
absolutely dishonest (Paisley, 12.9.91).13
Thus, unionist and nationalist MEPs from N orthern Ireland are aware 
of the importance of EC policies for their economy. Irish MEPs are also 
active in maximising benefits from the EC for the Irish economy. All 
Irish MEPs frequently speak on the CAP reform, on the Structural 
Funds and on the plight of the Republic as a peripheral region. Thus, 
rhetoric indicates that the EC policy changes which were initiated in the 
1980s are perceived to be im portant by Irish and N orthern Irish MEPs. 
This im portance is reflected by the fact that SDLP, UUP and DUP 
MEPs co-operate with the aim of maximising their receipts from the 
EC.
12 Debate of the European Parliament, No. 3 412/114, 11. 12. 1991.
13 Debate of the European Parliament, No. 3, 498/266, 12.9. 1991.
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Informal and Formal Nationalist-Unionist Co-operation 
There is cross-party co-operation between N orthern Irish MEPs on 
the desire to receive more aid for N orthern Ireland from the Structural 
Funds. For example, in June 1993, N orthern Ireland was in the final 
throes of submitting its application for Structural Funds for the period 
1993 -1996. Jim Nicholson, the UUP representative, and John Hum e 
discussed this m atter informally: "on the plane from Brussels, for 
example" (Interview, European Parliament, June 1993). Similarly, in a 
meeting with the British Prime Minister, John Major, in the aftermath of 
the divisive M aastricht Conference, both H um e and Paisley joined 
together to m eet Major to express their discontent at N orthern  
Ireland's exclusion from the new Cohesion Fund (RTE news, 21.1.92). 
A nother exam ple of un ion is t/na tiona list co-operation is H um e's 
proposal that the EC sponsored Belfast Integrated Scheme, which was 
initiated in 1979 should be applied to N orthern Ireland as a whole. This 
proposal was backed by both Paisley and the UUP representative at 
that time John Taylor.
Moreover, the fact that Irish and N orthern Irish MEPs share a 
com m on in terest in defending  their econom ies appears to be 
acknowledged by the fact that UUP, DUP, SDLP and Irish MEPs are 
m embers of the EC's Agriculture, Fisheries and Rural Developm ent 
Committee. The Irish and Northern Irish MEPs work together on EP 
committees. Informal discussions take place between these MEPs on 
committee matters:
Corridor talks take place ... There's a fair bit of co-operation
betw een MEPs on the com m ittee (In terv iew , E uropean
Parliament, 31.3.93).
Similarly, Jim Nicholson's European Officer commented that there is 
"fairly good co-operation generally on the com m ittees" (Private 
Interview , 1993). From my reading of EP debates and from my 
interviews conducted w ith those w ho w ork for the N orthern  Irish 
MEPs, the work of Jim Nicholson at EP meetings stands out. Again, the 
fact that Nicholson is not an MP gives him more time for EC work. 
However, one officer commented upon Nicholson's pragmatic attitude, 
and upon the ease w ith which he interacts w ith his fellow MEPs. 
(Interview, European Parliament, July, 1992).
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In a practical informal sense, the EP's committee system of the 
EP provides a forum  for cross-border co-operation betw een MEPs. 
M oreover, EC regional policy has caused unionist and  nationalist 
politicians to co-operate with each other, either overtly, as when Hum e 
and Paisley met the British Prime Minister, or informally, in corridor 
chats and during flight journeys. In this way, the EC policy has indeed 
influenced the behaviour of N orthern Irish and Irish MEPs. As one 
European officer pu t it: "It's not zero sum. Here, they can have a 
disagreem ent that doesn 't mean a loss on the constitutional issue". 
(Interview, European Parliament, 31.3.93).
Thus, unionist MEPs, do acknowledge the significance of EC 
policy for Northern Ireland in practice. Although both the DUP and the 
UUP proclaim  their opposition to the EC as a threat to national 
sovereignty, both their MEPs participate in EC institutions. Both co­
operate  w ith  H um e in their a ttem pt to m axim ise EC receipts. 
Consequently, EC policy does have some effect upon N orthern Irish 
MEPs.
iv. Conclusion
There are two apparently contradictory sets of evidence regarding 
Irish/N orthern Irish MEP co-operation. There is little tangible evidence 
of co-operation either between SDLP and unionist MEPs, or between 
unionist and Irish MEPs. M oreover, MEP political co-operation is 
absent. For these reasons, partisan  linkage politics m ay indeed 
characterise MEP attitudes towards EC policy change. If so, then there 
is little chance of cross-border co-operation emerging betw een Irish 
and Northern Irish MEPs.
However, beneath this interpretation of this chapter's findings, 
there lies another world. Despite the absence of political co-operation 
and of cross-border economic co-operation, the existence of partisan 
linkage politics is not entirely confirmed. The N orthern Irish MEPs do 
n o t au tom atica lly  subsum e EC econom ic m atte rs  u n d e r  a 
na tionalist/un ion ist ideological um brella. There is a consensus of 
opinion between all MEPs (Irish and N orthern Irish) on EC regional 
policy. In other words, there is cross-national and cross-sectarian 
practical support, albeit grudging, for EC regional policy.
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While condemning the basic integrative principle of the EC and 
while claiming that the Community is evil, unionist representatives still 
participate in its Parliament and lobby for increased am ounts of aid 
from its funds. M oreover, unionist representatives do so in co­
operation with the SDLP. Hence, in a political game where there are so 
few bargainable issues and w here such little leeway is given for 
compromise, the UUP and the DUP exhibit an equivocal attitude to EC 
aid.
Unionist leaders milk the EC cow (Hainsworth, 1981, p. 12), 
whence the inherent contradiction in their response to the EC. The 
UUP in particular has confused its supporters, so ambivalent has its 
election rhetoric been on EC m atters (Hainsworth, 1989, p. 59 and 
Hainsworth, 1979, pp. 477-478). However, this ambivalence does not 
precipitate sharp grassroot cries that unionism is selling out to the EC. 
This ambivalence lifts the EC out of the zero-sum  gam e that is 
N orthern Irish politics.
The creation of the SEM, the reform of the CAP and the reform 
of EC regional policy have not created this equivocal attitude. There 
was a unionist/SD LP willingness to co-operate economically before 
these policy initiatives, for example, in 1979. However, these policies 
have increased the economic logic of such co-operation. The financial 
stakes to be won from maximising EC aid are higher since EC policy 
reform. Thus, although cross-border co-operation between Irish and 
N orthern Irish MEPs is not as evident as that between nationalist and 
unionist MEPs, there is still evidence that the EC can increase co­
operation between parties within Northern Ireland.
For this reason, the reaction of N orthern Irish MEPs to the EC 
policy initiatives of the 1980s is not a clear cut example of linkage 
politics. The UUP, the DUP and the SDLP are more free to react 
w ithout inhibition to EC policy within the EP framework. In one sense, 
the EC represents a limited normalisation of politics for N orthern Irish 
MEPs. The dramatic interludes exist, but so too do the quiet informal 
conversations on matters other than N orthern Ireland's constitutional 
status. The subject of this co-operation is the attem pt to maximise EC 
aid.
Thus, 'm oney talks', even in N orthern Ireland and even EC 
money. EC regional policy, by providing money, has indeed affected 
the behaviour of MEPs. It has not altered greatly the level of cross­
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border co-operation between nationalists and unionists. N or has it 
affected levels of political co-operation. However, EC m oney does 
provide a basis for economic co-operation betw een nationalists and 
unionists within Northern Ireland. Arguably, increased am ounts of EC 
aid  w ould  increase the chances of cross-border econom ic co­
operation occurring between Irish and Northern Irish politicians.
Chapter Seven
Political Parties and Cross-Border Co-operation 
Local Government and Cross-Border Co-operation
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In tro d u c tio n
Local councillors are in constant touch w ith their constituents. They 
reflect both their parties' opinions on EC policy and, yet, they may 
communicate their constituents practical concerns. For this reason, it is 
vital to examine the response of local councillors to EC policy change. 
In this chapter I examine the reaction of political parties at grass root 
level to the EC.
The extent to which local councillors conform to their parties 
attitudes to the EC will be examined. As in the previous chapter, the 
m ain focus of a tten tion  is w hether p a rtisan  linkage politics 
characterises the reaction of local councillors to the EC. Local 
governm ent in four border counties will be studied: Donegal in the 
Republic of Ireland and the adjoining county of Londonderry/D erry in 
Northern Ireland; and Louth in the Republic and its adjoining county of 
Down in Northern Ireland. Local representatives of six main parties in 
both the Irish and British jurisdictions were interviewed: Fianna Fail 
and Fine Gael in the Republic and the Democratic Unionist Party 
(DUP), the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), the Social Democratic and 
Labour Party (SDLP) and Sinn Fein in Northern Ireland.
Before beginning the substantive section of this chapter, the role 
of local governm ent in both jurisdictions will be assessed. This 
assessment is followed by the examination of the EC's effect on local 
governm ent cross-border co-operation. In conclusion, I will argue that 
the EC is increasing the level of cross-border co-operation betw een 
local councillors. However, there is no evidence of the EC increasing 
the level of cross-border political co-operation  betw een  local 
councillors.
i. The Role of Local G overnm ent in  N orthern  Ire land  and  the 
R epublic
In N orthern Ireland, the role of local governm ent has been closely 
bound to the sectarian divide. Unionist fear of Catholic Irish usurpation 
led to the creation of a Protestant state in Northern Ireland (see p. 42). 
Local governm ent was used to achieve this aim. Thus, PR was 
abolished for local elections, electoral boundaries were redraw n and 
restrictions of the franchise were m aintained and extended (see p. 42). 
These reforms had the effect of diminishing Catholic influence in the
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running of the N orthern Irish state in general and, in particular, of 
effectively excluding nationalists from involvem ent in m ost of local 
governm ent. The perm eation of unionist influence, w hereby local 
governm ent became merely another channel of discrimination, led to 
the reform of N orthern Irish local government in 1972 under direct rule 
from Westminster (chapter two).
A m anagerial reform  process had occurred gradually , bu t 
incompletely, in the 1960s.1 The MacRory Report in 1968 attem pted to 
introduce change to the local government system. In 1969, for example, 
local governm ent lost control of housing and health. H ealth Boards 
were established upon which a small num ber of local councillors sat, 
alongside experts and professionals. The 1972 reform  created new  
constituency boundaries. It also extended the franchise and introduced 
PR as the local governm ent electoral system. Thus, "the N orthern  
Ireland system is a product of the political turmoil of the late 1960s and 
early 1970s when change was dictated by the dramatic events of the 
troubles" (Knox, 1990a, p. 42).
The main result of these changes is that the num ber of unionist 
dom inated councils has decreased and, indeed, on m ost councils no 
one party has a clear majority. However, although nationalist parties 
enjoy a greater chance of w inning local governm ent seats, the real 
pow er of local governm ent has been greatly eroded. Its functions 
consist mainly of regulatory services, for example, street cleaning, 
refuse collection and cem etary m aintenance work. H ow ever, the 
overriding concerns of local councillors relate not to these narrow  
functions, but to the constitutional issue of N orthern Ireland's status 
and, more generally, to the sectarian divide within Northern Ireland.
Thus, in 1985, unionist councillors p ro tested  against the 
participation of Sinn Fein members in local government, following the 
Sinn Fein decision to take its seats in the political arena (Knox, 1990a, p. 
47). In 1986, unionist councillors threatened to refuse to set local rates 
and to bring local government to a standstill in protest at the signing of 
the Anglo-Irish Agreem ent (O 'Leary and McGarry, 1993, p. 253). 
Similarly, the 1989 local government election was fought on predictably 
nationalist and unionist issues. For example, the DUP and the UUP
1 For a discussion of local governm ent reform in the sixties and its 
inadequacy, see Tomlinson, M., (1980), "Relegating Local Government", 
in O 'D ow d, L., Rolston, B., and Tomlinson, M., Northern Ireland: 
Between Civil Rights and Civil War , pp. 95-119.
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continued to voice their opposition to the Anglo-Irish Agreem ent, 
whilst the SDLP emphasised the need for the sharing of authority  at 
local level (Knox, 1990b, pp. 78-79). The latter party  voiced its 
opposition to the devolution of power to local government, whilst the 
unionist parties dem anded that local governm ent's power should be 
increased. As for Sinn Fein, it opposed the media ban which prevented 
its members from speaking on television and radio and it called for 
Irish national self-determination (Knox, 1990b, pp. 79-80). Clearly, in 
N orthern Irish local government, the "absorbing concerns about the 
presence of Sinn Fein councillors and the Anglo-Irish A greem ent 
overshadow  the ro u tin e  business of p ro v id in g  le isu re  and  
environmental services" (Knox, 1990a, p. 42). Moreover, local elections 
are perceived to provide valuable inform ation on the clim ate of 
Northern Irish public opinion as regards wider political issues (Knox, 
1990b, p. 77). This predominance of wider political issues implies that 
broad party  policy dictates the behaviour and attitude of individual 
councillors. This situation is not unique to N orthern Ireland. Local 
politics in the Republic is also dominated by broader concerns.
The functions of local government in the Republic are relatively 
narrow  in scope. They include w ater supply, road safety, w aste 
d isposal, burial ground upkeep and the provision of recreation 
amenities. Control of housing and health is not w ithin Irish local 
government's competence. Many of these functions appear to be more 
significant than they actually are. For example, the key decisions 
regarding the quantity of money available and how exactly this money 
will be spent are m ade at central level. The Local G overnm ent 
(Financial Provisions) Acts in 1977 and 1978 removed the power of local 
governm ent to set local rates. In 1987, local governm ent expenditure 
accounted for only 10 per cent of Gross N ational P roduct (GNP) 
(Barrington, 1987, p. 138). Even the 1989 Programme for Government 
failed to grapple w ith local governm ent finance.2 M oreover, the 
existence of brokerage weakens local government.
2 For an overview  of the 1992 Irish local governm ent reform  see 
McDonald F., Bureaucracy Casts Shadow over Devolution, The Irish 
Times, June 5, 1992, and for an overview of the problem s of local 
governm ental finance in the Republic, see Kennedy, G., U nfair 
Advantage and Anomalies of Local Charges, The Irish Times, June 7, 
1992.
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Brokerage consolidates the weakness of Irish local government. 
'Brokerage' describes the situation where constituents lobby members 
of parliam ent (TDs) who, in turn, lobby the central governm ent to 
provide services for the constituents at the local level. In return, if the 
TD is successful, the constituents support himXher at election time. 
Thus, the TD acts as a patron to the constituents and as a broker 
between the constituents and central government. This ultimate power 
of central governm ent as a provider of favours to local constituents, 
greatly underm ines the position and power of local government. The 
im portant point to note is that national party machines dom inate the 
local elections:
Local government may ostensibly be about local issues, bu t they 
are fought by national parties ... and are seen by these parties as 
an im portant part of their preparations for national elections 
(Fitzgerald, 1992, p. 99).
In the attem pt to overcome the existence of brokerage, the 
system of city or county management was introduced in the Republic. 
Rather than  a com m ittee system , the m anager dom inates local 
governm ent decision m aking process. S /h e  controls staff, enters in 
contracts and gives or withholds planning permission (Roche, 1982, p. 
111). The m anager is also responsible for the budgetary process and 
plans expenditure for the forthcom ing year. The existence of the 
managerial system strengthens the degree of centralisation in the Irish 
local government system. Its introduction into the Republic was m eant 
to lim it the extent of brokerage in the system, for local councillors 
would be less able to pursue their own individual clientelistic relations 
if a manager ensured centralised control of their activities. However, 
according to the McKinsey Report, the manager is embroiled in day to 
day tasks and fails to plan ahead (McKinsey & Co, 1972). Thus, local 
governm ent in the Republic is criticised for failing to plan strategically 
and to think in the long run, as opposed to the short run.
The weakness of local government is a common feature of both 
N orthern Ireland and the Republic. In contrast to the N orthern Irish 
case, however, the weakness of local governm ent in the Republic does 
not necessarily imply that local issues are transcended by ideological 
party  political issues. In fact, in the Republic, local issues can often 
dominate the behaviour of the national parties, because of the specific 
nature of the political environm ent. Thus, one observer notes that,
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"local representation is considered vital to the continued success of the 
parties at national level, because of the localist and clientelist nature of 
Irish politics"' (Fitzgerald, 1992, p. 99). The situation is a complex one 
therefore where national parties dom inate local council activity and 
limit council power, but local issues often dominate national politics.
The very weakness of local governm ent both in the Republic 
and in N orthern Ireland, constrains EC reform. The EC envisages 
greater sub-national participation in dom estic p lanning processes. 
Ideally, it would foresee local governm ent as a free agent reacting to 
economic incentives for cross-border co-operation and engaging in 
long-term  cross-border in itia tives. The dom inance of central 
governm ent in both EC regions potentially inhibits cross-border co­
operation, because central government will not necessarily respond to 
local economic signals and incentives for cross-border co-operation. 
The extent to which the EC has overcome these possible obstacles to 
cross-border co-operation is the subject of the rem ainder of this 
chapter.
ii. The EC and Local G overnm ent Cross-Border C o-operation
A ccording to those who believe tha t partisan  linkage politics 
characterises party  attitudes tow ards the EC, the EC will have little 
effect on cross-border co-operation between specific local councillors. 
Those councillors w ho are opposed to a un ited  Ireland will be 
opposed to EC-induced cross-border co-operation, because such co­
operation will be perceived to be a step towards a united Ireland. In 
contrast, evidence that all local councillors are responding to EC 
policies by increasing cross-border co-operation, implies that the EC- 
induced cross-border co-operation is not subsum ed under a sectarian 
umbrella. In this way, neo-functionalism is applicable to the case of 
local government.
There are various types of evidence indicating  tha t local 
councillors are engaging in cross-border co-operation because of EC 
policy. In practical terms, local governm ent cross-border co-operation 
means that councillors are in support of cross-border initiatives. This 
support m ay be m anifested in a num ber of ways: by attending 
m eetings with adjoining councils across the border; by exchanging 
inform ation w ith other councillors across the border; by advancing 
joint cross-border programmes to the EC or national government; or
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simply by commending the cross-border co-operation approach. That 
is, support may be manifested by the rhetoric of individual councillors. 
The extent to which there is evidence of these forms of cross-border 
co-operation will now be examined. A cursory examination of local 
governm ent along the border regions provides a glimmer of light for 
advocates of cross-border co-operation. There is evidence both of the 
existence and the absence of increased local governm ent cross-border 
co-operation.
Evidence of local government cross-border co-operation:
Evidence of local governm ent cross-border co-operation falls into 
three categories: special cross-border committees which provide a 
struc tu red  forum  for cross-border m eetings and initiatives, the 
existence of joint studies and the rhetoric of certain local councillors 
w ho were enthusiastic about EC-induced cross-border co-operation.
Special cross-border committees have been estab lished  in 
both the Dundalk-Newry area (the East Border Region Committee) 
and the D onegal-D erry/Londonderry area (the N orth  W est Cross 
Border Group) to advance the econom ic developm ent of these 
economies. A lthough these committees were established before the 
EC's recent policy reforms, it appears that these EC policy initiatives 
have provided greater impetus for each committee's activities. In this 
way, the EC has increased cross-border co-operation betw een local 
councils.
The N orth  W est Region Cross-B order G roup  com prises 
D erry/Londonderry city council, Donegal county council and Strabane 
district council and it has been given im petus by the reform of EC 
regional policy and by the creation of the SEM. The group aims to work 
together for the benefit of N orth W est region as a whole. The 
argum ent is that as areas on both sides of the border in the N orth  
W est face common problem s, then, they should join together to 
develop a common strategy so as to overcom e these econom ic 
problems (North West Region Cross-Border Group, 1993). This logic of 
co-operation fits neatly w ith the argum ent that the EC has created 
incentives for cross-border co-operation by not only providing money 
for such co-operation, but also by increasing the num ber of common 
threats and opportunities faced by N orthern Ireland and the Republic.
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In this way, EC policy should provide im petus for the Cross-Border 
Group's activity.
Indeed, it appears that the EC has provided this impetus. In 1987, 
the same year as the signing of the SEA, a N orth W est Study was 
comm issioned by the British and Irish governm ents to develop a 
common strategy for the three regions, so as to overcome common 
problems. The study was partly financed by the Commission and it 
em phasised the need to build on shared strengths and to overcome 
peripherality. The study em phasised the need to build  on tourism  
po ten tia l, to foster ind igenous en te rp rise  and  to encourage  
development. It also emphasised the need to im prove infrastructure. 
Interreg provided funding for the implementation of specific projects 
outlined in the study.
In April 1993, the North West Region Cross-Border Group office 
w as o p e n e d  in D e r ry /L o n d o n d e r ry  to  im p le m e n t th e  
recommendations of the North West study. Again, the office is funded 
by Interreg. The Irish Taoiseach, Albert Reynolds, when opening the 
office with Lord Arran, N orthern Irish Minister for Health and Social 
Services, observed that:
In the new post-1992 context, there is growing appreciation that co­
operation between the two economies, N orth and South, can bring 
enorm ous econom ic benefits ... The on-going  E C -funded 
O perational Program m es are ... being used w here possible to 
advance a num ber of recom m endations of the Study. The same 
approach will be followed in regard to the post-1993 round  of 
Structural Funds (Lord Arran, quoted in Derry Journal, April 20, 
1993).
Thus, the activities of the N orth W est G roup have indeed been 
increased by the reform of EC regional policy which provided the 
money for Interreg and by the general initiative of creating the SEM.
Similarly, the East Border Region Committee has been given 
fresh impetus by the EC. This committee was established in 1976 and it 
consists of members of four councils, two from each side of the border: 
N ew ry and M ourne (constituting one council area); and Down (in 
Northern Ireland) Louth and Monaghan (in the Republic). Although the 
committee has been in existence longer than the 1987-1992 time span 
covered by this examination, there is no doubt that the chance to gain 
regional policy money from the reform ed EC structural funds has 
aided cross-border activities. As an SDLP councillor noted "it is easier
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to get m oney (from the EC) for a cross-border scheme" in the 
afterm ath of EC regional policy reform  than for a scheme that is 
specific to one side of the border only (Interview, SDLP councillor,
28.7.92). Thus, the EC provides greater im petus to the East Border 
Region Committee to develop cross-border initiatives.
The committee meets every two m onths and has engaged in 
tourism  studies, which are funded by the EC. Tourism too is at the 
heart of the joint proposals m ade to advance the economic welfare of 
the East border region. The key proposal of relevance to Dundalk and 
N ew ry is the joint Dundalk-Newry lobby currently being m ade for a 
bridge, linking the Clooney peninsula in Dundalk with W arrenpoint, 
north of Newry, a scenic point, which according to one SDLP councillor 
is "ideal for a bridge" (Interview, SDLP councillor, 28.7.92). Similarly, 
Newry council is supporting Dundalk council in the latter's lobby for an 
airport — an infrastructural aid to both areas on either side of the 
border.
The increased activity of these two cross-border committees 
from 1987 onwards and the financial help which these groups receive 
from the EC provides evidence that the EC has indeed increased levels 
of cross-border co-operation. The committees' work also involves the 
p reparation  of studies and necessitates joint m eetings betw een 
councils on either side of the border. Thus, the establishm ent of the 
committees, the resultant cross-border meetings and the preparation 
of joint studies forms the core of tangible evidence that the EC has 
increased levels of local governm ent cross-border co-operation in the 
D onegal/D erry /L ondonderry  and D undalk /N ew ry  regions. A part 
from this more tangible evidence of cross-border co-operation, there is 
also evidence from the rhetoric of local councillors that the EC has 
increased cross-border co-operation.
Rhetorical Enthusiasm for Local Government Cross-Border Co­
operation
Many councillors who were interviewed expressed their belief that the 
EC was increasing cross-border co-operation between local councils 
and that such co-operation was desirable. Thus, apart from the more 
tangible examples of cross-border local governm ent co-operation, 
there is the strong perceptual element which governs the behaviour of 
councillors. Thus, enthusiasts of the above co-operative endeavours
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note the existence of common interests between, for example, Newry 
and D undalk — the proxim ity of the two areas to each other; the 
common geographical and demographic aspects; the common benefit 
to be derived from developing tourism.
There were councillors on both sides of the border w ho noted 
this perceived existence of common interests. For example, one SDLP 
councillor commented:
I w ouldn't deride the EC. The principle behind it, that the other 
less developed countries will be assisted by the well developed 
ones, is a good decision ... With the disappearance of customs 
controls, excise duties and  w ith  harm onisation , national 
governm ents will just be a rubber stamp. That'll be great for 
people like us (Interview, SDLP councillor, 28.7.92).
Similarly, one Fianna Fail councillor in Dundalk noted the extent of 
interm arrying between citizens of Dundalk and N ew ry and also the 
extent of cross-border shopping and commented on the significance of 
the EC in bringing down border posts, where such common interests 
exist (Interview , Fianna Fail councillor, 1.7.92). Similarly, a UUP 
councillor in Newry noted how a majority of people in Newry share an 
interest in Gaelic football with the Dundalk population, how they share 
a similar lifestyle and how they enjoy trade links (Interview, UUP 
councillor, 28.7.92). The Fine Gael councillor interviewed also noted 
these common interests (Interview, Fine Gael councillor, 8.8.92).
The perception of common interests extended also to the case 
of Donegal and Derry/Londonderry. Here, one Fianna Fail councillor 
regretted the fact that for administrative purposes Donegal was always 
treated alongside Connaught in the West of Ireland, but that in fact it 
had little in common with Connaught and had much more in common 
with Derry:
[Donegal] has a totally different outlook from Connaught. We 
w ould see fishing, tourism  and farm ing as im portant. In 
Connaught, farming comes first (Interview, Fianna Fail councillor,
12.8.92).
This councillor observed that Donegal and D erry /L ondonderry  
councils enjoyed good and close relations and cited the N orth West 
study as evidence of cross-border co-operation.
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S im ila rly , b o th  SDLP a n d  D U P c o u n c illo rs  on 
D erry /L ondonderry  council expressed support for cross-border 
endeavours:
With barriers down, I don 't see anything wrong with commercial 
companies co-operating ... Nobody m inds as long as there are 
no po litica l overtones (In terv iew , D e rry /L o n d o n d e rry  
councillor, 5.1.93).
The above DUP councillor spoke of how members of the new Europe 
m ust learn from each other and adapt to the m odem  world. Similarly, 
the SDLP councillor who was interviewed observed that:
You get a consensus [between the parties] for any kind  of 
funding ... There is a fair degree of consensus at this stage. In the 
early days, unionists were restrained about the EC. They were 
certainly "iffy" about w hat the SDLP does [lobbying for greater 
EC competence in certain areas] ... The change in the Structural 
Funds has helped (Interview, SDLP councillor, 5.1.93).
This SDLP councillor also m ade another significant point. For him  the 
role of business communities was vital in influencing party responses 
to the reform  of the Structural Funds. The absence of regional 
governm ent within N orthern Ireland as well as the spread of quangos 
has m eant that w hen it comes to political appointm ents in the 
adm inistrative system in N orthern Ireland, people in business are 
appointed. Thus, business people have formal pow er in N orthern  
Ireland. Their attitude to cross-border co-operation thus influences the 
general level of cross-border co-operation between N orthern Ireland 
and the Republic of Ireland (Interview, SDLP councillor, 5.1.93).
Furtherm ore, the EC is perceived by this SDLP councillor to 
have an indirect effect upon political parties in N orthern Ireland. The 
EC places parties in N orthern Ireland in a new transnational setting, 
w here the trad itional notion of sovereignty is less significant. 
Consequently,
There's a different psychological fram ework. The notion of 
regionalism has been encouraged. Hum e used the term  a few 
years ago. Unionists cried out that he m eant one Irish region. 
Now they use the term themselves (Interview, SDLP councillor, 
5.1.93).
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Thus, there is evidence of two types of EC-induced cross-border 
co-operation: first, co-operation w hich is m ore tangible — joint 
meetings of councils, cross-border projects funded by the EC's regional 
fund, since its reform in 1988, and of course, joint studies and, second, 
there is evidence of more abstract co-operation — the perception that 
common interests exist. This perception is not necessarily caused by 
the EC, but w hat is important in the context of this thesis is that the role 
of the EC and of EC regional policy are recognised by certain 
councillors as building upon those common interests. Precisely which 
councillors emphasise this EC role — SDLP, Fianna Fail and Fine Gael 
members — qualifies the above ’optimistic' argument. The next section 
amplifies this point.
Evidence of the absence of local government cross-border co­
operation: The meaning of co-operation
The significance of the fact that those councillors who enthused most 
about EC-induced cross-border co-operation belonged to either the 
SDLP, Fianna Fail, or Fine Gael is based upon the analysis of co­
operation from chapter one. These parties have an ideology which fits 
the argum ent for EC-induced cross-border co-operation neatly. Thus 
one councillor pointed ou t that the level of (N orthern Irish) local 
governm ent cross-border co-operation was "a function of SDLP 
influence" (Interview, Fianna Fail councillor, 12.8.92). W here the SDLP 
had a majority on a council, that council engaged in cross-border co­
operation. Both Newry and D erry/L ondonderry councils have SDLP 
majorities.
Sim ilarly, another councilor no ted  tha t "generally  those 
councillors that lobby best [for EC aid] co-operated better w ith each 
other in the first place" (Interview, SDLP councillor, 5.1.93). As those 
councils which co-operated most with each other were SDLP majority 
councils, then those councils which now  respond to EC policy by 
engaging in joint lobbying activities are councils with SDLP majorities.
Thus, the DUP councillor observed that "There's a lot of talk 
about having joint boards. This idea of joint this and joint that, I would 
be totally opposed to it" (Interview, DUP councillor, 5.1.93). For this 
councillor business co-operation was acceptable, but a joint board to 
adm inister over a particular functional area was construed as being a
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form of political cross-border co-operation and consequently was 
deemed to be out of hand.
Similarly, whilst SDLP councillors in Newry were up-beat in their 
perception of EC activity in the area, the UUP councillor in N ew ry 
exhibited a starkly d ifferent a ttitude. A lthough this councillor 
m entioned  the East Border Region C om m ittee, he expressed  
ignorance of its activities and advised that the interviewer speak to the 
m em bers of the committee, rather than  him self (Interview , UUP 
councillor, 28.7.92). This advice highlights a problem which is common 
to the findings of the previous chapters, nam ely, that often the 
interviewees in D undalk /N ew ry  were aware of EC-induced cross- 
border initiatives only because they themselves were directly involved 
in such initiatives. Thus, in a relatively small town such as Newry, the 
UUP councillor had little knowledge of cross-border activities, because 
he was not on the appropriate committee. There was little evidence of 
spillover between the East Border Region Committee and the council 
as a whole. This absence of spillover is not necessarily a function of the 
sectarian divide in Northern Ireland. It reflects the planning systems in 
both areas, w here there is lim ited co-ordination of activity.3 For 
example, one observer has noted that "theoretically 187 agents could 
be operating in the same village [in Donegal] on the same day, 
oblivious of each other's presence and the strategies being proposed 
to m eet local needs" (Barrington, quoted  in N orth-W est Study, 
Background Report, 1990, para. 709). Yet, the SDLP councillor 
interviewed was not a member of the East Border Region Committee 
either, but, as was show n above, this councillor repo rted  the 
Committee's activities fully. This fact leads to the argum ent that the 
unionist perspective heightens the Unionist councillors' insularity.
This argum ent is supported by the UUP councillor's attitude to 
the EC in Newry. In contrast to the SDLP councillor's rhetoric, the UUP 
m ember argued that "there’s not much EC presence here" (Interview, 
UUP councillor, 28.7.92). W hether or not this view  is an accurate 
depiction of EC activity in Newry (after all, the examples of EC activity, 
cited above, are not numerous), what is notew orthy is that the SDLP 
and UUP councillors have a different perception of this activity. The 
difference runs deep. Thus, the UUP councillor claimed that: "the EC
3 North-West Study, Final Report, (1990), op.cit., p. 52.
205
brought money, but people would rather reach into their own pockets" 
(Interview, UUP councillor, 28.7.92). He added,
I don 't m ind trading , bu t let it stop at that. The Republic 
shouldn 't have any say ... Will the EC weaken the link [with 
Britain]? It w ould  m ake me reserved about taking EC aid, 
because we don't know if it will weaken the link (Interview, UUP 
councillor, 28.7.92).
It is clear, then, that there is evidence that the EC's impact is less 
obvious upon those w ho are opposed to a united  Ireland and that 
those who support the concept of a united Ireland greet EC-induced 
cross-bo rder co -opera tion  m ore en thusiastica lly . T here is a 
qualification to this statement, however, namely, Sinn Fein. The unionist 
argum ent of EC-induced "unity through the back door" would be all the 
m ore compelling if Sinn Fein also embraced the EC with the SDLP's 
warmth. However, Sinn Fein's response to the EC, at the time of writing, 
has been markedly different from that of the SDLP.
Again there is little evidence that Sinn Fein councillors diverge 
from the party line in their response to EC regional policy. Thus, the 
Sinn Fein councillor in N ew ry began by supporting the EC endeavours: 
"Further co-operation obviously makes sense, because its going back 
to the pre-1921 situation" (Interview, Sinn Fein councillor, 28.7.92). 
However, there followed a list of complaints about EC activity. The 
prim ary criticism made by the above Sinn Fein councillor was that no 
industry was located on the border and that tourism was not a sensible 
investm ent option, because it is dependent on w eather, on o ther 
countries economic well-being and because it involves low-paid staff. 
The EC, it was argued, was investing mainly in tourism (Interview, Sinn 
Fein councillor, 28.7.92). A second point which was m ade was that the 
removal of customs barriers in fact underm ined the economic interests 
of the border communities, because the black economy was a rich 
source of income for border area dw ellers (Interview, Sinn Fein 
councillor, 28.7.92).
Another argum ent m ade by the Sinn Fein councillor was that 
the EC should help resolve the conflict by putting  pressure on the 
British governm ent to w ithdraw  from N orthern Ireland. The internal 
solution supported  by the SDLP (w hereby the com m unities in 
Northern Ireland are reconciled) will not work.
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This state was not built to deliver equality. The British are 
playing the role of referee, but they could resolve the conflict. 
The EC and the UN would realise that. I don't know if they have 
long-term ambitions to make the UK do that, bu t you’re only 
delaying the inevitable by ten years. We should play a stronger 
hand now (Interview, Sinn Fein councillor, 28.7.92).
Sinn Fein policy is revealed in the above statement. The emphasis is on 
Britain as the root cause of the conflict and on the need for a speedy 
resolution of the conflict. The SDLP approach of supporting power- 
sharing  and aim ing for the g radual reconciliation of the tw o 
communities in Northern Ireland is also perceived to be too slow and 
doomed to failure as long as Ireland is not united. Similarly, the EC's 
role in resolving conflict by advancing cross-border co-operation is 
argued to be m inimal and also to be too slow. Its only potential 
positive role is to remove the British presence from Ireland.
N or is the concept of European integration perceived to be 
desirable by the Sinn Fein councillor
I wouldn't like the EC to reach the supranational level ... Ireland 
is very lim ited and small. It w ould be a m istake to lose 
independence to the EC, having fought for it (Interview, Sinn 
Fein councillor, 28.7.92).
Similarly, a Sinn Fein councillor in Dundalk was sceptical of the EC and 
was tied so m uch to the traditional nationalist approach that the 
interview barely centred upon the EC at all, but moved in mechanical 
fashion to the main plank of Sinn Fein policy: rem oving the British 
presence. Again, the emphasis (when the EC did receive a m ention 
from the councillor) was on the need for immediate action (Interview, 
Sinn Fein councillor, 1.7.92). The response to the EC belied an 
impatience: "You're getting an awful lot of talk about jobs. Where is it? ... 
W hen I see something concrete, I'll have an opinion" (Interview, Sinn 
Fein councillor, 1.7.92).
Therefore, the EC does not appear to have altered  the 
perspective of those councillors w ho w ere interview ed from the 
extremist parties. This fact would seem to confirm the argum ent that 
the EC can have little effect in a deep and bitter ethnic conflict (O'Leary, 
1990, p. 21). However, as the concluding section will show, there are 
different ways of interpreting the findings of this case study. N ot all 
these interpretations are negative.
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iii. Conclusion
On one level, the above findings bear the familiar trappings of national 
and sectarian politics and confirm the argum ent that the EC's role in 
N orthern Ireland is yet another example of linkage politics. In other 
words from an examination of Fianna Fail, Fine Gael, DUP, UUP and 
SDLP councillors reaction to EC-induced cross-border co-operation, it 
appears that "political party  attitudes are then quite predictable" 
(Hainsworth, 1990a, p. 9) and councillors do not diverge from party 
policy. Consequently, local governm ent cross-border co-operation, 
m easured either by behaviour or rhetoric, is limited. Yet, as the next 
paragraphs show, the actual behaviour of the parties towards the EC's 
contradicts their rhetoric. Thus, there is scope for the EC to increase 
local government's cross-border co-operation.
It is arguable that the EC's effect on the Northern Irish parties is 
not a predictable one and that the prospect of increased aid from its 
regional funds pulls the DUP, the UUP and Sinn Fein into ambivalent 
waters. The UUP councillor, for example, preferred the prospect of 
"reaching into his own pocket" to that of receiving EC aid, if such 
receipt meant a united Ireland. He commended the performance of the 
local UUP MP in doing favours for the constituency and for providing a 
vital link with Belfast (Interview, UUP councillor, 28.7.92). There was a 
resolute satisfaction with how the system operated and a confidence 
that, if N orthern Ireland did reach 'into its own pocket', the money 
would be there. Yet, the DUP councillor observed that he was "not 
happy with Europe, but while we're in it, we've got to milk the system" 
(Interview, DUP councillor, 5.1.93).
U nionist leaders milk the EC cow, w hence the inherent 
contradiction in their response to the EC. The Sinn Fein councillors 
who were interviewed were also ambivalent in their approach to the 
EC, as is the Sinn Fein party. Thus, the councillors could not oppose EC 
regional policy, because such policy aim ed to erode the economic 
border between N orthern Ireland and the Republic. N or could Sinn 
Fein councillors oppose the concept of EC integration when applied to 
Ireland. Yet, Sinn Fein opposed the principle of European integration.
Hence, Sinn Fein party  m embers and councillors are caught 
between two interpretations of the EC. First, the positive interpretation 
that European integration means Irish integration and, second, the 
negative in terp reta tion  m eans that Irish in tegration  w ithin  an
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integrated European superstate is meaningless. The point is that it is 
ideologically difficult for Sinn Fein to object to EC regional policy, just 
as it is practically difficult for the UUP and the DUP to object to it. Thus, 
the N ew ry Sinn Fein councillor sta ted  tha t EC cross-border 
endeavours were good in that they aimed to bring Ireland back to its 
pre-partition situation.
The implications of this Sinn Fein ambivalence again depend 
upon greater amounts of EC finance existing and also upon the efficacy 
of EC policy. Sinn Fein argues that EC regional policy in Ireland is not 
targeting industry, nor increasing employment sufficiently. Indeed, the 
N ew ry SDLP councillor who was interviewed also stated that more 
attention should be paid to the private sector, so as to create more 
jobs (Interview, SDLP councillor, 28.7.92). So too did the Fianna Fail 
councillor on Letterkenny council observe that "the emphasis of the EC 
will have to change to job promotion" (Interview, Fianna Fail councillor,
12.8.92). As long as the EC fails to increase employment in the border 
regions, Sinn Fein can continue to argue that EC regional policy, while 
theoretically having positive implications for Ireland, is irrelevant in 
practice.
Hence, increased local governm ent cross-border co-operation 
depends greatly upon the existence of increased am ounts of EC 
money for cross-border programmes and also for a w ider EC policy to 
com bat unem ploym ent. H ow ever, the argum ent of this chapter 
remains that the EC does have a potential role to play in the Northern 
Irish conflict and one which entails the increase of cross-border co­
operation. This potential role arises from the fact that there is a 
consensus of opinion between all the parties (Irish and Northern Irish) 
on EC regional policy. In other words, there is cross-national support, 
albeit grudging, for EC regional policy. This support is shared generally 
by councillors.
This examination of both MEPs and of local councillors leads to 
the finding that cross-sectarian party  support exists for EC regional 
policy. In this way, party members are found to be aware of the EC's 
financial incentives. The fact that both unionists and Sinn F£in 
members offer this practical support to EC regional policy means that 
EC regional policy is one policy area where issue linkage does not 
necessarily occur. This result, as well as those of all the previous 
chapters, will be discussed in the next (final) chapter and the validity of 
neo-functionalism will be assessed.
Chapter Eight
Continuity and Change in the Cross-Border Relationship
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Introduction
Each case study in this thesis tells its own story of the effect of EC policy 
on the Irish/N orthern Irish cross-border relationship, yet general themes 
emerge from each chapter. In this concluding chapter, I draw  these 
themes together and present the full picture of how the EC has affected 
the relationship between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic. I argue 
that neo-functionalism and neo-realism share common ground, but that 
both also have weaknesses in their explanations for the effect of the EC 
on the Irish/N orthern Irish cross-border relationship.
In the first section, I present a synopsis of the findings from each 
chapter. In section two, I present the neo-realist and neo-functionalist 
interpretations of these findings. Finally, in section three, I determine the 
strengths and weaknesses of each in terpretation and provide an 
alternative interpretation.
i. The EC and the Irish/Northern Irish Cross-Border Relationship: 1988- 
1993
The picture presented by this thesis is of an historically complicated 
cross-border relationship. Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic, while 
lying in close proximity to each other and whilst sharing many common 
attributes, have not enjoyed a close relationship and have not co­
operated closely with each other (chapter two). Political differences have 
been superim posed upon economic sim ilarities and  have stunted  
Irish/N orthern Irish cross-border co-operation.
The EC has not simplified the Irish/N orthern  Irish relationship. 
On the contrary, it has introduced a greater complexity. Thus, whilst 
political conflict continues to claim its victims and w hilst some 
interviewees had a predictable response to the concept of cross-border 
co-operation and did not separate their opinion of such co-operation 
from their opinion of the desired constitutional status of N orthern 
Ireland, others provided evidence that the EC had stim ulated them to 
engage in cross-border co-operation since 1987, regardless of their 
political persuasion. Continuity and change describe the EC's effect on 
the cross-border relationship for the period 1988 to 1993.
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The EC and Irish/Northern Irish Cross-Border Co-operation: Empirical 
Conclusions
Figure 8.1 presents information on the level of cross-border co-operation 
that exists betw een civil servants, local councillors, MEPs, business 
groups and agricultural groups in N orthern  Ireland and the Irish 
Republic. Evidence of co-operation is divided into three categories. The 
first category refers to those cases w here there is evidence of more 
w idespread economic cross-border co-operation and of a dynamic 
movement in favour of such co-operation. The second category refers to 
the case where there is limited cross-border economic co-operation, but 
no evidence of a powerful thrust in favour of such co-operation. The final 
category is for those cases where political cross-border co-operation 
exists.
Figure 8.1: EC-induced Cross-Border Co-operation betw een Irish and 
N orthern Irish Actors
Actor W idespread Limited Political
Economic Economic Co-operation
Co-operation Co-operation
Civil Service No Yes No
MEPs No Yes No
Local government No Yes No
Agriculture No No No
Business Groups Yes N /A No
For the civil service there is evidence of only limited economic co­
operation. There are areas of civil service behaviour where, rather than a 
common interest existing, there is in fact a conflict of interests between 
N orthern Ireland and the Republic. In particular, the Republic regards 
Northern Ireland as a rival not as an ally in the field of tourism. Thus, 
there is no substantial co-operation in such fields, because there is no 
perceived benefit from cross-border co-operation.
The resounding piece of evidence from the civil service case study 
is that only the Anglo-Irish division of the departm ent of foreign affairs 
and the NIO are keenly interested in developing cross-border co­
operation and have such co-operation high on their list of priorities. All 
other departm ents do not pursue cross-border co-operation and their
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representatives firmly believed that cross-border co-operation is the 
concern of those officials who were involved in Anglo-Irish affairs. There 
was also the perception that the AIA had increased cross-border co­
operation between civil servants more than had the EC.
Cross-border co-operation between MEPs was also limited. There 
was no formal economic co-operation, bu t there was evidence of 
informal corridor co-operation between N orthern Irish nationalist and 
unionist MEPs on m atters of common interest to N orthern Ireland and 
the Irish Republic. There was also evidence of a practical consensus in 
support of EC regional policy and in defence of the CAP among Irish and 
N orthern Irish MEPs. The EC was found to provide a forum  where 
economic m atters could be discussed by nationalist and unionist 
politicians and, thus, it p rovided an opportun ity  to engage in 
negotiations where the "game" being "played" by Irish and N orthern 
Irish politicians was not zero sum. However, there was no evidence of 
political co-operation between Irish and N orthern  Irish MEPs, or 
between nationalist and unionist MEPs from Northern Ireland. Spillover 
from economic co-operation to political co-operation did not exist.
In a similar vein, co-operation between local councillors was also 
limited. As with civil service co-operation, there was little spillover 
between the activities of special cross-border committees and the general 
work of the councils. However, again there was a practical consensus 
among all interviewees in support of EC regional policy. Moreover, the 
w ork of cross-border committees had been given im petus by the EC. 
Again, the evidence was of limited co-operation, but not of widespread 
co-operation between Irish and Northern Irish councillors.
The case of agriculture was perhaps the most disappointing for 
would-be neo-functionalists. Despite the common threat posed by the 
reform of the CAP, there was no evidence of cross-border co-operation. 
The UFU preferred to lobby Whitehall and to concentrate its activity on 
the NFU based in London. Trade between Northern Ireland and the Irish 
Republic was low and the main aim of farmers organisations was to 
m aintain farm incomes. There was little sign of dynam ic strategic 
thought so as to maximise gains from cross-border co-operation.
In contrast, the chapter on business groups provides evidence that 
EC policy is affecting cross-border co-operation. Businesses are reacting 
to the creation of the SEM, perceiving it to be a th rea t and an 
opportunity. The increase in cross-border co-operation is not visible
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across all sectors, but it is clearly evident in the behaviour of the CBI-NI 
and the CH. There is also increased cross-border co-operation between 
the Cham bers of Commerce from N orthern  Ireland and the Irish 
Republic, between certain sectors of business, in particular in the 
construction industry.
On the other hand, there is only lim ited co-operation in the 
tourism  sector. As for civil servants, those engaged in tourism  in the 
Republic are not keen on developing links with their perceived rival in 
the tourist trade: N orthern Ireland. However, small initiatives have 
begun to occur in the tourism sector. One individual business m an also 
believed that large businesses did not perceive there to be much benefit 
to be made by co-operating with businesses in the Republic, because the 
Irish m arket was small. However, there was a general feeling am ong 
most individuals who were interviewed that the business community on 
both sides of the border was altering its behaviour in response to the 
SEM initiative. Cross-border co-operation was part of a strategy devised 
specifically because of EC policy change.
The EC is having some impact on behaviour in Northern Ireland 
and the Irish Republic. Only in one case was there no evidence of co­
operation, namely in agriculture. In all other areas, there was evidence of 
co-operation in response to EC policies. However, in nearly all of these 
areas, the increase in cross-border co-operation was marginal. Only in 
business was the change in the cross-border relationship  m ore 
widespread. Moreover, there was no evidence of political co-operation 
occurring on the basis of economic co-operation. No spillover occurred.
In many chapters, the point emerged that the Commission has a 
potential effect on cross-border co-operation. The practical consensus in 
favour of EC regional policy underlines the Commission's potential to 
provide financial incentives to increase economic co-operation between 
N orthern Ireland and the Irish Republic. The policies initiated by the 
Commission in the 1980s have upgraded common interests between 
Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic. However, the chapter on the 
Commission reveals that it prefers to stand aside from the conflict.
There is no evidence that the Commission as a whole has a view or 
policy on Northern Ireland. Only its Irish and Northern Irish members 
focus their attention on the conflict. There is no extra money m ade 
available to help resolve the conflict or to help im prove the 
Irish /N orthern  Irish cross-border relationship. The Commission in
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general is largely confused by the conflict and follows the advice of the 
Irish and British governments. The AIA process is more fundamental in 
determining Commission policy on Northern Ireland and on the cross- 
border relationship. Logically, the AIA is thus a greater influence on the 
cross-border relationship than is the EC.
ii. Neo-Realism and the Cross-Border Relationship
In chapter one, neo-functionalist and neo-realist hypotheses were 
derived. The aim was expressed to determine which hypotheses best fit 
the case of the EC and the Irish/N orthern Irish cross-border relationship. 
It was perhaps telling that of the four hypotheses derived only one 
confirmed neo-functionalism. This hypothesis proposed that economic 
co-operation increased between Northern Irish and Irish actors and that 
this co-operation spilt over to political co-operation. There was also the 
'flux' situation where economic co-operation increased between actors, 
bu t there was no evidence of political co-operation existing. However, 
the possibility was that such political co-operation would occur at a later 
date.
Given the larger range of possibilities that confirm ed the 
applicability of neo-realism, it seems as if the dice were weighted in 
favour of neo-realism from that first chapter. Indeed, neo-realism 
provides the most obvious account of the EC's effect on the cross-border 
relationship. Three neo-realist hypotheses appear most relevant from an 
examination of each case study:
1. There is evidence of increased economic cross-border co­
operation, but this co-operation will not lead to political co-operation.
2. There is evidence of increased economic co-operation, but 
political co-operation has caused this economic co-operation. The EC has 
not caused economic co-operation. Spillover from economic co-operation 
to political co-operation does not exist. This hypothesis refers to the 
possibility that the AIA is the cause of change in the Northern Irish/Irish 
cross-border relationship.
3. There is no evidence of the EC increasing economic or political 
cross-border co-operation.
These hypotheses are applicable to two distinct levels of behaviour 
in Northern Ireland and the Republic. The first level constitutes the sub­
national actors in Northern Ireland and the Republic: business groups,
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agriculture groups, MEPs and local councillors. I call this level the micro­
level of analysis. The second level constitutes the civil service and the 
Commission. This is the macro-level of analysis.
The first hypothesis seems to fit the case of business groups, MEPs 
and local councillors. Economic cross-border co-operation has increased 
between for these three groups (see figure 8.1 and p. 142). However, to 
date there has been no evidence of political co-operation. Business 
groups did not make dem ands for a common institution to govern 
adm inistrative relations betw een N orthern  Ireland and  the Irish 
Republic. Political aspects of the cross-border relationship remain a taboo 
subject and were perceived to hinder cross-border economic endeavours. 
Spillover from economic co-operation to political co-operation did not 
occur. Neo-realism appears to be a more appropriate explanation of 
cross-border co-operation.
Similarly, the first hypothesis can be applied to the case of MEP 
and local government co-operation. Here there has been limited EC effect 
on cross-border co-operation, but in the case of MEP activity, this effect 
has been very insignificant. Co-operation caused by EC policy among 
these groups did not spillover to political co-operation. Again, neo­
realism appears to be an accurate description of the EC's effect on the 
cross-border relationship, because of the absence of the spillover. The 
second hypothesis can be applied to the case of agriculture, where there 
was no evidence of EC policy changes affecting the cross-border 
economic relationship. Thus, there was no opportunity for spillover to 
occur from economic to political cross-border co-operation.
The civil service and the Commission constitute the second key 
level of analysis in this examination of the EC's effect on the cross-border 
relationship. At this level, there is clear evidence that political co­
operation is at the basis of economic co-operation. The evidence from 
interviews with civil servants and w ith Commission officials is that 
political co-operation through the AIA is fundam ental in determining 
cross-border activity.
The EC plays a lesser role in civil service cross-border co­
operation. As the AIA is a political agreement, political co-operation is 
the m ain influence on economic co-operation. Economic co-operation 
does not spillover to political co-operation, but, in fact, it is political co­
operation which increases economic co-operation. Neo-realism is upheld, 
although I am not denying that the EC affects cross-border civil service
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co-operation. However, EC-induced cross-border co-operation is limited 
to specific program m es and is not a general feature of civil service 
behaviour.
Neo-realism, then, is apparently confirmed in three ways:
1. The hypothesis that economic co-operation exists because of EC 
policy, but it does not spillover to political co-operation is validated by 
the case studies of business', local government's and MEPs' behaviour.
2. The hypothesis that the EC has altered neither economic co­
operation, nor political co-operation is validated by the case study of 
agriculture.
3. The hypothesis that political co-operation between N orthern 
Ireland and the Irish Republic spills over to economic co-operation and 
not vice versa is confirmed by the case of the civil service and of the 
Commission.
Neo-realists can explain these results in two ways. Co-operation 
can be explained by neo-realists by examining the specific incentives for 
co-operation that each group faces and by examining whether interests 
are maximised by cross-border co-operation. Secondly, cross-border co­
operation can be explained by examining the intensity of each group 's 
political preferences. Is one group m ore extrem e in its political 
persuasions than another? If so, then overpoliticisation of economic 
issues exists.
Overpoliticisation refers to the existence of partisan issue linkage, 
whereby even economic cross-border co-operation will be opposed by 
unionists who fear that such co-operation is a political ploy to achieve a 
united Ireland. Economic cross-border co-operation is perceived to be a 
step tow ards a united Ireland. Thus, no cross-border economic co­
operation occurs.
Of course, these two neo-realist reasons for the absence of cross- 
border co-operation in specific sectors are not m utually exclusive. Where 
overpoliticisation exists it is impossible for the relevant actors to examine 
economic interests in isolation from their political preferences. In contrast, 
where overpoliticisation does not occur, then, political interests are kept 
separate from economic interests and economically rational decisions are 
m ade in isolation from one's political beliefs.
Using these two reasons neo-realists can explain the difference in 
the level of cross-border co-operation undertaken by each group. For 
example, the level of business cross-border co-operation was higher than
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that of agricultural cross-border co-operation, because the IF A did not 
perceive a need for cross-border co-operation, whereas both the CBI-NI 
and the CII did desire greater cross-border co-operation. Business groups 
perceived there to be a long run benefit from cross-border co-operation, 
whereas, agricultural groups did not, as illustrated beautifully by the 
exam ple of Irish Milk m arketing board suing its N orthern  Irish 
counterpart for calling its butter "Irish" butter.
However, apart from these different economic interests it also 
seemed likely that the UFU's political unionist tradition influenced its 
approach  to economic cross-border co-operation. The UFU was 
traditionally close to the UUP, thus overpoliticisation of economic issues 
occurred at least up until 1984 (see p. 145). Neo-realists can employ both 
these factors, economic interests and political beliefs, to explain the 
absence of agricultural cross-border co-operation.
Similarly, in the tourism  sector both the Irish departm ent of 
tourism  and Bord Failte think that they have m uch to lose from co­
operating with the NITB and the N orthern Irish civil service. These 
bodies do not wish to be hindered in their efforts to attract tourists to the 
Republic by the violence in Northern Ireland. They perceive the NITB to 
be a rival not a potential co-operator. Cross-border co-operation does not 
maximise their interests.
Neo-realists would also argue that local councillors co-operate less 
with each other than do business groups, because the am ount of money 
forthcom ing for such co-operation is small. For example, Sinn Fein 
councillors questioned the EC's effect on employment. All councillors 
pointed  to the small size of the Interreg fund, as did governm ent 
agencies, Commission members and civil servants. The benefit to be 
derived from cross-border co-operation was small. M oreover, it is 
possible that local councillors being political actors have a greater 
intensity of political preferences than do business people. For local 
councillors cross-border economic co-operation may be perceived to 
damage their political interests.
For each case study chapter, it is possible for neo-realists to 
attem pt to explain the different levels of cross-border co-operation that 
exist for each group of actors, by highlighting w hether each actor's 
interests are maximised by engaging in cross-border co-operation and by 
examining whether or not overpoliticisation of economic issues exists. 
However, the necessity that actors reap benefits from cross-border co­
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operation is quite compatible with neo-functionalism. The neo-realist 
cost-benefit analysis of cross-border co-operation does not falsify neo­
functionalism. Moreover, in the next section I show that the neo-realist 
hypotheses that overpoliticisation occurs can be underm ined by a neo­
functionalist interpretation of the results of this case study.
iii. Neo-Functionalism and the Cross-border Relationship
For neo-functionalists, common economic in terests w ould lead to 
economic co-operation which in tu rn  w ould  lead to political co­
operation. These common interests form ed a prerequisite  for co­
operation, an essential condition, which if not satisfied would prevent 
co-operation from occuring in the first place. Because of this neo­
functionalist premise, the neo-realist argument that there are insufficient 
benefits from cross-border co-operation is really just another way of 
stating that a key neo-functionalist condition for cross-border co­
operation is absent.
Consequently, a neo-functionalist could argue that if h is /h e r  
necessary condition exists, that is, if there are sufficient common interests 
between communities on both sides of the border, then the integrative 
process will begin. For example, farmers in N orthern Ireland and the 
Irish Republic need short term tangible financial incentives before they 
will co-operate with each other. For neo-functionalists if these interests 
are created, then co-operation will occur.
The situation is one of flux, (figure 1.1), where economic cross- 
border co-operation is just beginning. It can develop even in spheres 
where there is little evidence of such co-operation at this moment, such 
as agriculture, and it may well spillover to political co-operation at a later 
date. Basic neo-functionalist logic remians strong. A dd its key essential 
condition and this logic will unfold.
However, although the cost-benefit analysis of co-operation is a 
common feature shared by neo-realist and neo-functionalists, a neo­
functionalist interpretation of this study can reject the neo-realist 
argum ent that overpoliticisation of economic issues prevents co­
operation. For neo-functionalists, it is not the political conflict in 
Northern Ireland which impedes agricultural co-operation. This conflict 
is a potential constraint on all actors, not only on the UFU, yet different
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groups react differently to this political constraint. For neo-functionalists 
economic factors alone explain these variations.
Neo-realism  fails to take account of the fact that economic 
incentives can alter people's preferences even w hen those people are 
d iv ided  by an old political conflict. In this w ay, neo-realism  
underem phasises the rationality of citizens in N orthern Ireland, for it 
assumes that new information and a new set of external and internal 
economic circumstances will not affect their behaviour. Because some 
groups are reacting to EC policy, even when these same groups have 
political beliefs which have traditionally im peded cross-border co­
operation, and, because it is possible to identify the specific economic 
interests which have caused this new response, the overpoliticisation 
thesis cannot be upheld. One neo-realist hypothesis is falsified.
Any celebration of this result m ust be shortlived, however. It is 
glaringly obvious that the neo-functionalist spillover thesis has not been 
falsfied.
The Limitations of Neo-Functionalism: Political Cross-Border Co-operation
In each case study there was no evidence of the EC causing political 
cross-border co-operation. Instead it was the ALA, a political agreement 
and an example of neo-realist logic which was found to have had the 
most effect on the cross-border political relationship. Neo-functionalism 
fails to convince sceptics that EC induced economic cross-border co­
operation can spillover to political co-operation.
For neo-functionalists, the absence of political cross-border co­
operation can be explained in two ways. Either there are insufficient 
common interests between actors to cause economic co-operation and 
spillover cannot occur, or, at this moment in time, the situation is one of 
flux where political co-operation has not occured yet, bu t m ay occur 
later. (See Figure 1.1). This study takes place at the start of a period of 
change and cannot tap the eventual outcome of such transformation. As 
Community initiatives increase over time, political co-operation will also 
increase. For neo-functionalists, it is the Commission which is charged 
w ith the task of providing Com munity initiatives, so as to upgrade 
common interests between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic. 
H ow ever, the Com m ission's w eakness underm ines the neo­
functionalist case.
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If the neo-functionalist premise of common interests is not present 
in all case studies then who is "to blame" for this absence? Neo­
functionalists pointed to the Commission as "the up-grader of interests" 
and so if these interests are insufficiently up-graded, then the finger is 
firmly pointed at the Commission. The weak link in the neo-functionalist 
chain is not the existence of political conflict in Northern Ireland, but the 
Commission's weakness in the face of that conflict.
To be sure, the Commission upgrades common interests to the 
extent that it has devised common policies which offer an incentive for 
Irish/N orthern  Irish cross-border co-operation. The reform of the CAP, 
the SEM and the reform of EC regional policy all theoretically upgrade 
common interests between N orthern Ireland and the Irish Republic. 
However, the Commission has not succeeded in upgrading common 
interests to an adequate degree. For many actors, these policies in practice 
were not adequate incentives for cross-border co-operation.
The Commission also falls short of neo-functionalist assumptions 
in another way. The Commission, for neo-functionalists, was to be a 
supranational institu tion which w ould m ediate betw een national 
interests and w ould pursue the Community interest. In practice, the 
Commission does not behave as a supranational institution with respect 
to N orthern Ireland (chapter three). The Commission's weakness is 
illustrated by the fact that it did not allow N orthern Ireland to be 
included in Cohesion Fund set up under the M aastricht Treaty. 
Interviews with Commission officials showed that the Commission as an 
institution had no will to involve itself in a conflict it did not understand. 
It did not want to play a key role in resolving the conflict in Northern 
Ireland and, consequently, its effect on the cross-border relationship was 
curtailed. Thus, there is little possibility that present EC policies will 
eventually increase common interests sufficiently between N orthern 
Ireland and the Republic, so as to attain cross-border political co­
operation.
Most fundam entally, the Commission's policies do not cause 
political co-operation between N orthern Ireland and the Republic. On 
the contrary, the AIA which was signed in 1985 is regarded by 
Commission members as being the main influence on Irish /N orthern  
Irish political cross-border co-operation. The Commission was found to 
play a less than dynamic role in the Irish/N orthern  Irish cross-border 
relationship. The relative passivity of the Commission in its approach to
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the conflict in Northern Ireland means that it does not live up  to neo­
functionalist standards.
Neo-functionalism  is invalidated by an exam ination of the 
Commission and the civil service. W hereas at the micro-level of local 
government, MEP, business and agricultural activity, there was evidence 
of change in the cross-border relationship and of variations in the level of 
cross-border co-operation between these different groups, the interviews 
undertaken with Commission officials, perm anent representatives and 
civil servants were fixed in the certainty that the AIA was the main 
influence on the cross-border relationship.
iv. Conclusion: Trespassing on Borders?
The case studies in this thesis falsify the neo-functionalist assumption 
that the Commission is supranational and that it is a dynamic force in the 
Irish /N orthern  Irish relationship. Spillover has not occured. On this 
basis, neo-realism has the upper hand in explaining the EC's effect on the 
Irish /N orthern  Irish relationship. As long as the Commission does not 
upgrade common interests between Northern Ireland and the Republic 
to an adequate degree, neo-functionalism is falsified.
The identification of two distinct levels of behaviour in this thesis 
means that the EC and the AIA can work together in a complementary 
fashion. There is evidence that overpoliticisation of economic issues does 
not occur at grass root level if sufficient incentives for cross-border co­
operation  exist. The fact that the AIA is a political agreem ent 
autom atically  politicises its endeavours to increase cross-border 
economic co-operation. In contrast, the EC as a detached agent has a freer 
hand to improve the cross-border economic relationship. Thus, both the 
AIA and the EC are geared tow ards d ifferent aspects of the 
Irish /N orthern  Irish cross-border relationship. Neo-functionalism has 
proved helpful in clarifying the EC's effect on one such specific aspect — 
the behaviour of sub-national actors.
At the start of this thesis, it seemed likely that I would find little 
of interest in an examination of cross-border co-operation. The task 
ahead was clear cut and the intention of falsifying neo-functionalism 
seemed easy enough. Conflict and deep-felt emotion in Northern Ireland 
w ere the constants, the 'dreary steeples', the eternal battlefield. The 
image of a place immune to change and implicitly of a people prone to
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irrational hatred implied that the EC w ould have little im pact on 
behaviour. Some also wondered w hether I should bother with neo­
functionalism at all.
H ow ever, this exam ination  of the EC's effect on the 
Irish /N orthern  Irish cross-border relationship shows that not all neo­
functionalist assumptions are whimsical. Continuity and change m ark 
the cross-border relationship, for the period 1988 to 1993. Although this 
change is small, it has occurred because of EC policy. For this reason, this 
study is im portant for neo-functionalists. If neo-realism and realism are 
described as constituting a philosophical disposition, then this study 
show s how  that realist disposition is overly pessim istic about the 
possibility of co-operation in a politically conflictual setting.
It is true that the conflict in Northern Ireland continues unabated, 
even if there are apparent signs in late 1993 of a peace process being 
initiated. However, despite the limitations of neo-functionalism, I have 
discovered that a pocket of "normality" in the cross-border relationship 
already exists in some sectors and that the EC has played a role in 
fostering it. Can the EC trespass on the psychological and political 
borders which divide nationalists and unionists? If pressed to answer 
this question, I could only reply as Chairman Mao did when asked to 
assess the impact of the French Revolution, 'I t 's  too early to tell".
APPENDIX ONE
Methodology
Choice of Organisations Examined
Much of the information in this thesis is obtained from interviews w ith key 
actors in N orthern Ireland and the Irish Republic. The choice of which 
groups of actors to interview was governed by who m ight be expected to 
respond to the SEM, to the reform of EC regional policy and to the CAP 
reform. Neo-functionalists emphasise the role of economic interests in 
reacting to economic incentives for co-operation. Thus, I decided to examine 
the response of the business community and the agricultural community to 
EC policy initiatives.
At the same time, economic co-operation under the aegis of EC 
Special Programmes necessitates administrative co-operation. Consequently, 
I examine civil service cross-border co-operation. As neo-functionalists 
propose that economic co-operation spills over to political co-operation, it is 
necessary also to examine political actors in Northern Ireland and the Irish 
Republic. I examine the response of MEPs, two of whom in the N orthern 
Irish case are leaders of the DUP and the SDLP. I also examine the response 
of local councillors in four border regions to the EC.
Obviously, an examination of MEPs and of local councillors is not an 
exhaustive study of political co-operation. However, given the slow pace of 
change in Northern Ireland, I am assuming that spillover, if it occurs, will 
occur very slowly. Consequently, I have chosen to study those political 
actors who m ight be expected to react m ost quickly to economic co­
operation, if it exists. Local councillors are assumed to be in a position to 
recognise more quickly than party head office, EC incentives for cross- 
border co-operation, because they are in constant touch w ith their local 
communities in the border areas. They are in a position to judge at first hand 
the effect of EC policy on those border areas. Similarly, Irish and Northern 
Irish MEPs, by participating in a transnational forum (the EP), may be more 
rem oved from the ideological divisions which separate them at home. I 
assum e that if political co-operation is emerging it will appear betw een 
MEPs in Brussels and Strasbourg.
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There are groups of actors I have not examined, for example, the trade 
unions. Unfortunately, it was not logistically possible to include all groups 
of actors. The final decision of who to interview for each case study rested on 
certain assumptions. I explain these assumptions in each case study.
Choice of Individuals Examined
My choice of which particular individuals to interview was governed by my 
attem pt to interview a representative sample of each group of actors. Where 
possible, I interview ed individuals w ith particular responsibility for or 
interest in the three policy areas: agriculture, tourism and transport. It was 
also useful to interview actors who were not specifically involved in any of 
these areas, but who had a general interest in local economic and political 
conditions. Consequently, I interviewed local councillors w ho w ere not 
m em bers of any cross-border committees, so as to determ ine the more 
general effect of EC policy.
I attem pted to interview Northern Irish and Irish officials who held 
equivalent positions in equivalent organisations, for example, the Irish and 
N orthern Irish chairmen of the Irish and Northern Irish tourist boards. In the 
case of the Commission, I interviewed those Commission officials who were 
responsible for EC initiatives w ith respect to N orthern Ireland and the 
Republic of Ireland.
Sixty six people w ere in terv iew ed in total. For reasons of 
confidentiality, the names of these interviewees are not disclosed in this 
thesis. However, a record has been kept of each interview which indicates 
who has provided each of the direct quotes and other information. A list of 
interviewees has been forwarded to the qxternal and internal examiners of 
this thesis.
Interview Format
I conducted semi-structured interviews with each actor for each case study. 
These interviews began with general questions, for example, "What common 
interests do you think exist between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic 
in the transport sector?" As the interview  progressed m ore probing 
questions were asked in response to each interviewees specific statements.
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These questions related to existence of conflicts of interest and  to the 
question of how the EC had, or had not, provided incentives for cross-border 
co-operation. Many questions were not pre-planned.
In general, the information given by an interviewee in one group of 
actors was confirmed by h is /h e r colleagues and counterparts across the 
border. If contradictions did exist, these have been cited in each case study. I 
have been careful to base my theoretical argum ents only on information 
which was provided by one or more interviewees and which was confirmed 
by other interviewees.
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